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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the branch of computer science that
attempts to have machines emulate intelligent human behavior. This goal
is rather formidable, and, until recently, workers in the field had met
with limited success. However, research activity directed towards
reasoning from knowledge in restricted domains has produced computer
programs that often approach, and, at times, even exceed human levels
of performance. This has led to a renewed interest in AI (Kinnucan s 1984)
which has spawned buzz-phrases such as Knowledge Engineering and Expert
Sys terns
.
The recent successes encountered in AI research are due to shifts
in the philosophy and direction of conventional approaches. The older
methodologies sought for generalized increases in computational power,
and researchers strived to develop techniques that were as general as
possible (Minsky and Papert, 1974). Unfortunately, such strategies
proved to be hopelessly inefficient for dealing with the sheer
combinatorial complexity that was often encountered in real-world
problems. The knowledge-based or epistemic strategy (Feigenbaum, 1977),
on the other hand, is a pragmatic approach toward the emulation of
intelligent human activity. The approach emphasizes domain-specific
problem solving strategies over the older, weaker methods. Progress is
seen as coming from better ways to express, recognize, and use diverse
and particular forms of knowledge. The approach recognizes explicitly
the local quality of human expertise, and we are encouraged to attack
realistic problems that may have been suitably constrained so that
useful solutions are realized. The shift to the knowledge-based approach
in AI has contributed to the fast-growing sub-field of Knowledge
Engineering and the development of Expert Systems.
Knowledge is a precious resource, and Knowledge Engineering is
concerned with the tasks of extracting, articulating, and computerizing
knowledge. In much the same way as electricity is the power source for
electrical engineers, knowledge engineers view knowledge as a source of
power. They tinker with knowledge, and the appliances they create run
on knowledge
.
Expert systems may be considered to be the appliances created by
Knowledge Engineering, They are computer programs that embody knowledge
and use it to solve real-world problems in specific areas of human
activity. These programs use collections of facts, rules of thumb, and
other forms of domain-specific know-how, coupled with methods for
applying this knowledge, to make inferences. They differ substantially
from conventional computer programs because their tasks have no simple
algorithmic solutions, and because often they must reason in the presence
of incomplete and uncertain information.
Production rules (also known as condition-action , or IF-THEN rules;
see, e.g., Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981) are a popular approach for
representing and manipulating domain knowledge in expert systems. Rule-
based, or Production Systems (Davis and King, 1977), as they have come
to be called in the jargon of AI , operate by selecting rules, verifying
whether the premises or condition parts of the rules are satisfied,
noting the results, and applying new rules based on the changed situation.
Production rules are natural to human strategies of problem solving and
decision making, and this has contributed to their application in many
expert systems.
An expert system that relies on a pattern of rule-directed inference
represents an attempt to capture the spirit of human reasoning in a
computer program. This is consistent with the goals of AI research.
However, human reasoning is characterized by an ability to reason in
qualitative and imprecise terms; and this ability must be introduced
into the production rule formalism. Several expert systems (see, e.g.,
MYCIN, Shortliffe, 1976), in their attempts to emulate human strategies,
soften production rules so that partial satisfaction of their premises
are sufficient to lead to certain actions or decisions being made. In a
soft product-ion rule, the propositions that make up the premise are
permitted to take truth values in the interval ranging from complete
truth to absolute falsehood. This represents a departure from the domain
of conventional two-valued logic to one of multivalued logic. Most
theories of approximate reasoning (see, e.g., Zadeh, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c)
are founded on a multivalued logic base, and could be justified on the
basis of observation of human behavior in the real-world.
It is well-known that human experts introduce considerable
subjectivity into their decision making. When performing evaluations,
they are inclined to weigh and balance the evidence. From this point
of view, it is not sufficient that propositions be allowed to take
multivalued truth levels; but it is also necessary that we incorporate
methodologies for combining these truth values, so that the evidence is,
indeed, weighed and balanced.
The combination of the separate pieces of evidence, provided by
individual propositions contained in premises of production rules, is
distinctly non-linear, and requires raeta-level descriptions of knowledge.
It is a fact that some propositions are more important than others, and
would, therefore, carry greater weights in the evaluation of a premise.
This deeper information concerning the relative weights of propositions
might be a significant feature of domain-specific know-how. The essential
characteristic of an expert, perhaps, is that he possesses accurate
conceptions of these weights. Doubtless, these a priori notions usher
in the subjectivity that sways his evaluations. As knowledge engineers,
we must look toward ways to express, represent, and use this meta-level
knowledge in synthetic models of human reasoning. In doing so, we are
able to introduce the non-linear and subjective aspects of human expertise
into the framework of mechanistic decision making.
The objective of the present work is to develop a methodology for
the combination of evidence in the production rule formalism. This
methodology must model effectively the subjectivity that is a feature
of human evaluative strategies, and will be applied to the problem of
classification of milled rice grain.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY
Any methodology that is devised for the combination of evidence
must be founded on a basic human trait. Mono tonicity is one such
fundamental concept that appears to play a major role in human
evaluative strategies. The principle of monotonicity is illustrated
by the adage
:
Given more, we feel at least as good, or even better*.
This principle accurately reflects human behavior, and has special
relevance in modeling the subjective combination of evidence.
Very often, in real-life, a single piece of evidence is not
sufficient to force an evaluation in the direction of truth or
falsehood. On the other hand, as additional pieces of evidence are
obtained, the total weight of the body of evidence pointing to the
conclusion becomes greater, the picture begins to clear, and the
evaluation becomes more certain, or, at least, remains the same. This
process conforms with the principle of monotonicity.
The present methodology focuses on the combination of evidence
in the production rule formalism. The premise of a rule comprised of
AND-connected propositions is written as a set. Each proposition is an
element of the premise set, and is considered to represent a specific
piece of evidence that points toward the action. Thus, the evaluation
of the premise essentially involves the combination of the distinct
pieces of evidence provided by the individual propositions. Since the
premise is expressed as a set, it is convenient to employ measures of
subsets of this set to quantify the relative weights that groups of
propositions, or bodies of evidence, carry in an evaluation. These
weights are the a priori notions that are used by human beings when
they weigh and balance the evidence. The combination of the measures
models the combination of the evidence provided by individual
propositions. Human combination of evidence is performed monotonically
.
The measures, therefore, must obey the same principle. Specifically,
fuzzy measures (Sugeno, 1974) are employed in the present work to
quantify the relative importances that groups of propositions carry.
These measures follow the principle of monotonicity, and for this
reason, we prefer to call them monotonia measures. This term has been
employed throughout this thesis
.
If the propositions comprising the premise are allowed to adopt
just one of two truth values - true and false, the combination of
measures is sufficient to model the combination of evidence. However,
the present methodology permits multivalued truth levels, and it is
necessary to combine these truth values with the relative weights in
a premise evaluation. The Sugeno Integral t also known as the Fuzzy
Integral (Sugeno, 1974), defined on monotonic measure space, unites
these two quantities. The result is a mean or weighted premise evaluation
that is also monotonic, and possesses excellent intuitive justification.
As will be seen in later chapters, several significant advantages
are offered by the application of monotonic measure theory in the
framework of production rules.
i) The methodology employing monotonic measures provides a
convenient foundation for expressing, representing, and coping with
the subjectivity that is the hallmark of human evaluative strategies.
ii) It offers a viable framework for the representation and
treatment of ignorance, and the conservatism that is seen in evaluations
made in its presence.
iii) The Sugeno Integral is simply an extension of the minimum
operator that is conventionally used to evaluate premises consisting
of AND-connected propositions. In fact, it will be seen that the Sugeno
Integral reduces to the minimum operator in the absence of meta-level
knowledge about the relative weights of propositions
.
iv) The methodology may be extended to admit multilevel
reasoning without any loss in generality.
The guidelines imposed by Knowledge Engineering exhort us to search
for better ways to express, recognize, and use diverse and particular
forms of knowledge. This is our intention, and the advantages gain
significance when viewed in this light.
ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
In this thesis, we employ elements of monotonic measure theory to
model the human subjective combination of evidence in the production
rule formalism. The current emphasis on the proper representation and
use of knowledge has motivated the development of the present methodology,
and in Chapter II, we review the significance of the knowledge-based
approach in AI. Expert systems are a natural consequence of this approach,
and we proceed to examine some of the more important issues in expert
systems research.
Chapter III provides the theoretical foundation for the methodology.
In order to gain an insight into the controversy surrounding non-additive
probability, we begin by tracing the historical conceptions of probability.
We go on to examine monotonic measures, and finally, focus on the Sugeno
Integral, a functional defined on monotonic measure space.
Chapter IV forms the core of the present work. We start by examining
production systems in considerable detail. The concept of monotonic
measures is introduced into the production rule formalism, and a
methodology based on the Sugeno Integral is proposed for the evaluation
of premises of production rules. The methodology is shown to offer a
convenient framework for the treatment of ignorance, and is subsequently
extended to admit multilevel reasoning.
In Chapter V, the methodology is applied to the problem of classi-
fication of rice grain. An attempt is made to follow the visual approach
that an expert grain inspector would adopt. Essentially, a prototype
10
from each class is defined by a unique production rule
s
similar in form
to a discriminant function employed in classical pattern recognition
theory.
The conclusions and recommendations for future work are summarized
in Chapter VI.
11
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CHAPTER II
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING, AND EXPERT SYSTEMS
13
Ever since Charles Babbage conceived his Difference and Analytic
Engines in the mid-nineteenth century, mankind has devoted considerable
effort toward machine-based creativity. The advent of the first digital
computers in the early 1950s revolutionized this effort, and attempts
to develop thinking machines
,
that could emulate intelligent human
behavior, seemed destined for success. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is
the discipline that is devoted to developing and applying computational
approaches to intelligent behavior. However, researchers in the field
always fell short of their goal, the creation of a genuine thinking
machine.
In the mid-1960s, AI underwent a shift to a knowledge-based
paradigm. The new approach emphasizes the power of knowledge, and has
led to the creation of a new sub-field called Knowledge Engineering.
Knowledge Engineering is the technology that promises to make knowledge
a valuable commodity, and, in recent years, research in this area has
had many major successes. Perhaps, the most noteworthy of these has
been the construction of Expert Systems. Modeled on human experts,
these programs are designed to represent and apply domain-specific
knowhow in solving practical problems. Several conventional systems
have been evaluated as performing at or above the level of human experts.
As a result, interest in expert systems has exploded in industry and
government.
In this chapter, we review the significance of the shift in emphasis
of AI research from the older, weaker methods to the knowledge-based
approach and Knowledge Engineering. Expert systems are a natural
14
development of this approach, and we proceed to examine some of the
more important issues in expert systems research.
15
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED APPROACH IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The realization that digital computers are not just fast adding
machines, but instead, are potentially capable of being programmed to
exhibit human-like intelligence has sparked serious interest in
Artificial Intelligence (AI) . AI is perceived as the computational
study of intelligence , and researchers in the field attempt to develop
computational models of intelligent behavior, including both its
cognitive and perceptual aspects [see, e.g. , Barr and Feigenbaum. 1981,
1982. ] . In practical terms , this reduces to the development of computer
programs that can solve problems normally thought to require human
intelligence.
The earliest years (the late 1950s and early 1960s) saw attempts to
solve problems that had a distinctive non-numerical flavor. Computers
were programmed to play games, compose music, solve puzzles, and even,
devise and prove theorems in mathematics and symbolic logic. On the
theoretical side, the important techniques that emerged emphasized the
symbolic aspects of problem solving. Researchers looked for structures
for representing symbolic information, methods for manipulating these
structures and heuristics for searching through them. While the results
obtained during this period supported the possibility of machine
intelligence, they could not provide a basis for solving complex
practical problems.
Goldstein and Papert (1977) discern important reasons for this
failure. The early period confined AI to the domain of heuristic search,
16
that is, the study of procedural techniques for exploring state spaces
too large to be explored exhaustively. This was due to the feeling that
a relatively small number of powerful general mechanisms would be
sufficient to generate intelligent behavior, and manifested itself in
the power-based approach. Minsky and Papert (1974) characterize this
point of view.
"The power strategy seeks a generalized increase in computational
power. It may look toward new kinds of computers (parallel or fuzzy or
associative or whatever) or it may look towards extensions of deductive
generality , or information retreival , or search algorithms - things
like better resolution methods, better methods for exploring trees and
nets , hash- coded triplets , etc. . In each case the improvement sought is
intended to be uniform - independent of the particular data base."
Experience showed that programs that relied on uniform search or logistic
techniques which were problem-independent proved to be hopelessly
inefficient for handling the sheer combinatorial complexity that was
often encountered. Additionally, according to Duda and Shortliffe (1983).
the general techniques were found to be inadequate when confronted with
imprecisely stated problems, uncertain facts, and unreliable axioms.
Today, the most fundamental problem in AI is not the identification
of a few powerful techniques. Instead, as suggested by Goldstein and
Papert (19 77), is the question of "how to represent large amounts of
knowledge in a fashion that permits their effective use and interaction"
.
It is realized that there are diverse kinds of knowledge, and the
problem-solver, whether man or machine, must know how to process the
knowledge it has. For this reason, it is imperative that the general
17
techniques of the older approach be supplemented with "domain-specific
pragmatic knowhow". Thus, there has been a shift from the power strategy
to what is termed as a knowledge-based or epistemio approach. In the
words of Minsky and Papert (1974),
"The knowledge strategy sees progress as coming from better ways to
express, recognize, and use diverse and particular forms of knowledge.
This theory sees the problem as epistemological rather than as a matter
of computational power or mathematical generality. It supposes, for
example, that when a scientist solves a new problem, he engages a highly
organized structure of especially appropriate facts , models , analogies
,
planning mechanisms, self-discipline procedures, etc.. To be sure, he
also engages in general problem solving schemata but it is by no means
obvious that very smart people are that way directly because of the
superior power of their general methods - as compared with average
people. Indirectly, perhaps, but that is another matter: a very
intelligent person might be that way because of specific local features
of his knowledge-organizing knowledge rather than because of global
qualities of his thinking which, except for the effects of his
self-applied knowledge, might be little different from a child's."
The knowledge-based approach serves to identify AI as a procedural
theory of knowledge. The view is that the process of intelligence is
determined by the knowledge held by the subject, and the approach stresses
an understanding of the operations and data structures involved. We can
discern two key procedural concerns. Knowledge within a specific domain
must be represented so that it can be used efficiently. Comprehension,
transformations, and results must occur within a reasonable length of
time
.
So the first concern is to identify and formalize domain-specific
knowledge. Most intellectual activity involves the interaction of
knowledge from different domains. Hence, the second, and essential
concern
, is to construct frameworks so that diverse kinds of knowledge
18
can successfully interact. In this view, AI embraces attempts to structure
knowledge into procedural systems that can solve complex real-world
problems
.
The shift to the knowledge-based approach, while delivering AI from
its initial forays into toyland t has contributed to a fast-developing
sub-field called Knowledge Engineering . Feigenbaum (1977) has defined
this activity as
"...the art of bringing the principles and tools of AI research to
bear on difficult applications problems requiring experts ' knowledge for
their solution. The technical issues of acquiring this knowledge,
representing it, and using it appropriately to construct and explain
lines-of reasoning, are important problems in the design of knowledge-
based systems. ... It is the art of building complex computer programs
that represent and reason with knowledge of the world."
Feigenbaum's definition of Knowledge Engineering is a prescriptive
guide for the construction of Expert Systems. An expert system is a
computer program that can help solve complex, real-world problems in a
specific area of human expertise. The development of expert systems is
the result of the shift to the knowledge-based approach, and these
programs are characterized by their use of large bodies of domain-specific
knowledge. Human experts normally possess extensive knowledge about a
narrow class of problems. It is this feature that makes it feasible to
provide a computer with sufficient knowledge so that it could serve as
a consultant for decision making.
The field of expert systems is perhaps the most active area of
applied research in AI
.
Several factors have motivated this development.
19
In many areas of human expertise, problems are very complex, and this
often results in large solution spaces. A large solution space renders
it difficult for a human being to locate all possible solutions, or
even, to be confident of a particular solution. For a computer, this
limitation is not too severe, and it can effectively search a large
solution space if it is provided with a proper conceptual methodology.
Often, the same methodology can be used to search an even larger
solution space with no significant increase in computational time.
Additionally, in domains such as medical diagnosis, problem solving
by computer also ensures that remote possibilities are not overlooked.
Otherwise , a potentially disastrous situation is likely. An expert system
could, therefore, provide reliable and thorough services, more rapidly,
and perhaps, at a reduced cost.
Another motivation is due to the fact that some tasks are too
routine for a human being to perform repeatedly. It is a good idea to
delegate such tasks to a computer. In these scenarios, the human
assumes the role of a supervisor; to man is allotted the task he does
best - thinking.
20
IMPORTANT ISSUES IN EXPERT SYSTEMS RESEARCH
The simplest and most successful expert systems are classification
programs. These systems, which are designed to be used in a well-defined
context, weigh and balance pieces of evidence for a given manifestation
to decide how it should be classified. A number of consultation systems
which are used as aids in medical decision-making fall in this category.
The expert system, MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976), is designed to provide
consultative advice on the diagnosis and therapy for microbial infectious
diseases. CASNET (Weiss at al. , 1977) aids in the assessment and
treatment of Glaucoma. PUFF (Kunz et^ al . , 1978) is being used to analyze
pulmonary function tests . Other important medical applications systems
are INTERNIST (Pople, 1975), for internal medical diagnosis; the
Digitalis Therapy Advisor (Silverman, 1975): and EXPERT (Weiss and
Kulikowski, 1979), a general facility that helps investigator build
medical consultative models in Rheumatology , Opthalmology , and
Endocrinology
.
Expert systems have not been confined to medical diagnosis alone,
and DENDRAL (Buchanan and Feigenbaum, 1978) , is perhaps the best known
system from outside this domain. It is one of the earlier expert systems,
and predicts the chemical structure of unknown compounds by analyzing
mass spectral patterns. Also well-known is PROSPECTOR (Duda et al. , 1979).
PROSPECTOR assists geologists in hard-rock mineral exploration. Some of
the other important expert systems are Rl [or XCON (McDermott, 1982)],
which is being used by Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) to configure
21
VAX computers; HASP and SIAP (Nii et_ al . , 1982), which use information
about vessels and the sea, and expertise about signal interpretation to
analyze signals from ocean sensors; and DELTA (Bonissone, 1983), which
is used by General Electric Corporation for troubleshooting diesel
electric locomotives.
Many of these systems are considered to have achieved performances
at the expert level. This success is, in part, due to the fact that
much of the experts' knowledge in these domains concern specific pieces
of information, which has made it easier to identify and filter the
necessary knowledge. In contrast, Duda and Shortliffe (1983) opine that
it is much more difficult to develop expert systems that have a more
synthetic character, such as those that concern planning or require
de novo generation of solutions. There are other basic problems that
have been holding back the wide proliferation of expert systems. We
proceed to examine some of the more important issues in expert systems
research.
Knowledge Acquisition
Building an expert system requires the transfer of expertise to a
computer program. The identification and representation of this knowledge
is complex and presents many problems. Experts often have difficulty
expressing their knowledge in the knowledge representation formalism
that is being used. Currently, the only successful method of knowledge
transfer is through a computer scientist intermediary.
Attempts to construct knowledge bases often disclose inadequacies
22
in our understanding of the subject domain. Human beings also tend to
forget , or to simplify details about their expertise . Additionally,
the domains themselves develop rapidly with time , and it is necessary
for the system to augment its knowledge at a later date.
If an expert system is to perform as well as human experts, it
should be able to learn as they do. Current research is geared towards
the development of learning systems as a means of knowledge acquisition.
A potential solution is to allow the expert to teach the system directly.
It is realized that learning is not just the accumulation of new facts,
but instead, involves the interaction of old and new knowledge. From
this point of view, it is important to understand how human experts talk
about what they know, and it has been suggested (Duda and Shortliffe,
1983), that, in the design of systems that allow for interactive
transfer of expertise, the machine should be able to ask focused
queries, and not general questions. The system must also be able to
make changes in its knowledge base, and it must do so easily, and in
an incremental or modular fashion [see, e.g., TEIRESIAS for EMYCIN
systems (Davis, 1976)]. It is, therefore, obvious that proper knowledge
representation is also an essential concern in the design of expert
systems
.
Knowledge Representation
Efficient knowledge representation is the key issue at this point
in the development of AI . Most researchers adopt a pragmatic view of
knowledge representation. In this view, a knowledge representation
23
formalism is a combination of data structures and interpretative
procedures that if used properly by a program could lead to
knowledgeable behavior. Duda and Shortliffe (1983) list the roles
that a knowledge representation formalism must assume; they are:
i) Faithful representation of the concepts and intentions of
the expert.
ii) Allow for effective and correct interpretation by the
program.
iii) Support explanations that convey a line of reasoning that
a human expert can understand and critique,
iv) Facilitate the process of finding gaps and errors in the
knowledge base.
v) Allow the separation of domain knowledge from the interpretation
program so that the knowledge base can be enlarged or corrected
without the need for rep rog ramming the interpreter.
The last three properties point toward a single, uniform formalism that
is simple and easy to interpret. This methodology has been used
successfully in many expert systems. However, recently there has been
a trend towards more complex and heterogeneous representation schemes
that would allow for faithful representation and effective interpretation
(Stefik et al. , 1982).
Lately, research in knowledge representation schemes has involved
the design of several classes of data structures for storing information.
They include logic, production rules, semantic networks and frames. The
flexibility and precision of mathematical logic make it a useful method
24
and also promote it as a basis for comparing different representation
schemes. Production rules offer a modular and uniform mechanism which
has been used successfully in several conventional expert systems.
Semantic networks simplify certain deductions (inferences through
taxonomic relations) by reflecting them directly in the network. Frames
generalize this idea by providing frameworks or structures for organizing
knowledge. For an excellent treatment of these knowledge representation
schemes, the reader is referred to Barr and Feigenbaum (1981).
Research on expert systems has benefitted from the simplicity of
using uniform representation schemes. However, significant penalties
are incurred when these formalisms are used in large knowledge bases.
Stefik et al. (1982) , suggest that future research should look into
methods of tuning expert systems by making changes in the ways they
represent knowledge. This would involve the use of specialized data
structures, knowledge compilation schemes, and knowledge transforms
for cognitive economy. Such a system could automatically improve its
performance by changing its internal representation.
Other open problems in knowledge representation include
quantification, that is, the ability to specify properties of
arbitrarily defined sets; the representation of beliefs, degrees of
certainty, mass nouns, time and tense information, and processes that
consist of sequenced actions taking place over time (Barr and
Feigenbaum, 1981).
25
Reasoning and Inference
The ability to reason is intrinsic to human intelligent behavior,
and substantial research has been directed towards the development of
reasoning mechanisms for expert systems. The process of reasoning, which
must resemble that a human expert would employ, usually involves the
creation of hypotheses and their verification by weighing and balancing
the different pieces of evidence. In a chain of reasoning, the hypotheses
are nested, and hypotheses at one level are successively used to verify
hypotheses at a higher level. We can discern two specific methodologies.
A system could either start from the goals and reason backwards to the
data, or, it could reason forwards from data to goals . Most conventional
expert systems employ one of these two strategies. The specific domain
of application and the architecture of the system's data base play
important roles in the selection of the appropriate strategy.
In MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976), expert reasoning is represented by
condition-action rules, which, while linking patient data to infection
hypotheses, also provide estimates of certainty for the links. The
reasoning process chains backwards from hypothesized diagnoses (goals).
Rules are used to estimate the certainty of conclusions based on the
certainty factors of their antecedents, to see if the evidence (data)
supports a diagnosis. All possible hypotheses are evaluated, after
which, MYCIN matches treatments to all diagnoses that have certainties
higher than a predefined threshold value. This is termed as a goal-
driven or backward-chaining inference strategy.
The expert system Rl , on the other hand, uses a data-driven
26
mechanism to configure VAX computer systems. The user initially enters
all the information about the problem, and the rules chain forward to
evolve the best possible configuration. This strategy is appropriate
because the computer configuration problem can be solved without
backtracking and without undoing previous steps (Gevarter, 1983).
A new level of complexity is introduced when the expert system
must be designed so that it is able to reason in the presence of
uncertainty
. Conventional systems cope with unreliable or incomplete
data in a variety of ways. One of the earliest approaches has been
incorporated in MYCIN. This approach employs a model of approximate
implication involving a calculus of certainty factors to indicate the
strengths of heuristic rules. Although MYCIN has been demonstrated as
having expert skills in clinical tests (Yu, Buchanan e_t jil .
, 1979),
several researchers opine that the methodology may be ad hoc, at best,
since the operational meaning of the computed values is not always
clear (Stefik et al. , 1982; Duda and Shortliffe, 1983). Other expert
systems use methods based on statistical theories. For example,
PROSPECTOR assigns probabilities to conclusions using a form of Bayes
'
rule to update probabilities as more information is obtained. The
major drawback in using Bayes' posterior probabilities is that a large
number of observations is needed to determine them. This is often not
possible, and as a result, the approach may not be statistically valid.
Duda e_t _al . (1976) suggest an alternative approach based on subjective
estimates of prior probabilities. Other methods for increasing
reliability by combining evidence are based on non-additive monotonic
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measures (see, e.g., Zadeh, 1978; Shafer, 1976; and Martin-Clouaire
and Prade, 1983); and exact approaches using non-mono tonic correction
rules (Stefik, 1978). All the approaches mentioned require the use of
meta-level descriptions of knowledge, but a general methodology is
lacking. Duda and Shortliffe (1983) are of the opinion that Possibility
Theory (Zadeh, 1978), or the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence (see,
e.g., Shafer, 1976), could be used as the basis for formal treatments
of imprecision and uncertainty.
A human expert incorporates substantial subjectivity in his
decision-making, and this feature has yet to be introduced successfully
in expert systems . Future research concerning reasoning mechanisms is
also expected to involve reasoning in the presence of ignorance , the
ability of a program to recognize the limits of its knowledge, and,
when required, engage in cautious guesswork.
Explanation
Explanation of the program's line of reasoning is an important
factor for the acceptance of an expert system. Like a human expert, the
system must be able to provide explanations about its behavior. A user
may need clarification or reassurance about the program's output . An
explanation facility contributes to the transparency of the reasoning
process, and is an essential feature of medical consultation systems.
Furthermore
,
causal explanations also help in the debugging process
.
Here, the human expert could use the explanations provided to locate
the causes of error. The specific knowledge representation formalism
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used is an important consideration, and in certain cases, it may be
necessary to augment empirical knowledge with causal links to represent
functional behavior.
Another feature of human experts is that their explanations are
adjusted to satisfy the perceived needs of the user. An expert system
should, therefore, maintain a user profile. It must assess what the
user does and does not know, and what he is trying to accomplish. This
feature is especially important for the instructional use of expert
systems (see, e.g., MACSYMA Advisor: Genesereth, 1979). Presently,
however, research in this direction is in its infancy, and these features
often create more problems than they solve (Duda and Shortliffe, 1983).
Justification and Validation
These are important factors that must be considered before an
expert system is deemed fit for general use. A panel of experts must
assess the accuracy, reliability, and utility of the system. This
would involve examining whether the knowledge representation formalism
effectively captures the experts ' conceptions of the problem, and
whether the associations represented in the system's data base are
justified. In order to facilitate justification, a useful design
methodology would relate the reasoning steps to deeper causal models
using split-level representations
.
In some instances, a consensus opinion of the architecture of an
expert system may be sufficient to validate it. However, medical
consultation systems are also put through years of clinical tests to
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verify their performances. CASNET and MYCIN have been rated in
experimental evaluations as performing at human-expert levels in
their domains (see, e.g., Yu, Buchanan et_ al. , 1979; Yu, Fagan e_t al.
1979).
The success of expert systems has led to several ethical and
sociological problems, especially concerning their use in sensitive
areas such as medical diagnosis and nuclear defence. The idea of a
computer going beserk has been the subject of several thrillers,
such as the recent movie, WarGanes . A word of caution is in place.
Expert systems must be designed to provide advice only if and when
the need arises, and under no circumstances should they be allowed
to usurp the roles of physicians or missile defence strategists.
For further details concerning expert systems , the interested
reader is referred to Hayes-Roth et al. (1983) , Barr and Feigenbaum
(1981, 1982), Gevarter (1983), and Kinnucan (1984).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The knowledge-based strategy in AI lays stress on the expression,
recognition, and use of diverse and particular forms of knowledge. It
acknowledges the local quality of human expertise, and has led to the
creation of a new sub-field called Knowledge Engineering. Knowledge
Engineering concerns itself with the technical issues of acquiring,
representing, and using knowledge in constructing complex computer
programs - Expert Systems.
The aim in expert systems research is to develop programs that
are able to provide expert-level advice in various domains of human
activity. This does not mean that an expert system is viable only if
it duplicates intelligent behavior in all its aspects. At present,
most expert systems are not able to converse in idiomatic natural
language, nor can they perceive evidence directly and learn from
experience. Often, they are not able to reason at the expert-level,
or even possess elements of common-sense knowledge. We must adopt a
pragmatic view and look toward the utility of expert systems. At this
point in time, the intention has been to solve realistic problems that
have been constrained so that useful solutions are obtained. However,
the development of high-performance computer programs is not the only
contribution of expert systems research. An equally important
contribution is the systematization and codification of domain-specific
knowledge. This often leads to new insights, and contributes towards
progress within the domains themselves.
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The past few years have seen a rush to design expert systems in
various areas of human activity. In the simplest sense, an expert system
is a computer program which contains relevant information and the
techniques necessary to manipulate this information, so that, for all
practical purposes , it could function at the same level of competence
as a human expert in the specific domain. An essential feature of human
expertise is the ability to reason, a feature that induces a substantial
amount of subjectivity. A viable expert system must model this phenomenon.
Conventional systems use the theory of probability in their attempts to
approximate human subjective reasoning.
The theory of probability has been the subject of controversy ever
since its inception. The relation of probability to frequencies is often
denied, and scholars have, therefore, broken down probability into two
distinct parts: a part belonging to the realm of randomness which retains
its relationship to frequencies, and a second part which is due to
knowledge, and is known a priori. However, the additivity of probability
has not been the subject of debate, and most discussions have tended to
re ly on an addi t ive concep tion of p rob ab il ity
.
The axiom of additivity states that the probability of a proposition
and its opposite must sum to one. Stated simply, this means that for two
independent events, the combined probability is exactly equal to the sum
of the two individual probabilities. This constraint comes about as a
result of the frequentative interpretation and should be reserved for the
domain of pure chance. While probabilities defined by this axiom would
suffice for the study of coin-tossing experiments, etc., it would seem
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to be incorrect to extend this to the domain of evidence and its
subjective combination. Non-additivity , on the other hand, implies
that the combined probability of two independent propositions could
be greater or less than (or even equal to) the sum of the individual
proposition probabilities. Given the enigmatic nature of human judgments,
it is reasonable to use non-additivity to mirror human strategies
involved in the combination of evidence, and also utilities in economic
theory.
In this chapter, we attempt to shed some light on the conundrum by
tracing the historical conceptions of probability. We go on to examine
monotonic measures (a general definition which includes additivity as
well as non-additivity) in some detail, and finally, focus on a
functional defined on monotonic measures.
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HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF PROBABILITY
The word probability is used today in a variety of ways, and
philosophers have discerned many different kinds of probability. However,
the most common, and perhaps, the most fundamental distinction is between
aleatory (Latin, aleae: die, chance) and epistemic (Greek, episteme:
knowledge) probabilities
.
An aleatory (or, objective) probability of an outcome is simply the
probability of a chance event and attempts to measure the propensity of
its occurrence. Since this concept is approximated by the frequency with
which the outcome does occur when a large number of trials are performed,
it is a feature of the objective world. Due to this relationship with
frequencies, aleatory probabilities must be additive. Epistemic
probability, on the other hand, Is strictly a feature of our knowledge.
It is a number that very subjectively represents the degree to which we
are certain of a proposition, the measure of our belief in it, or, the
extent to which our evidence supports it. There is no necessary relation
to frequencies, and therefore, epistemic probabilities need not be
additive
.
The foregoing definitions may appear to be idealized views of the
overall conception of probability, and nuances in the way we understand
probability could be used to attack them. But these nuances must not be
allowed to obscure the important fact that at least a part of probability
is a feature of knowledge and Is due to nothing else. The view that
epistemic probabilities should also be additive is deeply engrained in
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current thought. This could be the result of a failure in recognizing the
difference between aleatory and epistemic probabilities, and from a
misunderstanding of the mathematics of additive probability. More
importantly, the Bayesian theory of statistical inference has exerted
considerable influence in favor of additivity. To gain insight into the
debate on additivity, it is of interest to trace the historical
conceptions of probability.
For several centuries, the idea of chance and the concept of belief
have been united under the name probability. In this essay, we reject
the unification and use the term probability to refer to the domain of
subjective judgments and beliefs. Chance has been reserved for the realm
o f randomness
.
According to Van Brakel (1976) , the Greeks divided knowledge into
three categories: "(i) that of which certain knowledge is possible,
(ii) that of which probable knowledge is possible, and (iii) that of
which no knowledge is possible." The first two categories arise out of
Plato's distinction between knowledge (episteme: Latin, soientia) and
opinion (doxa: Latin, opinio). Since the Greeks subscribed to
determinism, the third category belonged to the realm of randomness.
These distinctions appear to have endured through the middle ages;
probability was an attribute of opinion where the random was quite out
of play.
With the advent of the Renaissance, these categories were
transformed for reasons still not clear. Racking (1975) traces the
transformation to the notion of sign> as it had been understood during
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the middle ages. The modern concept of evidence was lacking, and the
notion of testimony was extended by including signs - the testimony of
nature. Opinion was based on testimony, and a probable opinion was one
approved by some authority after observing the relevant signs.
Towards the end of the Renaissance, the connection between
probability and chance seems to have first been made in a discussion
of the philosophical concept of probability by Arnauld (1662), He
distinguished between two kinds of evidence: external evidence, or the
evidence of testimony, and internal evidence, the evidence of things. At
that time, the mathematical theory of chance was just emerging, and
Arnauld suggested that the principles of the new theory be used when
considering the "probabilities of gain and loss in everyday life".
Hacking (1975) is of the opinion that the origin of the new concept of
internal evidence in the older concept of sign was reflected in a
tendency of philosophers of the day to relate issues of evidence and
probability to wagers in games of chance. This new kind of evidence
made propositions worthy of approval by virtue of the frequency with
which they made correct predictions . Although Arnauld used the theory of
chance to calculate his probabilities, it is clear that they were
epistemic. They were known a priori and, therefore, were unequivocally
a feature of knowledge. The connection seems to have been introduced in
an attempt to lend mathematical formality to the study of epistemic
probability
.
In the late seventeenth century , the tendency to associate
epistemic ideas with chance could also have been furthered by the
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activities of the practical statisticians of the age - the demographers.
Stimulated by the new theory of games of chance, political curiosity,
and the fashion of selling annuities, many authors began using a more
epistemic vocabulary than had been seen in the early theory of chance.
Yet, none of these authors followed Arnauld in using the weightier
epistemic term - probability.
Jacob Bernoulli was the first substantial contributor to the theory
of games of chance to grapple with its connection with probability. In
his Are Conjeatandi (the Art of Conjecture), written around 1692, and
published posthumously in 1713, Bernoulli has stated that probability
is a degree of subjective certainty. The probabilities of different
arguments have been combined to produce a probability based on the total
evidence. Although Bernoulli has used methods from the mathematical
theory of chance, non-addltivity is evident, in several instances, when
the probability of a thing and its opposite do not add to one. In essence,
Bernoulli realized that combinations of arguments in the epistemic
domain were quite different from corresponding manipulations in the
theory of chance.
Bernoulli's subtle view of the connection between probability and
chance did not endure, and Shafer (1978) has discerned important reasons
for its failure. The theory of combining arguments was a prelimnary
attempt and could not be compared as a mathematical theory with the
already well-developed theory of games of chance. Bernoulli's
understanding was a bit too subtle, and his successors simplified it
by connecting his probability with the ease of happening as understood
41
in games of chance. The simplification was to some extent encouraged by
Bernoulli's own Law of Large Numbers . This theorem which plays an
important role in the theory of chance, maintains that in cases when
the ease of happening of an event is not known a priori, it may be
learned a posteriori from the observation of frequencies. Bernoulli
thought one could use frequencies to find the ease of happening of
various cases in individual arguments, the probabilities of these
individual arguments could then be calculated and combined according
to general rules. His successors abandoned his struggle with the
combination of arguments and tended to think of probability as an ease
of happening to be found directly from frequencies.
The word probability continued to have its broad epistemic
connotations after Bernoulli's death. But the connection with chance
gradually came to dominate the thinking of those who endeavored to
treat epistemic probability numerically. In the works of Montmort (1708)
and DeMoivre (1711) , the notion of numerical probability essentially
narrows to the paradigm of chance, and attempts to compute probabilities
in situations other than games of chance are seen as extensions of the
paradigm to those cases.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the synthesis of
probability and chance was complete. Lambert (1764) stands out as
the only scholar at the time who was able to break away from the
assimilation of probability in the additive theory of chance. He
explicitly recognized and sought to explain the possible non-additivity
of the probabilities of propositions, and he extended Bernoulli's rules
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for combining arguments. Lambert's rule of combination turns out to
be a special case of Dempster's rule of combination (Dempster, 1967).
Lambert's ideas did not influence the opinion at the time.
Probability and chance continued to be used synonymously, and scholars
began to learn, From Bayes (1764), Condorcet (1785), and Laplace (1785),
just how additivity worked in the case of propositions.
Almost two centuries later, we accept the synthesis of probability
and chance in the all-embracing term probability
, and have further
split it into aleatory and epistemic categories . More importantly , our
study of epistemic probability has been pervaded by a universal and
unconscious acceptance of additivity. The recent interest in AI, and
its applications in thinking machines requires us to lessen our
dependence on the restrictive constraint of additivity. For the sake
of future progress, we may have to rediscover the concept of
non-additivity introduced by Bernoulli and Lambert.
The reader is referred to Shafer (1978), Hacking (1975),
Van Brakel (1976), and, Pearson and Kendall (1970) for interesting
discussions on the history of probability.
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MONOTONIC MEASURES
Kolmogorov (1933) was the first to axiomatize probability by
representing random events as sets. According to this framework.,
probability is a normed measure defined on these sets. The measure-
theoretic treatment has provided a logical and consistent foundation
for the theory of probability and has united it with the mainstream
of modern mathematics. In this section, the concept of a monotonia
measure, defined using the same approach, is shown to include
additive as well as non-additive features . We start by defining
some basic concepts in measure theory.
Definition 3.2.1
A o-additive field (or a C-algebva) is a non-empty class of
subsets of a set X which is closed under the formation of countable
unions and complements and contains the emoty set 0.
Example 3.2.1
Let X be a finite set given by
X = {x-, x
2
, X-}.
The smallest a-field that can be generated is given by
£ = (X, 0}
= {{x
x
, x
2
, x
3
>, 0}.
The largest a-field is
£
m
= U*^, *
2
,
x
3
>, 0, {x
1
, x }, {x
3
}, {x
2
, x }, {x }, {x x },
(x
2
}}.
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I is also the power set of the finite set X, written as P(X).
Definition 3.2.2
A Borel a-additive field, B, defined on any subset of X
satisfies the following conditions:
DBS P(X) (3.1a)
ii) £ B (3.1b)
iii) If Q £ 8, then Q £ B (3.1c)
iv) If Vi £ N (the set of natural numbers) Q.E g,
then U Q. £. B. (3. Id)
ieN x
Definition 3.2.3
The Borel a-field of subsets on the real line, R, is the a-field
generated by the class of all bounded semi-closed intervals of the
form (a, b], and is denoted by B r .
Definition 3.2.4 (Sugeno, 1974)
A monotonia (or fuzzy) measure, g, is a fuction from a Borel field
to [0,1], which has the following properties:
i) g(0) " 0, g(X) = 1; (Boundedness and Non-negativity)
(3.2a)
ii) VQi , Q, £ S, if Q, £ Q 9 , then g(Q ) < g(Q ) ; (Monotonicity)1 Z L Z (3.2b)
iii) If Ti e N, Q i £ B, and the sequence (Q.). is monotonic
(i.e., Q 1 C q 2 £Q 3S....S QjS...., or, Qji 2 Q2 2 Q 3 2
=Q2 ), then
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lira g(Q 1 ) = g(lim Q L ); (Continuity). (3.2c)
Note that in these definitions, is the null or empty set, and X
is the reference set.
Definition 3.2.5
(X
, g) is called a measurable space, or Borel space.
Definition 3.2.6
The triplet (X, 6, g) is known as a monotonia (or fuzzy) measure
space
.
The concept of a raonotonic measure broadly defines most commonly
used measures. The key axiom is monotonicity
,
property (ii) in
Definition 3.2.4. This is a very general property that includes the
lesser constraint of additivity. Hence, a probability (additive)
measure is a member of the class of monotonic measures. The measure,
g, is associated with a non-located element x
±
of X. Sugeno (1974)
has called g(Q) a grade of fuzziness of set Q. It expresses an
evaluation of the statement
x^ belongs to Q
in a situation in which one subjectively guesses whether x. is within
Q (For the case of probability, the study of frequencies helps determine
the grade which is objective and necessarily additive.). Thus,
monotonicity of the measure g entails that
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xl £ Ql
is never more certain than
x
±
Z Q 2
when
h* Q 2-
It is also obvious that
Vt^, Q 2 E 6, g(Q 1UQ 2 ) ^MaxCgCC^), g(Q 2 )), (3.3a)
and
\/Qi» Q 2 e 0. gCQ!nQ 2 ) $ MinCgCQ^, g(Q 2))- (3.3b)
For the case of a finite reference set, the continuity axiom,
property (iii) in Definition 3. 2. A, is dropped. It is also
common to define the measure, g, on the power set, P(X)
.
We shall now examine some of the more commonly used
monotonic measures defined over normal sets.
Definition 3.2.7
A monotonic measure, p, is a probability measure iff
i) V i £ N, Q. £ 8 and i± i j, Q. fj Q . = 0, then
p( U Q ± ) = Zp(Q 1 ); (Additivity)
.
(3.4)
isH ieN
Example 3.2.2
Suppose we have an urn containing three balls of different colors,
red, blue, and green. The balls collectively represent a set X, where
X = (x,, Xj, xj,
x s red ball,
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blue ball.
and
x~ = green ball.
Let Q be any subset of X, i.e., Q SX, and assume that we randomly
pick one colored ball from the urn.
a) If Q is the empty set, we know that the ball is not contained
in set Q, and we write
p(0) 0.
b) If Q is the reference set, X, the ball definitely belongs to
the set, and,
p(X) = 1.
c) Suppose
Qi = {xxK
Since the ball has been selected at random, it may or may not be
contained in set Q,. Additionally, there is an equal chance that
the ball could be either red, blue, or green. Hence, we assign a
probability measure of 1/3 to set (J,, In other words, we are 1/3
certain that the unknown ball belongs to Q. . Similarly, we are
also 1/3 certain that the ball belongs to each of
Q 2 - {x2 },
and
Q
3
- fx
3
h
Let
Q4 - (*!, x2 ),
and we would like to assign a measure to which we are certain that
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the unknown ball belongs to this set. Again, since each color is
equally probable, the measure assigned to Q, is 2/3. Additivity is
inherent in the choice of measures, and is due to the element of
randomness. By Definition 3.2.7, we see that
p(Q4 ) - pC^, x2 })
• p({x
1
}U{x
2 })
• p(Q
1uQ 2 )
- p(Q
x
) + p(Q 2 )
= 1/3 + 1/3
- 2/3.
Since we are certain that a ball is either contained in a set or
its complement, we have
p(Q) + p(Q) - p(QUQ)
= p(X)
- 1.
This example illustrates two important features of additivity,
namely, the combined measure is exactly equal to the sum of the
individual parts, and, the measure of a set added to its complement
is exactly equal to one.
Definition 3.2.8 (Dubois and Prade, 1980)
A dtvac measure is a monotonic measure, d. , defined by
i J
q £ 6, d
i (Q)
= 1, iff x
±
£ Q (3.5a)
= 0, otherwise (3.5b)
where x^ is a given element in X, d.(q) is simply the membership
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(or characteristic function) of x^ in a subset Q of X.
Example 3.2.3
Let
X = {x
1 ,
x
2 ,
x,}.
a) If Q = 0; Vx± E X, d.(Q) - 0.
b) If Q = X; Vx. € X, d.(Q) • 1.
c) Suppose that
\ " {V>
Q, - (x },
Q 3 - {x 3L
Then we have
dj^Qj) = 1, d
2 (Q 1 )
= 0, d
3 (Q 1 )
= 0,
d
x
(Q 2 ) = 0, d2 (Q 2 ) = 1, d 3 (Q 2 ) 0,
d 1 (Q 3 ) - 0, d 2 (Q 3 ) = 0, d 3 (Q 3 ) = 1.
It can be seen that d^ is additive for fixed
d
1
({x
1
,
x
2
J) = d
1
({x
1
}U{x
2
))
= 1
• 1 +
- d^) + d
1
(Q
2
)
- d
1
({x
1
}) + d
1
({x
2
J).
Similarly,
d
2
((x
1
,
x
2
>) d
2
({ Xl }U{x2 })
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d
2
(Q
1
UQ
2
)
1
+ 1
d
2
(Q
l
) +W
d
2 ({ Xl }) + d2 ({ Xl }),
and
d
l
(Q
l U V = dl (X)
= 1
« 1 +
= d 1 (Q 1 ) + dyfij .
It is of interest to note that the Dirac assignment is performed
when the color of the ball (Example 3.2.2) which has been picked
from the urn is already known.
We now enter the realm of non-additivity which, in our opinion,
is suitable for the treatment of epistemic probability.
Definition 3.2.9 (Zadeh, 1978)
A possibility measure, II, is a monotonic measure such that for
any collection {Q.} of subsets of X,
H(U Q ± ) = Sup II(Q.), (3.6a)
1 i
and, for finite sets,
H(U Q ± ) = MaxH(Q). (3.6b)
i i
A possibility measure can be built from a possibility distribution
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i.e., a function n from X to [0,1] such that
Sup tt(x.) - 1. (3.7)
x^eX
This is a normalization condition which implies that at least one
event x
1
is absolutely possible. The normalization condition also
forces IT(X) to be equal to one [property (i) in Definition 3. 2. A].
Example 3.2.4
Consider the colored balls problem in Example 3.2.2. It is
always possible that the unknown ball belongs to any non-empty
subset of X, where
X = {X,, X2, Xn}.
Hence , we have
TT({x
i })
= 1, VX;L E X.
This leads to the assignment of the following possibility measures;
n(Q) = 1; VQ£X, Q * 0.
Let us suppose that for some (strange ?) reason, a person feels
that the green ball plays hard to get. A visit to any casino will
amply demonstrate this phenomenon. The assigned measures could be
given by
tt({ Xi }) = 1,
and
Thus
TT(tx
2
)) = 1,
tt({x
3 ))
= 0.5.
H(Q) • 1; VQSX, Q i (J, Q r {x3 ),
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H(Q) = 0.5; Q = {k3 },
and
n(Q) = 0; Q - 0.
The possibility measure is not additive, and it is obvious that
H(Q) + II (Q) > 1.
For further details concerning possibility measures, it is
useful to examine Zadeh (1978), and Dubois and Prade (1980).
Interesting relationships between possibility and necessity
[N(Q) = 1 - II(Q)] measures are provided by Dubois and Prade (1983).
The measures discussed so far relate mainly to the concept of
randomness (Possibility measures attempt to deal with subjectivity
introduced in the analysis of randomness.). We shall now focus on
measures that are useful for dealing with the subjectivity that is
inherent in epistemic probability.
In a measure-theoretic treatment of epistemic probability, each
element of the reference set, X, may be considered to be a fundamental
proposition. A measure would then assign a number between zero and one
to indicate a degree of belief or a grade of fuzziness accorded to a
subset Q of X, on the basis of the evidence it contains. The reference
set is given a measure of one, and this stands for the totality of
evidence. Shafer (1976) has called it a frame of discernment.
The intuitive picture is as follows. A portion of belief
committed to a proposition is also committed to any other proposition
it implies. This means that a portion of belief accorded to a subset
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is also accorded to any subset containing it. Thus, of the total
belief committed to a subset Q of X, some may also be committed
to one or more subsets of Q. However, there is a remainder that
is committed exactly to Q - to Q and to no smaller subset. The
fact that it ought to be possible to partition the total belief
among different subsets of the frame of discernment, while
assigning to each subset Q a portion that is committed to Q,
and to nothing smaller, has led to the following definition.
Definition 3.2.10 (Shafer, 1976)
If X is a finite frame of discernment (reference set), then
a function, m, from P(X) to [0,1] is called a basic probability
assignment whenever
i) m(0) = (3.8a)
and
ii) I m(q) = 1. (3.8b)
QSX
Note that m(Q) measures the belief committed exactly to Q,
not the total belief accorded to Q. Hence, to obtain the total
belief committed to Q, we must add to m(Q) , the quantities m(Q.)
for all proper subsets Q. of Q; i.e.,
Bel(Q) = I m{q t ). (3.9)
QiSQ
This is known as a belief function (Shafer, 1976). The following
example should clarify the intuitive understanding of the belief
function.
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Example 3.2.5
Combining individual propositions into a body of evidence can be
likened to building an edifice brick by brick. We use this idea to
illustrate the intuitive aspects of a belief function.
Let us suppose that our edifice (the totality of evidence)
consists of three bricks cemented together. This corresponds to
the frame of discernment,
X = {x1> x2 , x3 }.
In this model, the basic probability assignment, m, represents the
masses of the individual elements of the structure. So we have,
m({x^}) = mass of brick 1,
m({x
2 )) = mass of brick 2,
and
m({x3}) = mass of brick 3.
Suppose we start with brick 1. The total mass is given by
m(0) + m({x1 }).
A wall does not consist of bricks alone. Cement is used to bind
them together. Thus, when we join brick 2 to brick 1, the total
mass is the sum of the masses of the individual bricks, plus an
amount that is due to the cement bond. This is given by
m(0) + m({ Xl }) + m({x 2 }) + m({ Xl , x 2 )).
It is the mass of the cement bond alone, m({x1; x2 }), that corresponds
to the portion of belief that is committed exactly to set Q, and to no
smaller set, in Shafer's theory. This fits beautifully into our picture
of evidence combination. Whenever we combine the weights of two separate
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a) In the beginning, there is emptiness.
m(0) = 0;
Bel(0) = m(0)
= 0.
b) Three bricks are introduced into the
emptiness.
m({x }) > 0, i - 1, 2, 3;
Bel({ Xl }) = m(0) + m({ Xi }).
c)
L 1
x
s
1 *i H I* i
Two bricks are joined using a small
amount of cement, m({x, , x
? }).
Bel({x1 , x2 >) = m(0) + m({ X]L }) +
m({x
2 »
+ m({xv x2 J).
Bel({x,}) = m(0) + m({x,}).
d)
I"?J
5K1
To complete the edifice, it is
necessary to join the third brick
to the other two, using some more
cement
.
Bel(X) = m(0) + m({x1 }) + m({x2 }) +
m({x
3
}) + m({x
1
, x
2
>) +
m({x
1
,
x }) + m({x , x }) +
m({x
. x
2
,
x })
.
Bel(X) = 1 (by definition).
Figure 3.1. Combination of evidence using the belief function.
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propositions, we have an additional weight that is the result of
the combination - the glue that is an essential part of the union.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the steps involved in building the edifice.
Definition 3.2.11 (Shafer, 1976)
A monotonic measure defined on a finite set, X, is a belief
function iff
VQ 1 , Q 2 . • • > Qn e P(X),
Bel(U Q
J_)
» E Bel(Q.) - J Bel(Q flQJ + . . . .
i i=l i<j -1
. . + (-l)
n+1
Bel(f1 0.). (3.10)
Note that the belief function is defined on the monotonic measure
space, (X, P(X)
,
Bel). The reference set, X, is always assumed to
be finite in Shafer's theory of evidence (Shafer, 1976).
Xj},
Example 3.2.6
Let
X = {x1;
and
Q - {x
x
, x2
).
Due to the definition of the belief function in terms of the basic
probability assignments [Equation (3.9)!, we have
Bel(X) = m(0) + mf^}) + m({x
2
}) + m({x
3
}) + mCtx,, x })
+ m({x
1 ,
x
3
}) + m({x
2
, x
3
)) + m({x., x,, x,})
" 1.
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Bel(Q) = m(0) + m({ Xl }) + m({x2 }) + mCtxj^, x2 }),
and
Bel(q) = Bel({x
3
})
- m(0) + m({x
3
}).
Hence, if
"(Qi) > 0; VO^SX, Q t # 0,
we have
Bel(Q) + Bel(Q) < 1.
In general, however,
Bel(Q) + Bel(Q) $ 1.
This means that a lack of belief in an unlocated x^ £ Q, does not
imply a strong belief in x^ £ Q.
For further details concerning belief functions, see Shafer (1976).
Shafer's belief functions, while very general in their scope, do
not lend themselves to the specification of functionals defined over
them. This is due to the fact that knowledge of BelfQj^) and Bel(Q 2 )
is not always sufficient to calculate BelCQj^O Q 2 ) [see Equation (3.10)].
In order to define a functional on the monotonic measure space,
(X, 6, g) , the values of g must be given over the entire domain.
Additionally, since g is monotonic, this property must be satisfied
by all members of S without exception. Suppose that X is a finite
set with n elements, and P(X) is taken to be 8, the number of
monotone sequences in S is n!. Thus, without a simple rule to define
the measure, g, it is almost impossible to proceed.
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Sugeno (19 74) has provided a function that specifies g over
the entire domain:
g(Q!0Q 2 ) * f (g(Qi). g(Q 2 ))> (3.11a)
where
Qi. Q2 £ 6; QiHQ2 0. (3.11b)
and
f (yi> y 2 ) = yi + y 2 + A 'yi'y 2 > x e c-i, <*). o.iic)
The definition of a Sugeno measure follows.
Definition 3.2.
1
2 (Sugeno, 1974)
A monotonic measure, g, , is a Sugeno measure iff
fQj, Q 2 E S; Q 1 0Q2 = 0,
g
A
(Q
1UQ 2 ) g A (Q1 ) + g x (Q 2 ) + A-gA (Q1 )-g A (Q 2 ), (3.12a)
where
X £ (-1, <»). (3.12b)
More generally, when 0^ and Q, are any subsets of X, the following
formula (Dubois and Prade, 1980) holds;
gA (Qj.) + g x (Q 2 ) - 8 x (Q 1 nQ 2 ) + *'gA (Qi)-g A (Q 2 )
«»«io<y -
i + A-g
A
(Q 1nQ 2 )
(3.13a)
where
A E (-1, °°). (3.13b)
Note that unlike the belief functions of Shafer, the Sugeno
measure is not restricted to finite reference sets.
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Example 3.2.7
It is interesting to see how the restriction, X £ (-1, ">) i
Equations (3.11c), (3.12b), and (3.13b), arises.
a) It is obvious that the following relation should always
hold.
g
x
(Q) = s
A
w>; VQSX.
Now,
8 A (QUQ) g x (X)
= 1
= 8 X (Q) + g X (Q) + *'»x «3>'*A®.
Hence
,
1 - 8 X (Q)
s x «y
1 + *-g
x (Q)
and thus
,
gA
(Q)
i - s x (Q)
1 + *"*j(Q)
1 -
1 - g X W)
1 + A-g
x (Q)
1 + A
1 -
«x«)
gA (Q)
1 + X-g
x
(Q)
1 + A-g
A
(Q) - 1 + g A (Q)
1 + .\-g
x
(Q) + A - A-g
A
(Q)
gx (Q) (1 + X)
(1 + X)
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This implies that
x 4 -l.
b) For all
we have by Definition 3.2.12,
g
)v
(Q1UQ 2 ) = M^ + M Q 2> + ^-Sx^'Sx^
• i
x
(Q
x
) + g
A
(Q 2 )
• (i + x-g^)).
Also,
g^(Q1UQ 2 ) >, MV'
Hence, we obtain
g A (Q 2 )
• (1 + X-g
x
(Q 1 )) >, 0.
Now, since
g
x (Ql)> g x (Q 2 ) £ [0,1],
we can write
1 + X-g>.(Qi) » 0,
indicating that
X fc -1.
Thus, since [see part (a)]
X + -1,
we have
X E (-1, ~).
Example 3.2.8
a) If A = 0, the Sugeno measure has the additive structure of
a probability measure.
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For Q^, Q 2 e 6, Q 1 (\Q 2 - 0,
8
A
(Q1UQ 2 ) = 8X (Q1) + 8 X (Q 2 ) + A-g^Q^-g^Q^,
and when X = 0,
b) Since
1 - 8X (Q)
gx (Q)
=
*
,
1 + A-g
A (Q)
we obtain
1 - gA (Q>
8 A (Q) + 8 A (Q) - 8 A (Q) +"
1 + A-g
A (Q)
/Q) + A-S A (Q) + 1 - g A (Q)
1 + A-g
x
(Q)
l + A-g^q)
3 A (Q) + 8,(03 -
1 + A-g (Q)
Since
,
gA (Q) £ [0,1],
it is obvious that
8
A
(Q) « s
A
(Q),
and thus
,
i) for A e [0, ">),
8 A (Q) + g A (Q) « i.
which means that a lack of belief in a non-located x. E Q does not
imply a strong belief in x
± e Q. Hence, in this range, the Sugeno
measure is a belief function of Shafer.
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ii) for A £ (-1, 0],
we have
g A (Q) + 8 X (Q) » l,
or, a lack of belief In a proposition implies a very strong belief in
its negation.
Example 3.2.8 demonstrates that the Sugeno measure with
* E [0. •) (3.14)
is intuitively similar to Shafer's belief function (Example 3.2.5).
However, for
* E ("I. 0). (3.15a)
there is a certain amount of overlap whenever two independent
propositions are combined, i.e., for
Q 1 flQ 2 • (3.15b)
we have
g
x
(Q 1UQ 2 ) < g x (Q x ) + s A (Q 2 )- (3.15c)
This seems to model the phenomenon of marginal utility in economic
theory. The marginal utility, or extent of increase in satisfaction
per unit of commodity, in general, decreases with each increase in
the amount of commodity consumed. On the other hand, the total
utility, which follows the axiom of monotonicity , always increases.
The plausibility of a subset Q of a finite set X has been
defined by Shafer (1976) as
Pi(Q) = 1 - Bel(Q). (3.16)
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Definition 3.2.13 (Shafer, 1976)
A plausibility measure, ?l, is a monotonic measure for which
VQr Q2 , - . . , Q e P(X),
p«((lQ.) < £ P«.(Q.) - .r.PUQ UQ ) +
. .
+ (-1) P«.(U Q.). (3.17)
Example 3.2.9
a) Suppose that
\, Q 2 S x, q iOq 2 - 0.
Then, by Definition 3.2.13,
P4(Q
i nQ 2 ) « PJUQ^ + Pf.(Q2 ) - P«(Q 1 UQ 2 ),
or
P^(Q
1UQ 2 ) $ P«(Q1 ) + P«(Q 2 ) - P«(Q inQ 2 )
S P£(Q1 ) + P£(Q 2 ) - PJ(0).
Thus,
P*(Q
XUQ2 ) $ PUQX ) + PUQ 2 ).
b) For any Q£X,
we have, using Equation (3.16),
Pi(Q) + PS>(Q) = (1 - Bel(Q)) + (1 - Bel(Q))
= 2 - (Bel(Q) + Bel(Q)).
Since (see Example 3.2.6),
Bel(Q) + Bel(Q) $ 1,
we obtain
PJ(Q) + PS.(Q) >, 1.
Thus, a plausibility measure has the same structure as a Sugeno measure
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with A E (-1, 0].
The following theorems are pertinent.
Theorem 3.2.1
A Sugeno measure is a belief function iff
A E [0, »). (3.18)
Proof (Banon, 1978)
Let Q be a subset of X finite. Developing gx (Q) in terms
of g({x^})'s yields,
Card(Q.) - 1
g
x
(Q) t A i n g({xi }), (3.19)
where Card(Q-) is the cardinality of subset Q..
Thus, by writing
Card(Q.) - 1
m(Q.) A J II gCfxj^}); iff A > 0. (3.20)
we see that
gx (Q) - I m(Q,)
QjSQ
- Bel(Q).
. (3.21)
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.2.2
A Sugeno measure is a plausibility measure iff
A £ (-1, 0]. (3.22)
Proof (Dubois and Prade, 1980)
Let g be a Sugeno measure with A £ (-1, 0], and denote
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f(Q)
- 1 - g
x
(Q). (3.23)
For any Q1; Q 2 £X,
f(Q
1 UQ 2 ) - 1 - gA (Q 1 UQ 2 ). (3.24)
On expressing g^Q^l/O^) in terms of g^Q^, g^CQj) . and g^riO^),
and simplifying, we obtain
f(Q,) + f(Q,) + I-f(Q.)-f(Q ) - f(Q.nQ,)
f^uo.;,) = —-——
_
—1 :—_± L
,i+ WCQjftijj)
where
A =
(3.25)
(3.26)
-A
X * — ( = A ) (3.27)
1 + A
Thus, f is a Sugeno measure with parameter A.
Note that the function
1 + A
is an involutive bijection from (-1, 0] to [0, «•)
.
Due to the definition of plausibility measures in terms of
belief functions
, and also to the fact that g is a belief function
iff A E [0, °°) [Theorem 3.2.1], a Sugeno measure is a plausibility
measure iff A £ (-1,0].
Q.E.D.
AN ALGORITHM FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF SUGENO MEASURES
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In order to be able to use monotonic measures in applications,
it is essential that they be specified over the entire domain. The
Sugeno measure, due to its explicit definition, is easily fitted
from researched data. This section describes an efficient algorithm
(Wierzchon, 1983) for the determination of Sugeno measures by
regression from subjective estimates obtained by experiment.
Let
X = { Xl , x2 , . . . , xn ), (3.28)
be a finite reference set, and let
"(Q), QSX, (3.29)
be the experimentally determined subjective estimates which are
to be fitted to the constraints of Sugeno measures. The procedure
must look for densities
Si " g({x ± } ), i - 1, 2 n (3.30)
with a corresponding value of a so that an appropriately defined
error function is minimized. In mathematical terms, it is customary
to state the problem as:
Locate densities,
g± ,
i = 1, 2, . . .
,
n (3.31a)
so as to minimize
.2
J = I (w(Q) - gl (Q)r
QSX
subject to the Sugeno constraints on g,
,
i.e.,
(3.31b)
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M > " °. (3.31c)
8xW = 1, (3.31d)
and
VQ1 , Q 2 c P(X), Qj^OQj = 0,
g
A
(Q 1 UQ 2 ) - g^Q^ + g x (Q 2 ) + A-g A (Q 1 )- g;i (q 2 ). (3.31e)
The optimization problem defined by Equation (3.31) can be
solved using a suitable objective function minimization technique.
Sekita and Tabata (1977) have suggested the use of a (rather
tedious) Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Technique (SUMT)
.
Other objective function minimization techniques can also be used.
However, the method of Wierzchon (1983), presented in this section,
is simple, fast and easily programmable. The method is based on the
following important results.
Theorem 3.3.1
Let (X, S, p) be a measurable space with a probability or
finite Lebesgue measure, p. A composition fop produces a Sugeno
measure if f is of the form
f(y) = -
— ( c
y
- 1 ) ; c > 0, c t 1. (3.32)
X
Proof [see Wierzchon, 1983.]
Corollary 3.3.1
A Sugeno measure gA defined on 6 produces exactly one probability
measure p defined on this 3 where
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P(Q) log (1+A)
(l + X-g^(Q)), Q E 6. (3.33)
The inverse is not true [see Wierzchon, 1983].
Example 3.3.1
Let P(Q^) and p(Q
2
) be probability measures for
Qx , Q 2 SX (finite),
and
Q
1
nQ
2
- 0.
a) By definition of probability measures (Definition 3.2.7)
we have
pd^UQ.,) - p(Q
1
) + p(Q
2
).
Using Theorem 3.3.1 (subject to the restrictions on c) , we obtain
1 /n -,
f«p(Q,) - ( cptV - i )1
A
f.p (Q 2 )
= i ( ep«te) . x j
and
f^ftJil/Qj) = -< cP(Q l WQ 2> -1 ).
A
As shown below, f p is a Sugeno measure;
f.p(q 1 uq 2 ) = f.pCQ^ + f. P (Q 2 ) + x-fop(Q 1 )-f6p(Q 2 )
. l(cP<Ql). d +
'
(cpW 2)_ u +
'
(cp«i)_ 1)(cp(Q 2 ). „AAA
. ^(cP
(<5i)_
x + c
p(Q2>_
x + cp(Qi)+p(Q2)_ cp(Qi)_ cp(Q2>
A
+ 1)
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=
_ c c
p(Qi)+p(Q2)
. x )
a
1
A
= f.p(Q.UQ,).
Example 3.3.2
It is of interest to see how the restrictions on c [Equation (3.32)]
arise. From Theorem 3.3.1, we have
g,(Q) - - ( cp(Q) - 1 ); c > 0, c f 1, QSX.
A
But, by definition of monotonic measures,
gx
(X) = 1,
and
p(X) = 1.
On writing
g A
(X) = - ( c
P(X)
- 1 ),
A
and simplifying, we obtain
1
A
- ( c
1
- 1 ).
Thus,
c = A + 1.
However, by definition of Sugeno measures (Definition 3.2.12),
A e (-1, •»],
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and, therefore,
c > 0.
Also, since A corresponds to the additive case,
c t 1.
Hence
,
c > o, c 4 l.
Since the minimization of the error function,
1 m 2
J - - I ( w(Q.) - g (Q.) ) (3.34a)
m j = l J
A J
where
Qj E P(X) (3.34b)
and
m = Card(P(X)), (3.34c)
subject to the Sugeno constraints on g^ , is rather difficult
from a mathematical standpoint, the problem is simplified by
employing the transformation provided by Corollary 3.3.1 to
define a new error function;
1
r ( ,rm.,R - - I < v(Q ) - p(Q.) ) (3.35a)
m j=l
where
v(Q
j
) = log
c
(l + A-wCQj)) (3.35b)
A = c - 1 (3.35c)
Qj £ P(X) (3.354)
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and
D = Card(P(X)). (3.35e)
Wierzchon (1983) has also shown that minimizing the error
function R [Equation (3.35a)] is equivalent to minimizing the
function J [Equation (3.34a)], and the optimization problem
simplifies to:
Locate probability densities,
pt ,
i - 1, 2, . . . , n (3.36a)
so as to minimize
1 m ~
R - - £ ( v(Q.) - p(Q.) ) (3.36b)
m j-1 J J
subject to the probability constraints,
V ± £ 0, i = 1, 2 n (3.36c)
X P, = 1, (3.36d)
i=l
P(0) = 0, (3.36e)
and
P(X) = 1. (3.36f)
The method of least squares is employed to derive an analytic
solution to the minimization problem.
The overall approach is as follows;
i) Reduce the identification procedure to the probability
domain using the fact that the Sugeno measure is the
exponential transformation of a probability measure
(Corollarv 3.3.1).
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ii) Minimize the error function using the method of least
squares,
iii) Having identified the probability measures, transform
them to Sugeno measures (Theorem 3.3.1).
The algorithm is comprised of the following steps [for details
and derivations, see Wierzchon (1983)];
i) Read in the data: the cardinality n of the set, X;
and experimentally obtained subjective weights, w(Q.),
j - 1, 2. ... , 2
n" 2
, i.e.,
Q fix, Q i 0, Q / X.
J 1 j
ii) Find the values of A by solving the following equation;
n (i + x-w(q.))
j=l J
where
J = (A + 1)
2
n_2 (n+l) - n
(3.37a)
k- = Card(Qj)
m = Card(P(X))
n = Card(X)
.
iii) Using a non-complex value of X closest to zero,
compute the values of z.
,
1 = 1 , 2 , . . .
,
n,
according to
(3.37b)
(3.37c)
(3.37d)
z. = log n (i + >.-w(q.) -d.
.
1 c j=i J «
where
(3.38a)
ij " 1. i£ xi £ Qj
= 0, otherwise.
(3.38b)
(3.38c)
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g, = - (c
Pl
" 1) (3.40a)
iv) Compute the values of Pl , 1 = 1, 2, . . . , n, according
to the equation
p. = 2
"n
( Zl + 1) - 1. (3.39)
v) Finally, compute the Sugeno densities, g. , i = 1, 2, . , n,
using the transformation,
1
X
where
c = A + 1. (3.40b)
The preceding algorithm has been termed a direct method for
the estimation of Sugeno densities because it requires the knowledge
of weights for all subsets of set X. There is, however, a practical
difficulty. When the cardinality of the reference set is large, a
considerable number of subjective estimates are needed (If there are
10 elements in the reference set, a subject has to provide 1022
estimates!). In such instances, we may drop from the set X those
aspects whose grades of importance are close to zero. Lowering the
cardinality results in a reduction of the number of subjective
judgments that are required (If the number of elements in the
reference set is reduced from 10 to 8, only 254 subjective estimates
are needed.)
.
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THE SUGENO INTEGRAL
In the preceding sections, the mathematical and intuitive aspects
of monotonia measures have been reviewed in some detail. We have seen
that measures with non-additivity have properties which could render
them useful for modeling human decision making strategies. Before we
venture any further, let us sum up the ideas we have expounded to this
point.
There are two distinct types of probability, aleatory and epistemic.
The measure-theoretic approach for aleatory probability represents
random events as sets. A weight (or, probability) is assigned to each
subset depending on the likelihood that an unknown event would belong
to it. In a sense, the measure of probability could be taken to
represent the grade of importance the specific subset has for the
purpose of predicting an event. Due to an implicit relation between
randomness and frequencies , the measure is necessarily additive.
In the epistemic domain, each element of a set is a fundamental
proposition. A measure defined on a subset is taken to indicate the
degree of belief accorded to the subset on the basis of evidence it
contains. Observation of human behavior points to many non-compensatory
and conjunctive strategies . It is these features that we attempt to
model using non-additivity. The following example illustrates the point.
Example 3.4.1
For some time, a Chemical Engineering Department has been searching
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for a suitable candidate to fill a vacant position of Assistant
Professor in the department. The advertisement states that a young
candidate with demonstrated research skills, and substantial
teaching ability is preferred. Since the department is oriented
towards research, the candidate's research skill is very important.
However, it is not necessary that the candidate be young.
A mathematical formulation could represent the reference set
by
X {x^, x,, x,}
where
x. = candidate is young,
*2 - candidate is a good teacher,
and
x^ - candidate is a good researcher.
Members of the selection committee were asked for their opinions
concerning the relative weights (measures) for each subset of X. The
consensus values provided were as follows;
g(0) -
gC^}) = 0.10
g({x,}) = 0.20
g(.U
x
, x
2
)) = 0.55
gCtx^ x
3
}) = 0.75
g({x
2 ,
x
3
J) = 0.95
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Observe that these measures satisfy the axiom of monotonicity , and
are non-additive. Each value expresses the level of satisfaction
that would arise if a candidate has the qualities contained in the
corresponding subset of X. A value of one entails sure selection of
the candidate, while a value of 0.5 could be taken to suggest that
the candidate may or may not be selected. Note that good research
skills alone will not ensure selection. However, a person with
demonstrated research and teaching abilities is almost a cinch for
the position.
In this example, the propositions are all assumed to be
answered with either a yes or a no. But, in real-life situations,
a candidate might satisfy each proposition partially - somewhere
between a sure yes and an emphatic no. Monotonic measures alone
will not suffice. As we shall see, the Sugeno Integral, a functional
defined on a Sugeno measure space (or other monotonic measure spaces)
,
could help solve this difficulty.
Definition 3.4.1 (Sugeno, 1974)
Let (X, B, g) be a monotonic measure space, and let h:X + [0,1]
be a measurable function defined on X. A Sugeno Integral (or Fussy
Integral) over Q E B, of h(x) with respect to a monotonic measure g
is defined by
f h(x)og(.) - Sup (Min(a, g(QflF)), (3.41a)
Q a e [0,1]
where
F
a
= (xjh(x) > a}. (3.41b)
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In this work, we are concerned with finite reference sets, and
it is not necessary to assume continuity of monotonic measures. The
definition for this case follows.
Definition 3.4.2 (Sugeno, 1974)
Let (X, P(X), g) be a measurable space, and let h:X * [0,1] be
a function defined on X. The Sugeno Integral over any set Q g P(X)
is given by
f h(x)»g(.) = Max ( Min (h(x.))A g(QnF) ). (3.42)
Q FeP(X) XieF
For further details, see Sugeno (1974).
The following example demonstrates the evaluation of the Sugeno
Integral.
Example 3.4.2
Let X be a finite reference set given by
X = {x^, Xn, x.,}.
The monotonic measures on (X, P(X), g) are
g(0) =
gt^}) = 0.2
g({x
2 »
= 0.3
g({x
3 })
= 0.4
g({x1; x2 )) = 0.6
gdx^ x-j}) = 0.7
g((x,, xJ) = 0.9
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g({x1; x2 , x3 }) = 1.
Let the function h(x) be given by
h(jcj) = 0.5
h(x
2
) = 0.6
h(x
3
) = 0.8.
a) Evaluation of the Sugeno Integral over Q {x. , x }.
{ h(x).g(.)
Q
Max ( Min (h(x ))Ag(QflF) ).
FeP(X) x.eF
Max
V
Min(h(0))A g(Qf10), F =
Min(h(x1))Ag(Qf|{x1 }), F = { Xl }
Min(h(x
2))/Vg(Qn{x2 }), F = {x2 >
Min(h(x
3
))Ag(Qn{x
3
}), F = {x
3
J
MinOUx^, h(x
2
))/\g(Q(l{x
i
, x }), F = {x
Min(h(Xl ), h(x 3))Ag(QfHx 1 , x-j}) , F = ix ± , x^}
Min(h(x
2 ), h(x 3))Ag(Qn{x2 , x3 )), F - {x2 , x 3 J
Mindi^), h(x2 ), h(x3))Ag(QH{x 1 , x2 , x 3 i), F = X
"O.O A 0.0 (g(0)]
0.5 A 0.2 [g({x1»]
0.6 A 0.3 [g({x
2 })]
0.8 A 0.0 [g(0)l
0.5 A 0.6 [g({x1 , x2 })]
0.5 A 0.2 [g({x1 })]
0.6 A 0.3 [g({x 2 »]
.0-5 A 0.6 IgC^, x2 J)]
- o.o"
- 0.2
= 0.3
= 0.0
= 0.5
- 0.2
= 0.3
= 0.5.
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Thus,
i h(x)og(.) = Max(0.0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5)
Q
= 0.5.
b) Evaluation of the integral over X = {:
i' v v-
f h(x).g(.) = Max ( Min (h(x ) ) A g(X flF) )
X FeP(X) x.eF
= Max ( Min (h(x))Ag(F) ).
FeP(X) x.eF
On substitution, we obtain
{ h(x)og(.) = Max(0.0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.5, 0.6, 0.5)
0.6.
Note that, in general, we have
i h(x).g(.) .$ / h(x).g(.), Q£X.
Q X
(3.43)
Defined on a monotonic measure space, the Sugeno Integral is
is interesting functional that is analogous to the Lebesgue Integral
(a well-known functional defined on additive measures). Sugeno (1974)
has shown that if p is a probability measure (additive monotonic
measure), defined on a reference set, X, then
i h(x).p(.) / h(x)dp
X
where
1
«
-
4
(3.44a)
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{ h(x)op(.) (3.44b)
X
is the Sugeno Integral evaluated over X, and
/ h(x)dp (3.44c)
X
is the Lebesgue Integral (or probability expectation value)
. The
relation presented in Equation (3.44) demonstrates that the Sugeno
evaluation is at most 1/4 away from the probabilistic expectation.
Hence, we could interpret the Sugeno Integral as representing a
subjective expectation value in applications where the subjectivity
has been grasped by monotonic measures. Some of the more important
properties of Sugeno Integrals are given below.
i) 4} h.g(.) ^ 1. (3.45)
ii) f (aVh).g(.) = aVfh.g(.), ae[0,l] (3.46)
iii) j (aAh)og(.) = aA^hog(.), as; [0,1] (3.47)
iv) } (h
x
Vh
2
).g(.) > { h
1
.g(.) V f h 2.g(.) (3.48)
v) f (h 1
Ah
2
)o g (.) ^ { h1#g(,) A { h 2«g(.) (3.49)
vi) f h.g(.) % } h.g(.) V i h.g(.) (3.50)
Q 1°Q 2 Q l
Q
2
vii) j h.g(.) £ f hog(.) A j h.g(.) (3.51)
Q
l"
Q
2 \ Q 2
These properties follow from the definition of the Sugeno Integral
(Definitions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2), and are easy to prove. For further
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details, see Sugeno (1974), and, Terano and Sugeno (1975).
The Sugeno Integral In Definitions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 is just one
functional defined on monotonic measures. It is possible to define
different functionals that may be suitable for other applications.
We are concerned with modeling human subjectivity, and from this
standpoint, the most important property of Sugeno Integrals is
monotonicity
.
If
Vx
±
E X, hj.fXj) ^ h 2 ( Xl ), (3.52a)
then
f h 1
(x)og(.) ^ f h 2 (x)»g(.), (monotonicity for the integrand, h)
x X (3.52b)
Additionally,
VQ 1; Q 2 e P(X), Ql£ Q 2 , (3.53a)
f h(x)»g(.) ^ f h(x)og(.), (monotonicity for the sets over
Q^ Q2 which integration is performed)
(3.53b)
These properties follow from the definition of the Sugeno Integral.
He shall shortly see that monotonicity is essential for approximating
human evaluative tendencies.
As stated previously, in the present framework, each element of
the reference set, X, is a fundamental proposition or criterion. Any
subset Q of this set consists of a collection of criteria, or intuitively,
is an aspect or view of the overall picture. A monotonic measure provides
a grade of importance, g(Q) , to each view, Q. In general, a manifestation
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would not satisfy the propositions completely. So the integrand, h(x-),
represents a truth value in the sense of logic, or a level of
satisfication of the proposition, x., with reference to the
manifestation. The operation
Min (Mx^), (3.54)
x^Q
would then provide the pessimistic or most secure level of satisfaction
that the manifestation offers when examined from the point of view of
the criteria contained in view Q.
The Sugeno Integral attempts to combine the most secure level of
satisfaction obtained from a view, with the relative importance of
that particular view. This is done for each view, Q, of the overall
picture, X. The power set, P(X), lists all possible views. Finally,
the integral gives the mean or expected value after considering all
views
.
There are two specific operations that are performed. First, the
most secure level of satisfaction is combined with the relative
importance of the corresponding view using the minimum operator.
Since the value obtained can never be greater than the importance
of the view, g(Q), this operation serves in limiting the evaluation
offered by the view to a value no greater than its importance, g(Q)
.
The second operation selects the best evaluation from among
all possible views. This is a common tendency in human judgments.
We evaluate things from many different angles or aspects. The angle
that strikes in terms of satisfaction as well as importance, plays
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a major role in our final analyses.
The Sugeno Integral restricts itself to the use of "Max" and
"Min" operators. Since both the level of satisfaction and the grade
of importance take values between zero and one, these operators are
appropriate, and the functional takes a non-linear form. Of course,
we could also define isomorphic functionals that employ other
operators. For example, the Lebesgue Integral uses "+" and "x"
operators. These operators are deemed necessary to deal with
additivity and the implicit relation between aleatory probability
and frequencies.
The following example should clarify the intuitive aspects of
the Sugeno Integral.
Example 3.4.3
As seen in Example 3.4.1, monotonic measures alone are not
sufficient for selecting a candidate for the post of Assistant
Professor. In this example, the Sugeno Integral is employed to
arrive at a more meaningful decision.
The criteria are represented by
X = {x,, x
2 ,
x^}
where
X-, = candidate is young
*2 - candidate is a good teacher
and
x~ = candidate has good research abilities.
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The relative weights for each collection of criteria, as given by
the selection panel, are as follows;
g(0) =
gMxjH o.io
g({x
2
» = 0.20
g({x
3
)) = 0.50
g({jc,, x
2
J) = 0.55
g({ Xl , itJ) = 0.75
5((x
2
, x
3
l) = 0.95
gffxj^, x
2
,
x }) = 1.
The weights satisfy the axiom of mono tonicity; they indicate that a
candidate with good research abilities is preferred, while it is not
very important that the candidate must be young.
Let us suppose that two candidates have applied for the position,
and the selection committee has felt that they have satisfied the
criteria to the following levels.
h
x
(H) = 0.4
h
1 (x2 ) = 0.7
and
0.8,
for candidate 1, and,
h
2 ( Xl )
= 1.0
h
2
(x
2
) = 0.8
and
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h
2
(x
3 )
= 0.4,
for candidate 2.
a) Evaluation of candidate 1.
0.00 A 0.00
0.40 A 0.10
0.70 A 0.20
0.80 A 0.50
0.40 A 0.55
0.40 A 0.75
0.70 A 0.95
0.40 A 1.00
j h 1 (x)og(.) = Max
and we obtain
i h x (x)og(.) 0.70.
Note that this value is obtained because the candidate has satisfied
the important important criteria of research ability and teaching
skill collectively to a value not lower than 0.7.
b) Evaluation of candidate 2.
0.00 A 0.00
1.00 A 0.10
0.80 A 0.20
0.40 A 0.50
Max
0.80 A 0.55
0.40 A 0.75
0.40 A 0.95
[0.40 A 1.00
f h (x).g(.)
X *
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and, therefore,
{ h2 (x).g(.) = 0.55.
In this case, although candidate 2 has satisfied the age and teaching
criteria to high degrees, poor research ability has led to the low
evaluation.
c) Candidate 1 is selected for the post due to a higher evaluation.
d) Let us suppose that a secretary has misplaced information about
the candidates' research abilities. However, due to time limitations, a
candidate must be selected. Additionally, the members of the selection
committee have given very low default values for research ability
[
^l^x3^
= n2^x3^ = 0.2: the other values remain the same ]. Hence,
we obtain
1 h (x).g(.)
X
0.00 A 0.00
0.40 A 0.10
0.70 A 0.20
0.20 A 0.50
0.40 A 0.55
0.20 A 0.75
0.20 A 0.95
0.20 A l.ool
Max(0.00, 0.10, 0.20, 0.20, 0.40, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20)
\ h
x
(x).g(.) = 0.40,
for candidate 1; and
{ h,(x)og(.) = Max
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. 00 A . 00"
1.00 a 0.10
0.80 a 0.20
0.20 A 0-50
0.80 A 0.55
0.20 A 0.75
0.20 A 0.95
0.20 A 1.00
Max(0.00, 0.10, 0.20, 0.55, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20)
f h (x).g(.)
X
0.55
for candidate 2.
Candidate 2 is selected because of higher satisfaction levels of
the criteria for which information is available. Note that the highest
possible evaluation is 0.55, since the two criteria are not too
important in the selection procedure.
.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The underlying principle of probability, be it aleatory or
epistemic, is monotonicity. Aleatory probability, because of its
relation to frequencies, is necessarily additive. In contrast,
epistemic probability, which is purely a feature of the human mind,
need not be so restricted. We feel that non-additive monotonic
measures lend mathematical formality to the study of subjectivity
and its existence in human reasoning.
In our attempt to introduce human subjectivity into mechanistic
decision making, we have broken down the decision strategy into two
separate parts. One is the intrinsic importance that propositions
carry, and the other, is the extent to which a manifestation
satisfies each proposition. Non-additive measures provide numerical
weights or levels of importance to sets of propositions. These values
are assumed to be known a priori. On the other hand, the truth value
of each proposition would depend on the manifestation, and is the
result of observation.
The Sugeno Integral combines these two quantities non-linearly
,
and results in an overall evaluation of the manifestation. This
functional, which is also monotonic, has excellent intuitive features,
and in our opinion, effectively approximates a human evaluation.
Additionally, when probability measures are employed, the Sugeno
Integral is close to the probability expectation value (or, Lebesgue
Integral). Thus, the Sugeno evaluation may be considered to be a
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subjective expectation value in applications where monotonicity is
used to grasp the concept of subjectivity.
The field of Expert Systems is one of the most active and exciting
areas of research in AI. A high performance expert system must
incorporate human subjectivity in its decision making. For this reason,
we feel that monotonic measures and the Sugeno Integral, defined on
these measures, could find applications in the design and construction
of efficient expert systems.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SUGENO INTEGRAL IN THE PRODUCTION RULE FORMALISM
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The technical issues of acquiring, representing, and using
knowledge are important problems in Knowledge Engineering, and in
the design of expert systems. Production Rules (or IF-THEN rules)
are a popular approach for representing and manipulating domain
facts and heuristics in expert systems. Implemented in Rule-based,
or Production Systems, these rules are natural to human strategies
of problem solving and decision making.
In this chapter, we focus on production systems, and go on to
propose a methodology for evaluating the premises of production
rules based on the concepts of monotonic measures and the Sugeno
Integral. The methodology essentially deals with the combination
of evidence in the production rule formalism, and provides an
excellent foundation for expressing, representing, and coping with
the subjectivity that is often introduced into human evaluations.
Additionally, the methodology offers a convenient framework for
the representation and treatment of ignorance, and the conservatism
that is seen in evaluations made in its presence. Finally, we extend
the formulation so as to admit multilevel reasoning.
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
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Production Systems were first proposed by Post (1943) as a formal
mechanism for combinatorial decision problems. Newell and Simon (1972)
later incorporated them in their models of human cognition, and since
then, the methodology has undergone substantial theoretical development
which has led to its extensive use in several AI programs. A production
system is a modular knowledge representation scheme that has been found
to be useful as a mechanism for controlling the interaction between
declarative and procedural knowledge (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981). This
has made it a popular approach for representing both facts and heuristics
of domain knowledge in an expert system. Production systems are founded
on a notion of condition-aetion (or situation-action, or IF-THEN) rulss
known as production rules, or simply, productions.
All production systems have three basic components: a set of
production rules that forms the rule base for problem solving, a
context or data base that helps in evaluating the rules, and, an
interpreter that controls the system's activity by using the rules
to mainpulate the data base.
A production rule is a conditional statement written in the form
If this condition holds, then this action is appropriate.
This scheme represents both logical implication
A implies B
as well as causality
A causes B,
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and is a convenient methodology for dealing with humanistic reasoning.
For example, the oft-used thumb-rule in football (Barr and Feigenbaum,
1981)
Always punt on fourth down with long yardage required,
may be translated to the production rule
IF it is fourth down AND long yardage is required THEN punt.
The IF part of a production rule (also called the condition part or
left-hand side) stipulates the conditions that must be satisfied if
the production rule is to be applicable. In general, this is a complex
conditional statement comprised of simple or unitary propositions
joined by AMD and OR connectors. The THEN part (or action part, or
right-hand side) defines the action to be taken. A production whose
condition part is satisfied can fire, that is, have its action part
executed by the interpreter. The invocation of many rules in a
production system can be viewed as a chained sequence of modus ponens
actions. This is a data-driven (or bottom-up) strategy, and it is
possible to vary the methodology to obtain a goal-driven (top-down, or
backward) scheme. Here, the elements of the left-hand side are
interpreted to be the goals obtained by the successful matching of
elements from the right-hand side. In this case the rules unwind. Thus,
the same set of rules can be used in two different ways, with
characteristically different control structures, and possibly, behavior.
In some instances it may be feasible to attempt a solution to a problem
by moving bi-directionally, that is, both forward and backward
simultaneously (Nilsson, 1980).
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The data base is the focus of attention of production rules. Also known
as the short-term memory buffer, it contains the state variables, the
facts and assertions about the world. Before a production rule can fire,
each element of its condition part must be present in the context data
structure. This may be a simple list, a large array, or even a medium-
size buffer with an internal structure of its own. But whatever the
organization of the data base, it is the sole storage medium for all the
state variables of the system, and all information must go there.
Moreover, the store is universally accessible to every rule in the
system, so that anything located there is potentially detectable by
any rule. This is termed as the unity of data and control store.
The interpreter, which is the source of much of the variation
found among different systems, controls the system's activity by
adjusting the sequence of application of the rules. The simplest
interpreter operates in a select-execute loop, in which a rule
applicable to the current state of the data base is chosen and then
executed. The action results in a modified data base, and the select
phase begins again. This alternation of selection and execution is an
essential element of production system architecture, and is responsible
for a very fundamental feature. Since a rule is selected for execution
on the basis of the total contents of the data base, a complete
re-evaluation of the control state of the system is performed at each
cycle . This is distinctly different fron procedurally-oriented approaches
,
and production systems are potentially sensitive to any changes in the
entire environment
.
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There are several approaches Co the selection procedure. Data-driven
approaches utilize variations of a left-hand scan, in which each left-
hand side is evaluated in turn. In such designs, conflict resolution is
an important consideration. Some systems resolve conflicts by stopping
their scan at the first successful evaluation. However, once this is
done, the question of where to start the next scan remains to be solved.
MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976), which is goal-directed, uses a right-
hand scan. Given a sub-goal, it examines all rules whose actions conclude
something about the sub-goal. Evaluation of the first right-hand side is
undertaken, and if any clause in it refers to a fact not already present
in the data base, a generalized version of the fact becomes the new
sub-goal, and the process recurs. Since MYCIN is designed to deal with
judgmental knowledge (implemented in meta-rules and certainty factors),
it does not stop after the first success. Instead, it evaluates all
possible rules and estimates the certainties of their conclusions. Thus,
the use of meta-level knowledge is seen to aid in conflict resolution.
Interpreter architecture strongly influences the overall efficiency
of a production system, and the specific domain of application has an
important bearing on the design of the interpreter. Interested readers
are referred to Davis and King (1977), and, Nilsson (1980) for excellent
treatments of interpreters for production systems.
The use of a production system methodology has several advantages.
Production rules offer a modular representation of knowledge that is
easily accessed and modified. The rules do not call each other, and
communicate only through the data base. In the process, interaction
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between the rules themselves is kept to a minimum, and each rule is
almost an independent piece of knowledge. Rules may, therefore, be
added, deleted, or modified independently. This modularity in knowledge
representation is useful as a scheme for systems designed to approach
competence in an incremental fashion. Encoding domain knowledge in the
form of rules reduces the entropy within the system and imposes a
uniform structure on the knowledge within the rule base. This facilitates
human understanding of the problem solving process. Better synthetic
understanding is also achieved by the machine itself, and this translates
into a more efficient explanation facility. An added advantage is that
production systems are natural to human understanding of problem solving.
Most experts , when asked about their knowledge , find it convenient to
express it in the form of production rules. This allows for easier
filtering of domain knowledge during design, and also permits knowledge
acquisition by the system.
There are , however, significant disadvantages in production system
formulations. The uniformity and modularity of knowledge representation
give rise to large overheads in problem solving. Often, each action is
performed by a select-execute cycle, and all information must be
communicated to the context data structure . This creates inefficiencies
in program execution. It is not possible to program sequencies of actions
that may be required in certain applications. Larger steps, or leaps in
reasoning are, therefore, never permitted. Another disadvantage is the
opacity of control flow in problem solving, due to the fact that
production systems are distinctly different from procedural approaches,
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and are, therefore, not easily represented in algorithmic form.
Production systems easily solve problems in some domains, but are
rather inappropriate for others. Production rules capture effectively
knowledge that is diffuse, consisting of many facts and rules of thumb.
Most classification and diagnosis problems fall in this category. On the
other hand, the methodology fails when applied to areas in which a few
tenets embody much of the domain knowledge. For this reason, production
rules are not able to capture knowledge in concise fields, such as
mathematics and physics. The complexity of control flow is also
important in determining whether production systems are appropriate.
They are suitable for modeling processes which can be represented as a
set of independent actions, but are awkward for complex, parallel
processes with dependent sub-processes, for which procedural approaches
may be better suited. An important feature of production system
architecture is that the data base is completely separated from the
interpreter, and the methodology makes no prior assumptions about
the way facts are employed. Thus, production systems are appropriate
when domain knowledge can be separated from the way it is to be used.
Fields in which representation and control are merged are better treated
procedurally.
An excellent overview of production systems is presented by Davis
and King (1977). Other pertinent references are Nilsson (1980), Barr and
Feigenbaum (1981,1982), Cohen and Feigenbaum (1982), and Gevarter (1983).
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THE SUGENO INTEGRAL AS THE BASIS FOR EVALUATING PRODUCTION RULES
In this section we propose a general formulation for representing
and evaluating production rules. The methodology provides a convenient
framework for approximate reasoning in the presence of ambiguity as
well as partial ignorance. We start by examining production ruie
formulations in two well-known expert systems.
A production rule is a statement cast in the form
IF condition THEN action.
One of the rules that the expert system, Rl (McDerraott, 1982), summons
while configuring VAX computers is:
IF the most current active context is assigning a power
supply
AND an SBI module of any type has been put in a cabinet
AND the position it occupies in the cabinet (its nexus)
is known
AND there is space available for a power supply for that
nexus
AND there is an available power supply
THEN put the power supply in the cabinet in the available
space.
Rl operates this rule by matching the conditions to the current
situation. Each proposition or assertion in the premise is matched
with corresponding elements in the data base. The rule is fired
only if all the conditions that make up the premise are satisfied.
The propositions in the premise are crisp - answered by yes or no,
true or false, or, 1 or 0.
This is the simplest form of a production rule. Mathematically,
the evaluation of the premise is performed by a minimum operator, i.e.,
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Min(h(Xl), h(x2 ), h(x 3 ) , h(x4 ) , h(x5 ))
wher
h(x ) S {0,1),
represents the truth value of proposition x., such that
h(x^) = 1, if proposition x^ is true (satisfied).
and
h(x.J = 0, if proposition x. is false (not satisfied).
Min(h(x.)) = 1,
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
the condition part of the rule is satisfied, and the rule can be
fired. On the other hand, if
Min(h(x )) = 0, (4.4)
at least one of the propositions is false, and the premise of the
rule is, therefore, not satisfied. In general, the left-hand side
of the rule could be a complex conditional statement comprised of
unitary or atomic propositions linked by AND and OR connectors.
Evaluation would then involve the use of minimum (AND) and maximum
(OR) operators.
Judgment plays an important role in clinical diagnosis, and
MYCIN introduces a new level of complexity in its rule base. The rule
IF the infection which requires therapy is meningitis
AND the patient has evidence of a serious skin infection
AND organisms were not seen on the strain of the culture
AND the type of infection is bacterial
THEN there is evidence that the organism (other than those
seen on cultures or smears) which might be causing the
infection is
staphylococcus-coagpus (0.75)
streptococcus (0.50)
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is used by MYCIN to diagnose and prescribe therapy for bacterial
infectious diseases. The left-hand side still consists of simple
assertions, but uncertainty is introduced into the right-hand side.
For the rule presented above, the evidence cited in the premise
provides degrees of confidence (rule certainty factors, CFs) of 0.75
and 0.50 for staphylococcus-coagpus and streptococcus, respectively.
The CFs are measures of association between the premise and action
clauses for each rule in MYCIN'S rule base. They assume that all the
antecedents are known with absolute certainty. If the rules'
antecedents are not determined to be completely true, the certainty
factors for the conclusions are reduced accordingly.
The premise of each rule in MYCIN is a boolean combination of
one or more clauses. It is always a conjunction of clauses, but may
contain complex conjunctions and disjunctions nested within each
clause (Instead of writing a rule whose premise would be a disjunction
of clauses, a separate rule is written for each clause). Each clause
is represented in the form of a 4-tuple,
(<predicate function> <object> <attribute> <value>)
.
Thus, to cope with situations in the real-world, medical facts are
represented in the form of 4-tuples corresponding to an atomic
formula with a numeric truth value between -1.0 and 1.0. A value of
-1.0 implies complete confidence that the proposition is false, while
a value of 1.0 represents complete confidence in its truth. A proposition
is given a value of if there is no evidence for its truth or falsehood.
This allows for the combination of evidence both, in favor of and against
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the same hypothesis. For example,
( TYPE INFECTION BACTERIAL 0.70 )
is interpreted as the type of infection is bacterial is known with a
certainty of 0.70. Hence, depending on the evidence, MYCIN permits its
propositions to have varying levels of truth and falsehood.
As in predicate calculus, the rules of inference provide a basis
for combining well-formed-formulas and truth values. MYCIN'S model of
approximate reasoning employs a unique calculus for combining evidence.
When the premise of a rule is evaluated, each predicate returns a
number between -1.0 and 1.0. The AND connector necessitates a
minimization of the arguments , while an OR connector requires that
a maximization be performed (recall that a rule may have nested OR
conditions in its premise). Thus, evaluation of a premise results in
a numerical value between -1.0 and 1.0. For a rule whose premise
evaluation does not lie within the empirically determined interval
(-0.2,0.2) , the conclusion is made with a certainty that is the
product of the premise evaluation and the certainty factor of the
rule.
Approximate reasoning is a process by which a possible imprecise
conclusion is deduced from a collection of imprecise premises. In
fact , it is the ability to reason in qualitative , imprecise terms
that distinguishes human intelligence from machine intelligence.
Imprecision is a feature of the real-world, and , whether it is
caused by uncertainty, ambiguity, or even, ignorance, human beings
display an ability to reason in its presence
.
The conclusions
,
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of course, would then be less than completely certain. In the
framework of production rules , imprecision gives rise to ambiguous
premises which are rarely completely satisfied. A suitable approach
for dealing with imprecision is to soften production rules so that
even partial satisfaction of their premises could lead to some
action being taken by the interpreter.
The first step in creating soft production rules is to allow
the propositions that make up the premises to take truth values
between truth and falsehood. Several conventional expert systems
provide multivalued truth values to their propositions. For example,
MYCIN'S propositions are assigned values in the range -1.0 to 1.0,
as suggested by the clinical evidence. As the following example
illustrates, human knowledge often consists of facts that can only
be stated imprecisely
. It is this feature that admits propositions
that can have varying degrees of truth.
Example 4.2.1
Most people who are familiar with the game of football have a
general idea of the qualities a good running back should possess. A
running back is usually well-built, but not too bulky. More
importantly, he should be very quick, and must have excellent ball-
handling ability. This knowledge can be represented in the following
production rule
;
IF a man is well-built, but not too bulky
AND he is very quick
AND he possesses excellent ball-handling ability
THEN he would make a good running back.
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The premise consists of three propositions, pertaining to the
attributes: build, speed, and ball-handling ability. Note that the
propositions are judgmental, and appear to be ambiguous. However,
this is a feature of knowledge about a running back, and even expert
football scouts would agree that the rule is reasonable. Indeed, the
same is also true in many other domains. Experts often find it
difficult to express their knowledge exactly. The facts and definition
are usually very qualitative, and the evaluations are purely
judgmental. Yet, an expert is able to provide excellent results.
Perhaps, this is because the expert possesses a deeper, more
correct conception of domain knowledge.
Consider the proposition concerning a running back's speed,
he is very quick.
When an expert (himself, a well-known running back) was asked for
additional details, his response was
"...he should be able to run the 40-yard dash in 4 . 7 seconds,
or less. And, the faster, the better."
This is the expert's deeper perspective. He knows what to look for,
and how to rate what he sees. Thus, depending on his speed, a
candidate could satisfy the proposition to a greater or lesser extent.
This degree of satisfaction is the truth value of the proposition
(with reference to the candidate) . A possible relation between the
time, t, taken to run 40 yards, and the truth value of the proposition,
is :
h(x2 ) =1, if t < 4.5 seconds
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h(x
2 )
= 1.0 - 0.25(t - 4.5), if t £ [4.5,4.9] seconds
and
h(x ) = 0, if t > 4.9 seconds.
The presence of linguistic concepts in the propositions gives
rise to ambiguity, and necessitates multivalued truth levels.
Perhaps, the essential difference between an interested spectator
and an expert scout is in the fact that the latter has a better
notion of these linguistic concepts that qualify the attributes.
It is this better notion that we call expertise. Hence, on
observation of a candidate, the expert could provide better
truth values to the propositions.
As Example 4.2.1 demonstrates, ambiguities in facts and definitions
arises from their specification in qualitative, linguistic terms (see,
e.g., Zadeh, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c; concerning the use of linguistic
variables in approximate reasoning) . Another characteristic of human
reasoning is that one is rarely absolutely confident of the truth or
falsehood of propositions. To accomodate the ambiguity and uncertainty
inherent in many areas of human expertise, it is plausible to permit
propositions to take multivalued levels of truth. This is a general
formulation that would always embrace conventional crisp propositions.
A production rule can be represented in the general form:
IF proposition 1
AND proposition 2
AND proposition 3
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The left-hand side of the rule presented above, is a compound condition
comprised of unitary or atomic propositions linked by AND connectors.
We assume that premises having OR connectors can always be decomposed
into two or more production rules of the general form, with the same
action, or right-hand side. For example, the production
IF proposition 1
AND (proposition 2 OR proposition 3)
THEN action
can be broken down to two rules having the same action,
IF proposition 1
AND proposition 2
THEN action
IF proposition 1
AND proposition 3
THEN action.
The right-hand side of a rule in this formulation is not restricted to
a single action. More generally, it could consist of a set of actions
to be performed once the conditions are satisfied.
Since the premise of a production rule in the present framework
is restricted to a compound statement consisting of AND-connected
,
soft propositions, for purposes of evaluation, it is convenient to
represent it as a set of propositions. For example, the rule
IF proposition 1
AND proposition 2
AND proposition n
THEN action
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would have its premise, X, given by
X = {x-p x
2 ,
. . . ,
x
n
} (4.5)
where x. represents the i-th proposition in the premise, X. The
production rule can, therefore, be written as
IF X THEN action.
Depending on the observation or manifestation, truth values,
h(x.) e [0,1], (4 . 6)
are provided to each proposition, x
±
£ X. Many conventional expert
systems (Rl and MYCIN, included) perform evaluations of their premises
(containing AND-connected propositions) using the minimum operator.
The premise evaluation, E (X), for the rule is given by
E
m
(X) = Min(h(x.)). (4 .7)
x.eX
i
There are two important points to be noted concerning this operation.
First, the evaluation is very pessimistic, since the premise
evaluation is the lowest truth value from among the propositions
contained in the premise set. Secondly, the evaluation using the
minimum operator is also feasible for crisp propositions, for which
h(x.) e {0,1}. . (4. 2)
Human experts introduce considerable subjectivity into their
decision making. Some extent of subjectivity is incorporated into
production rules due to the specification of premises in terms of
soft propositions. However, also important is the fact that in
performing evaluations
, human beings are inclined to weigh and
balance the evidence. We often have prior conceptions concerning
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the relative weights of propositions. These notions play important
roles in our analyses.
Example 4.2.2
Knowledge pertaining to the selection of a good running back
(Example 4.2.1) is represented in the production rule:
IF a man is well-built, but not too bulky
AND he is very quick
AND he possesses excellent ball-handling ability
THEN he would make a good running back.
The propositions that make up the premise of the rule deal with three
criteria: build, speed, and ball-handling ability. We felt that, while
all three criteria are relevant in selecting a running back, some
qualities could, possibly, be more important than others. So we went
back to our old friend, the expert, for his opinion. His answers were
most enlightening.
"...Most important, perhaps, is his speed. A good running back
is almost always an excellent sprinter. Take Herschel Walker, for
example.
.
."
"...But then, he should be able to hold on to the ball without
fumbling. So ball-handling ability would be almost as important.
Well, perhaps, slightly lower on the scale..."
"...Build is surely not as important as the other two criteria.
But we can't have someone too small or too big, playing running back.
In any case, it would be unlikely for someone rather big to be able
to run real fast..."
The comments provided above illustrate that knowledge about the
relative weights of propositions does form a sizeable chunk of expertise.
Additionally, they are usually known a priori.
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Monotonicity is a fundamental feature that is inherent in human
evaluative strategies. The principle of monotonicity is illustrated
by the adage
Given move, we feel at least as good, or even better.
Since a premise of a production rule is written as a set, it is
convenient to employ measures of sets to represent the magnitudes
of importance that groups of propositions (or subsets of the premise
set) carry. The principle of monotonicity is used as the basis for
the definition of these measures. Monotonic measures (or fuzzy
measures, see, e.g., Sugeno, 1974) provide a plausible framework
for dealing with information concerning the relative weights of
propositions
.
Definition 4.2.1 (Sugeno, 1974)
A monotonia (or fuzzy) measure, g, defined on a finite reference
set, X, is a function from the a-algebra, P(X), or power set of X to
the interval [0,1], which has the following properties;
i) g(0) 0, g(X) = 1. (Boundedness and Non-negativity) (4.8a)
ii)
V°-i> Q2 £ P(X) > if Qi£Q2'
g(Q
x
) « g(Q 2 ). (Monotonicity) (4.8b)
The premise of a production rule is the finite reference set, X,
in Definition 4.2.1, and any subset Q of X would then be a subset of
propositions from the premise. The measure, g(Q) , is taken to represent
the collective importance that the criteria (propositions) contained in
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set Q contribute toward the evaluation of the premise. The complete
premise, X, represents the totality of evidence that can be used in
the evaluation, and is, therefore, assigned a measure of one, i.e.,
g(X) = 1. (4.8a)
On the other hand, the null set, 0, contains no propositions, and,
therefore, contributes no information towards the evaluation; thus,
g(0) - 0. (4.8a)
The second property in Definition 4.2.1, which gives monotonicity
to the measures, provides the necessary intuitive framework. If Q
is a subset of Q the set Q contains at least one more criterion
(proposition) than set Q . It would, therefore, carry at least as
much weight as (if not more than) set Q in the evaluation. Thus,
we write
g(Qi) -S g(Q 2 )- (4.8b)
The broad definition of monotonicity includes additive as
well as non-additive features. A monotonic measure which is
subject to the additional constraint
g(Q 1 0Q 2 ) = g(Q,) + g(Q,), for Q Q £ P(X) and O^DO., - 0,
(4.9)
is additive. This restriction implies that the combined measure
is exactly equal to the sum of the individual measures of sets
Q and Q . Or, in our framework, the total information content or
importance of a group of criteria is exactly equal to the sum of the
contributions of the individual criteria. The principle of additivity
(Equation 4.9) is used to define probability measures in stochastic
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theory, and finds its rationale in the frequentative interpretation
of randomness.
The phenomenon of human subjectivity in the combination of
evidence is purely an epistemic concern. We are dealing with
a priori notions that may have nothing in common with the paradigm
of chance. It is implausible to suggest that these notions always
follow the axiom of additivity. A more reasonable approach would
be to allow for general non-additivity in the domain of evidence
combination. Additivity of measures is restricted to special
cases. Hence, instead of Equation 4.9, non-additive monotonic
measures are subject to the additional constraint;
gCQxUty B^) + g(Q2 ), f°r Qj, Q 2 £ P(X) and Qx f| Q 2 = 9-
(4.10)
The following example demonstrates the utility of monotonic
measures in knowledge representation.
e 4.2.3
In Examples 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the premise, X, of the production
rule contains three propositions, i.e.,
X = {x^, x
2
, x
3
J
where x
±
concerns the person's build, x
2
concerns the person's speed,
and, x
3
concerns the person's ball-handling ability. The production
rule can, therefore, be written in the form
IF X THEN Y (i.e., the person would make a good running back)
IF {x x , x } THEN Y.12 3
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Corresponding to this formulation we could define sub-rules of the
original production. The premises for these sub-rules are subsets
of the original premise, and, in general, 2 separate sub-rules can
be generated from a premise consisting of n propositions. The premise
in our example has three propositions, and the following eight sub-
rules result.
i) IF THEN Y
ii) IF {x } THEN Y
iii) IF {x } THEN Y
iv) IF {x > THEN Y
3
v) IF {x, , x„} THEN Y
1 2
vi) IF {x x } THEN Y
vii) IF {x , x } THEN Y
and
viii) IF {x
l
,
x
2
,
x } THEN Y.
Each sub-rule can be used independently in an evaluation. However,
depending on the importance of the propositions contained in the premise
of a sub-rule, a greater or smaller weight is accorded to it. This would
later manifest itself in the evaluation. The weights of importance of
the premises of sub-rules represent the meta-level knowledge that is
inherent in human expertise. An expert would know exactly how important
each subset of his original premise is, and the effect it would have on
his evaluation.
Monotonic measures provide a useful methodology for representing
meta-level knowledge. The premise, X, corresponds to the totality of
114
evidence that can be used in an evaluation. Hence
g(X) - 1.
On the other hand, the empty premise in the sub-rule
IF THEN Y
bears no information, and thus,
g(0) 0.
The expert's remarks in Example 4.2.2 indicate that although the
three attributes of build, speed, and ball-handling ability are relevant,
all of them are not equally important for the task, of selecting a
running back. Speed is the most preferred attribute, while it is not
absolutely essential that the person must satisfy the build criterion.
Based on these aspects, the following measures for sets of criteria
from the original premise (or, degrees of importance for premises of
sub-rules) have been provided by the expert.
g(0) =
5 ({x1 })
= 0.10
;({x
2
» = 0.25
g({x
3
}) = 0.20
g({x
x
, x
2
» = 0.50
g({x
x
,
x
3
}) = 0.40
g({x2 , x3 }) = 0.60
g({x
1
,
x
2
, x
3
>) = 1.
The measures are seen to be monotonic and non-additive.
One important point remains to be noted. It is almost a fact that
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an obese person cannot run very fast. One might, therefore, argue that
It is incorrect to treat build and speed as independent criteria, as
the theory of monotonic measures dictates. We concede that the relation
between build and speed does exist. However, we are dealing with epistemic
concepts, and the subjectivity that enters in their combination is,
perhaps, too complex to model precisely. In order to admit mathematical
treatment of these concepts, the present approach assumes that each
proposition is an independent piece of knowledge. Interactions, such as
the one between build and speed, are implicitly dealt with in the
procedure for formulating the measure for their combination.
Before venturing any further, it is useful to review the ideas we
expounded to this point. We have seen that domain-specific knowledge
encoded in the production rule formalism offers manifold advantages.
However, imprecision is a feature of the real-world, and allowances
must be made for reasoning in its presence. The specification of the
premise of a production rule in terms of soft propositions that can
take shades of truth, is the first step toward reasoning in the presence
of imprecision. An expert tends to have a clear conception of the
propositions that make up his expertise. He knows what the propositions
mean, and how to evaluate them depending on what he sees. Hence, the
task of a knowledge engineer is to find out exactly what the soft
propositions imply. He should also define them in a manner that would
enable a computer to assign accurate truth values depending on the
manifestation.
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Human experts also have prior notions about the relative weights
of propositions in a premise. Some propositions are more important
than others, and this deeper information is taken into account when
the evidence is weighed and balanced. Monotonic measures have been
shown to possess properties that come in useful for representing
meta-knowledge of this type. Perhaps, a person could be considered
to be an expert because he has clearer notions concerning the
relative importances of criteria. If this is true, Knowledge
Engineering requires us to glean this information from the expert
so that the most accurate measures of importance are obtained.
In the present attempt to introduce human subjectivity into
mechanistic decision making, the decision strategy has been decomposed
into two distinct parts. One is the intrinsic importance that each
proposition (and each group of propositions) carries in an evaluation,
and the other is the extent to which the propositions are satisfied
once an observation is made. A functional is needed to combine
these two aspects so that a mean evaluation of the premise is
achieved. The Sugeno Integral (or, Fuzzy Integral, see, e.g., Sugeno,
19 74) is one such functional that also has excellent intuitive
justification.
Definition 4.2.2 (Sugeno, 1974)
For a finite reference set X, let (X, P(X), g) be a monotonic
measure space, and let h:X » [0,1] be a function defined on X. The
Sugeno Integral over any finite set Q e P(X) is given by
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j h(x)og(.) - Max ( Min (h(x. ) ) A g(Q F) ). (4.11)
Q FeP(X) x.eF x
The Sugeno Integral combines the function, h, with the monotonic
measure, g , in a non-linear fashion that may appear to be rather
enigmatic; however, it possesses useful mathematical properties. The
Sugeno Integral may be interpreted as representing a mean or expected
value in applications where monotonic measures are used to grasp
human subjectivity. The integral is itself monotonic, and is analogous
to the Lebesgue Integral (a functional defined on additive measures)
that finds applications in the theory of probability. In fact,
Sugeno (1974) has shown that if the integral is defined on a probability
measure space (i.e., the measure, g, follows the axioms of probability),
the value is close to the probability expectation value. In addition to
these mathematical properties, the Sugeno Integral has excellent
intuitive features that render it useful for the evaluation of premises
of production rules. For the time being, let us confine ourselves to
the Sugeno Integral defined over the finite reference set X, which is
written as
j h(x)og(.) = Max ( Min (h(x. ) ) A g(X (\ F) )
X FeP(X) x eF x
l
= Max ( Min (h(x ))Ag(F) ). (4.12)
FeP(X) x.eF
Recall that in the present framework, the premise of a production
rule is the reference set, X. Each element of this set is a proposition
or criterion, and the premise is a collection of criteria on the basis
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of which the manifestation must be evaluated. Intuitively this
corresponds to a complete picture, while a subset F of X, is a
partial or incomplete view of the overall picture. Information
about the importance of the view F is specified by the monotonic
measure, g(F). The term, h(x
±
) , is the truth value or level of
satisfaction of the criterion, x , with reference to the manifestation.
The operation
Min (hCx^) (4.13)
x^F
in Equation (4.12) may be interpreted as providing the pessimistic,
or most secure level of satisfaction that the manifestation offers
when examined from the point of view of the criteria contained in
the view F.
In its attempt to provide a mean evaluation, the Sugeno Integral
combines the most secure level of satisfaction obtained from a view
with the relative importance of that particular view. This is done
for all possible views [F eP(X)] of the overall picture, X. These
values are then further combined, resulting in the mean evaluation.
Two specific operations are performed. First, the most secure level
of satisfaction is combined with the relative importance of the
corresponding view using the minimum operator. The value obtained is
no greater than the importance of the view, g(F) ; and this serves to
limit the evaluation provided by a view to a value no greater than
its importance. The second combination, which involves the maximum
operator, selects the best evaluation from among those provided by
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all possible views. This is a common tendency in human judgments. We
look at an object from many different angles or aspects. The angle
that strikes us in terms of satisfaction as well as importance plays
a major role in our analyses.
Example 4.2.4
In previous examples, we have seen that knowledge pertaining to
the selection of a running back is embodied in the production rule
IF a man is well-built, but not too bulky (x )
AND he is very quick (xj)
AND he has excellent ball-handling ability (x,)
THEN he would make a good running back (Y)
where
IF X THEN
{x.
,
X2
, XoK
Let us suppose that an expert football scout has given the
following evaluations to a walk-on candidate for the football team;
h(Xl ) = 0.35
h(x
2 )
= 0.45
and
h(x
3
) = 0.55.
Or, the candidate has been evaluated as satisfying the criterion of
build to a degree of 0.35, speed to a degree of 0.45, and, ball-
handling ability to a degree of 0.55.
a) The conventional scheme involves the use of a minimum operator.
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The expert systems, Rl and MYCIN use this methodology [see, Equation
(4.7)], and the premise evaluation is given by
E
m
(X) = Min(h(x ))
x.eX
= Min(h(x
1
), h(x
2
), h(x ))
Min(0.35, 0.45, 0.55)
= 0.35.
The blanket use of the minimum operator results in a very pessimistic
evaluation, since the candidate is evaluated to be only as good as his
worst quality indicates. More importantly, the deeper, yet pertinent,
information concerning the relative importances of the three criteria
has been neglected in the evaluation.
b) In Example 4.2.3, we have seen that the original production
can be broken down into 2 3 (= 8) separate sub-rules, given by
IF F THEN Y
where
FSX,
i.e.
,
F £P(X) = {0, { Xl }, {x2 }, {x3 }, { Xl , x2 ), {xr x 3 ), (x2 , x 3 ), X}.
Each sub-rule is a specific piece of knowledge which could be used
independently in deciding whether the candidate would make a good
running back. However, depending on the criteria contained in its
premise, the sub-rule carries a varying level of importance as an
independent evaluation. In terms of the intuitive picture discussed
previously, the premise of a sub-rule corresponds to a view of the
overall picture. The view may be incomplete, in which case, the
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resulting evaluation Is not absolutely certain. The measures, g(F)
,
where F £P(X), carry information pertaining to the importance of each
view. Our expert has provided the following values;
g(0) -
g({x }) = 0.10
g({x
2
J) = 0.25
g({x
3
)) = 0.20
g({x,, x,}) = 0.50
g({x 1; x3 }) - 0.40
g({x
2 ,
x
3
J) » 0.60
and
g({x1> x , x }) = 1.
The Sugeno Integral takes each sub-rule (or, view), and calculates
the minimum or most secure level of satisfaction for its premise. Thus,
the operation
Min(h(x.))
x.eF 1
i
gives rise to
for F = 0,
0.35 for F = {x },
0.45 for F = {x },
0.55 for F = {x },
Min(0.35, 0.45) = 0.35 for F = {x
, x },
1 2
Min(0.35, 0.55) = 0.35 for F = {x x },
Min(0.45, 0.55) = 0.45 for F = {x x },
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and
Mln (0.35, 0.45, 0.55) - 0.35 for F • {x x x }
1 2 3'
Next, the most secure level of satisfaction and the importance of the
premise of each sub-rule are combined. The evaluation provided by any
sub-rule is limited to a value no greater than its importance, and the
operation
Min(h(x ))Ag(F)
x.cF
i
yields
OftO = for F = 0,
0.35ft 0.10 = 0.10 for F = {x.},
0.45A0.25 = 0.25 for F={x
2
},
0.55A0.20 = 0.20 for F = {x },
0.35A0.50 = 0.35 for P - {x,, x,};
0.35 K0. 40 = 0.35 for F={x.,x,},
1 3
0.45 ftO. 60 = 0.45 for F={x
2 ,
x-j},
and
0.35M.00 = 0.35 for F = {x , x , x }.12 3
Finally, the Sugeno Integral takes the best (highest) evaluation from
among those provided by all the sub-rules. The premise evaluation is
given by
E (X) = /h(x).g(.)
X
Max(0, 0.10, 0.25, 0.20, 0.35, 0.35, 0.45, 0.35)
0.45.
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Note that the value obtained using the Sugeno Integral [E (X) = 0.45]
is substantially higher than the evaluation obtained using the minimum
operator in part (a) [1^00 = 0.35]. This is because we have been able
to take into account the information concerning the relative weights
of propositions in the evaluation. The criteria of speed and ball-
handling ability are considered to be rather important when taken
together [g({x2> x }) = 0.60]. Our candidate has satisfied these
criteria, collectively, to a value of 0.45; this has resulted in
the higher evaluation.
Monotonic measures have been introduced in the context of
production rules so that the a priori notions that human experts
have about the relative weights of propositions in premises can
be represented and dealt with effectively. The Sugeno Integral,
defined on these monotonic measures, has been shown to have a
reasonable intuitive justification as a means for evaluating premises.
On the other hand, the evaluation employed by Rl and MYCIN does not
take into account the importances of propositions, and has been seen
to be rather pessimistic. We employ the concept of a vacuous belief
function (Shafer, 1976) to demonstrate an interesting relationship
between the Sugeno Integral and the conventional procedure of
evaluation, using the minimum operator.
Definition 4.2.3 (Shafer, 1976)
A vacuous belief function, g , is a monotonic measure defined on
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a finite reference set, X, that satisfies the condition
VQCX, g
v
(Q) = 0. (4 . U)
Or, alternatively,
g
v
(Q) =1, if Q = X, (4 . 15a)
and
g (Q) = 0, if Q is any other subset of X. (4.15b)
Let us examine the Sugeno Integral defined on the measure space
of a vacuous belief function, (X, P(X), gy ) . The Sugeno Integral over
a finite reference set, X, is given by
f h(x).g(.) - Max ( Min (h(x. ) ) A g(Xfl F) )
X FeP(X) x.eF x
Max ( Min (h(x.))Ag(F) ). (4.12)
FeP(X) x.eF 1
Thus,
j h(x)og (.) = Max ( Min (h(x.))Ag (F) ).
X v FeP(X) x.eF v
(4.16)
Since
h(x.) E [0,1] (4 . 6)
and
(F) =1, if F = X (4.15a)
" °. if FC X, (4.15b)
for FCX, we obtain
Min(h(x,))/\g (F) = Min(h(x.))A0
x.eF v Xj eF
X
(4.17)
or, more specifically,
Min(h(x.))A g (F) = 0. (4.18)
xiE F
l v
PeX
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On substituting Equation (4.18) into Equation (4.16), we obtain
I h(x).g (.) = Max ( Min (h(x,))Ag (F) )
X FeP(X) XieF
v
= Max ( (Min(h(x.)) A g (F) ) , (Min(h(xt ) ) A gv (F) ) )
x.eF x eF
F eX F =X
= Max (0, 0,..., 0, (Min(h(x,))A gv (X)) )
XjeX
= Min (h(x.))f^g
v
(X)). ( 4 .19)
x^eX
Additionally, since
h(x
± ) 6 [0,1] (4-6)
and
8V
(X) = l
> (4.15a)
Equation (4.19) reduces to
I h(x).gv (.) = Min (h(x±))A 1
X x.eX
1
Min (h(x
± )). (4.20)
X.eX
1
Equation (4.20) leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.1
The Sugeno Integral over a finite reference set, X, and defined
on the measure space of a vacuous belief function, (X, P(X), g ),
reduces to the conventional evaluation using the minimum operator. Or,
the following relation holds;
i h(x)»gv (.) = Min (h( Xi )). (4.20)X x.eX
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Lemma 4.2.1 provides a significant relationship between the Sugeno
Integral and the conventional evaluation using the minimum operator. In
the present framework, monotonic measures are employed to convey
information about the relative weights of propositions in a premise.
The vacuous belief function is a special case of a monotonic measure
that corresponds to abject ignorance about the relative weights. This
measure gives no importance to all evaluations based on incomplete
views (or, sub-rules). Only the complete premise has a non-zero level
of importance, and, since it corresponds to the totality of evidence,
it is given a weight of one. This implies that all the criteria must
be used in the evaluation of a premise, and a partial or incomplete
set of criteria will not suffice.
We have stated that the conventional scheme of evaluation is
pessimistic. However, the pessimism involved now has added significance.
The fact that the Sugeno Integral under the conditions of vacuous
belief is equivalent to the minimum operator, implies that the
pessimism that is a feature of the latter could be considered to be
the result of ignorance. Almost always in real-life, when we know
more about something, we are more certain about our results. Ignorance,
or knowing nothing about the relative weights is implicit in the
definition of vacuous belief, and the Sugeno Integral under these
conditions, should correspond to the lowest possible evaluation. This
fact is, indeed, true, and follows from Lemma 4.2.1. In general, for
constant h(x)
,
f h(x).g(.) >, f h(x).g (.) (4.21a)
X X
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or, by Lemma 4.2.1,
i h(x).g(.) J. Min(h(Xi )) (4.21b)
X x
±
eX
where g(.) is any monotonic measure; and, g (.) is Che vacuous
belief function.
The development of expert systems that can reason in the presence
of ignorance is the focus of ongoing research. Yet, as Duda and
Shortliffe (1983) point out, "questions about how a program should
reason in the presence of ignorance, or how it can even recognize the
limits of its knowledge, are largely unanswered". It is, perhaps,
impossible to develop mechanisms that can reason in the presence of
complete ignorance, and our attention, therefore, is confined to
situations in which ignorance is not total. The definition of the
vacuous belief function, and its use in the Sugeno Integral represents
a step In this direction. A vacuous belief function entails the
absence of the meta-level knowledge that is used to weigh and balance
the evidence prior to making a decision. The Sugeno Integral in this
situation is the lowest bound or most pessimistic value. The low
value is the consequence of ignorance. Observation of human behavior
also shows that ignorance is often associated with conservatism and
pessimism, and these lead to lower levels of certainty being assigned
to the resultant decisions. The present treatment of ignorance is
based on this fact.
We have so far confined ourselves to the Sugeno Integral evaluated
over the reference set, X. The premise of a production rule is the
128
reference set, and the Sugeno Integral has been used to obtain a mean
evaluation over the entire premise, given by
E (X) = j h(x).g(.)
X
Max ( Min (h(Xi )) A g(X F) )
FeP(X) x.eF
l
Max ( Min (h(xj))Ag(F) ). (4.22)
FeP(X) x±eF
The evaluation, ES (X), has been shown to have excellent intuitive
features. Since the premise is represented in terms of a set of
criteria, there are several views or aspects on the basis of which
an object may be examined. The Sugeno Integral combines the most
secure level of satisfaction obtained from each view, with the
relative importance of that particular view. Each view, therefore,
provides a partial evaluation, and the integral selects the best
evaluation from among all possible views. As stated previously,
the Sugeno Integral appears to model the human tendency, whereby,
we look at an object from many different angles. The angle that
strikes us the most plays a major role in the final analyses.
Since the evaluation is performed over the entire premise of the
production rule, the Sugeno Integral considered up to now attempts
to examine the object from all possible views. The power set, P(X),
lists the maximum number of views that can be used.
We have mentioned that ignorance, or not knowing enough, leads
to conservative evaluations. In terms of the intuitive picture,
however, it is suitable to consider conservatism in evaluations
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within the paradigm of ignorance as arising out of an inability to
examine an object from all possible aspects. Complete knowledge
creates no such limitation; in this situation, it is possible to
look at an object from all angles.
To illustrate this point, suppose that we are required to make
a judgment concerning the girth of a tree-trunk. We would first
attempt to walk around the tree, and only then, would we make our
evaluations. On the other hand, if a barrier prevented us from
circumnavigating the tree, the analyses would be incomplete, and
the resulting judgments would not be very certain. In the present
treatment, we view ignorance as the allegoric barrier that prevents
circumspection. The list of possible views is no longer the power
set, but instead, is a proper subset of P(X). And, the greater the
ignorance, the fewer the views, and hence, the smaller the subset
of the power set over which information is integrated.
The term
E (X) = f h(x)og(.) (4.22)
X
represents an evaluation of the entire premise. The evaluation is
made on the basis of all the criteria, or all possible views, and
hence, the upper bound on E
g
(X) is one [This is because in Equation
(4.22) g(F) = 1, for F = X; if h(x
±
) - 1 for all x
±
E X, E S (X)
= 1].
Consider now, the Sugeno Integral evaluated over a proper subset Q
of the reference set, X. Since one or more criteria present in the
premise are not contained in set Q, the corresponding evaluation is
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incomplete, and Is, at best, a partial evaluation, given by (see,
Definition A. 2. 2)
E
S (Q) = ;fh(x).g(.)
Q
Max ( Min (h(x± ) ) A g (Q fl F) ). (4.23)
F£P(X) xl£;F
This corresponds to a situation of partial ignorance in the present
framework. Note that the measure, g, on the right-hand side of
Equation (4.23) has the set, QflF, as its argument. Although F can
be any element of the power set of X [F £ P(X) ] , the argument, QflF,
limits the number of views on the basis of which the evaluation is
made. The new list of views is given by P(Q) , where P(Q) is the
power set of set Q. Additionally, the Sugeno Integral is restricted
to a value no greater than g(Q) . In general, since
QSX, (4.24)
due to the definition of monotonic measures (Definition 4.2.1),
g(Q) * g(X) (4.8b)
and we obtain
ES (Q) $ E s (X) (4.25)
where
E
S (Q) - { h(x).g(.) (4.23)
Q
and
E (X) = f h(x).g(.).5
X
Equation (4.25) demonstrates monotonicity for the Sugeno Integral.
(4.22)
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In the present treatment of evaluations made in the presence
of ignorance, the set Q, over which the integration is performed,
is a subset of the premise set, X. The complete set of criteria is
not taken into account in the evaluation, and, therefore, the
result can never be absolutely certain. Monotonicity of the Sugeno
Integral is a key point in the treatment of reasoning in the
presence of ignorance. It can be seen that the smaller the set Q,
over which the integration is performed (or, the fewer the criteria
considered)
,
the lower the value of the Sugeno Integral. This
monotonicity is convenient for dealing with ignorance, and also
effectively models the conservatism that arises from this situation.
Note that we adopt a methodology by which an evaluation made in
the paradigm of total ignorance is always assigned a value of zero,
or false
,
i.e.
,
E
s (0) = f h(x).g(.)
Max ( Min (h(x.))A g(0fU) )
FeP(X) x±eF
Max ( Min (h(Xj))A g(0) )
FeP(X) x^F
°- (4.26)
[Recall that due to the definition of monotonic measures (see
Definition 4.2.1), g(0) = 0.]
The following example demonstrates the applicability of the
Sugeno Integral.
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Example 4.2.5
Continuing with the problem of selecting a running back, recall
that the production rule is given by
IF a man is well-built, but not too bulky (x-.)
AND he is very quick (X2)
AND he possesses excellent ball-handling ability (x,)
THEN he would make a good running back (Y)
.
This is equivalent to the rule
IF X THEN Y
where
X = {x_ ( X2» x~}.
Let us suppose that for some reason it is not possible to
evaluate the candidate's ball-handling ability. This could occur
in a situation in which information about the extent to which the
candidate satisfies this attribute has not been provided. Hence,
only the criteria of build and speed are taken into account, and
the production rule reduces to
IF a man is well-built, but not too bulky (xi)
AND he is very quick (x2 )
THEN he would make a good running back (Y)
.
The premise of this production rule is a subset of the original
premise, X; it is given by
Q = (Xj, x2 ),
corresponding to the sub-rule
IF Q THEN Y.
In Examples 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, we have seen that the relative
importances of groups of criteria are
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8(0)
gUx^) • 0.10
g«x
2 })
= 0.25
g({x
3
}) = 0.20
g({x. , x,}) = 0.501 2
g({x1 , x3 }) = 0.40
({x2 , x3 )) « 0.60
g({x1> x2 , x3 )) = 1.
These values correspond to the eight different views on the basis of
which the original premise is evaluated. Since the measure
g({x
1 , x2> Xj}) = 1,
the Sugeno Integral evaluation of the entire premise E (X) , has an
upper bound of one. On the other hand, the Sugeno Integral defined
over the set Q is employed to evaluate the incomplete sub-rule,
and
E
S
(Q) = $ h(x).g(.)
Q
Max ( Min (h( Xi ) ) A g(Q f) F) ). (4.23)
FeP(X) x^F
The argument, QflF, for the measure, g, restricts the evaluation
to just four different views. This is because
g(QO0) - g(0), for F =
gCQdtx!}) = g({ Xl }), for F = { Xl }
g(QIMx2 }) = g({x 2 }), for F = {x 2 }
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g(Qr>{x
3
}) = g(0), for F = {x }
eCJnfxp x
2
)) = g((xv x 2 }), for F = i Xl , x2 }
gCQfJtxj^, x3 }) = gCfxj^}), for F = {jtj, x3 )
8(QnU
2 >
x
3 >)
g(tx
2
}), for F = {x
2 ,
x }
and
g(Q0tx1> x2 , x3 )) = g({x1 , x2 )), for F = {k± , Xj, «3).
The measures corresponding to these four views are given by
g(0) =
gCfx^) = 0.10
g({x
2 })
= 0.25
and
g({x
1
, x
2 J)
= 0.50.
Due to the operations involved in the Sugeno Integral [Equation (4.23)],
we can see that
E
S (Q) * gCQn^, x2> * }) = g({x x2 J) = 0.50.
In Example 4.2.4, the degrees to which the walk-on candidate has
satisfied the three propositions are
h(x
x
) = 0.35
h(x2 ) = 0.45
and
h(x
3
) = 0.55
The present example, however, does not take into account the criteric
of ball-handling ability. This corresponds to ignorance about the
attribute, and, a suitable default value is
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h(x
3 )
= 0.
The other truth values, h(x.) and h(x~) , are unchanged. In assigning
the value of zero to the proposition, we assume that a worst-case
evaluation is given to a criterion that is not considered. This
smacks of pessimism; however, it is a common trend in human judgment
to give a conservative estimate concerning something that is unknown.
Thus
E (Q) = j h(x)og(.)
Q
Max ( Min (h(x.)Ug(QnF) )
FeP(X) x.cF
Max
0.00A0, for F
0.35A0.10, for F = {x^
0.45A0.25, for F = {x
2 >
0.00A0, for F {x,
0.35AO.50, for F = { Xl> x 2 )
O.OOA0.10, for F = {x
± ,
x
J
0.00A0.25, for F = {x
2 ,
Xj}
0.0OA0.50, for F = {x x., x }
Max(0, 0.10, 0.25, 0, 0.35, 0, 0, 0)
0.35.
Note that the value, E
S (Q) 0.35, obtained above, is significantly
lower than the evaluation of the premise in Example 4.2.4 [E (X) • 0.45].
This lower value is expected.
An interesting point to note is that the evaluation of the
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incomplete premise, Q, under the conditions of vacuous belief is
given by
E (Q) = i h(x)og (.)
Q
(4.27)
This is because the vacuous belief function places absolutely no
importance on all incomplete views. Indeed, the evaluation is
performed strictly on an all or nothing basis.
'
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THE SUGENO INTEGRAL IN MULTILEVEL REASONING
In the preceding sections, we have seen that production rules
offer a modular representation of knowledge that captures the essence
of human expertise. The methodology proposed by us employs the Sugeno
Integral to evaluate the premises of soft production rules which are
comprised of AND-connected propositions. This provides a convenient
framework for approximate reasoning in the presence of ambiguity as
well as partial ignorance. Additionally, the conventional evaluation
that uses the minimum operator has been shown to be a special case
of the present methodology. In this section, we extend the formulation
to admit multilevel reasoning.
A production rule connects a set of conditions with one or more
actions that are relevant once the conditions have been satisfied.
This represents a single deductive step. During the operation of a
production system, the interpreter summons the short-term memory or
data base, each time it executes a rule. If the premise of the rule
is satisfied, the rule is fired, and the corresponding actions modify
the data base. The interpreter proceeds to control the activity of
the system by adjusting the sequence of application of the rules.
Rules are selected and executed according to a predetermined sequence,
and each time, the data base is accessed. This elicits a chain of
reasoning, in which, a series of production rules appear to be linked.
The action parts of production rules at one level form the premises
of production rules at another level. Rules nested in this manner
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represent larger deductive steps, or, deductive leaps.
As an example, consider the following production rules;
and
IF X C1) THEN Y (D
IF x (2) THEN Y (2)
IF x (3) THEN Y (3)
where X* ;
,
X ( ', and X (3> are the premises of three different rules.
Let us assume that the interpreter selects, executes, and then fires
each rule in turn. The actions, Y (1)
, Y
(2)
,
and Y (3)
,
then proceed to
modify the data base.
Suppose that there exists a fourth rule which uses these actions
as conditions in its premise. This rule could be written as
IF X (4) THEN Y (4)
or
IF Y (1)
(2)AND Y v ;
(3)
AND Y l ;
(4)
THEN t .
The scheduling, execution, and firing of the four rules in sequence,
represent two unitary deductive steps, or a deductive leap spanning
two levels
.
At this stage, it is of interest to examine the reasoning
methodology that MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976) employs. Suppose that
the following productions are present in MYCIN'S rule base;
Rule 1: IF X (1) THEN Y (1) [ CF (1J ]
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Rule 2: IF ( X
(2a)
OR X
(2b)
) THEN Y (2) [ CF
(2)
]
Rule 3: IF X*^ THEN Y (3) [ CF (3) ]
and an additional rule that uses the actions, Y , Y , and Y ,
as propositions in its premise. This rule could be specified as
Rule 4: IF ( Y
(1)
AND Y
(2)
AND Y
(3)
) THEN Y
(4)
or,
Rule 4: IF X 1- 4 -1 THEN Y*- 4 ' [ CF^ ].
Note that X represents an AND-connected set of propositions, and
the term, CF
,
is the certainty factor for the i-th rule.
Let us suppose that data concerning the premises of Rules 1, 2,
and 3, are already present in the data base. Additionally, let us
assume that the action of Rule 4, t"', is the prescribed goal. MYCIN
is a goal-directed system, and the process of reasoning starts by
searching the rule base for rules whose actions conclude something
about the goal. This points to Rule 4. Next, the premise of Rule 4
is examined. The clauses, Y
, Y , and Y , which comprise the
(4)
premise, X
,
become the new sug-goals, and MYCIN proceeds to
search its rule base for more information. This procedure comes up
with Rules 1, 2, and 3. A tree is generated, and using truth values
h E [-1.0, 1.0], (4.28)
for the propositions in Rules 1, 2, and 3, the certainty or truth
(4)
value of the goal, Y
,
is established. The methodology is as
follows
:
First, the premises of Rules 1, 2, and 3, are evaluated by
resorting to conventional maximum (OR), and minimum (AND) operators;
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the results are given by
Em(X
(1)
) = Mln (h(x.)) (4.29)
x.eX
(1) J
E
m
(X <2) ) = Max ( E
m
(X (2a) ), Em (X
(2b)
) )
= Max ( Min (h(x.)), Min (h(x.)) ) (4.30)
x eX< 2a > x ,X< 2b >
'
J j
and
E (X (3) ) = Mln (h(x )). (4.31)
v (3)
J
x.eX
Next, the certainties of the actions are obtained by multiplying
the premise evaluations with the corresponding rule certainty factors.
Note that if a premise evaluation, E
m ,
lies in the interval (-0.2,0.2),
there is insufficient evidence pointing to truth, or falsehood, and
the certainty of the corresponding action is equated to zero. Otherwise,
h(Y (1) ) = CF (1) • E
m
(X (1) ) (4.32)
h(Y (2 >) - CF
(2)
• E
m
(X
(2)
) ( 4 . 33 )
and
h(V (3) ) - CE
(3)
-Ey 3'). ( 4 . 34)
The premise of Rule 4 can now be evaluated. The result is given
by
(4)
E (X v ') = Min (h(x.))
x.eXW '
3
= Min ( h(Y (1) ), h(Y (2) ), h(Y (3) ) ). (4.35)
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Finally, the certainty or truth value of the goal t is
estimated. This is specified by
hCY<*>, - »<« • ^«) (4 . 36 a)
= 0, if E
m
(X v ') E (-0.2,0.2). (4.36b)
In the present methodology, premises of production rules are
restricted to those consisting of AND-connected propositions. This
is a convenient approach that gives rise to uniformity and modularity
within the rule base. Additionally, in our opinion, human experts
find it easier to comprehend and specify rule certainty factors for
rules that are made up of conjunctions of simple propositions. The
OR connector is quite ambiguous, and logical ORs nested within
premises normally complicate matters. More importantly, it will be
seen that the decomposition of complex premises containing disjunctions,
into two or more rules having the same action, is performed with no
loss in generality. In fact, the methodology involving the
decomposition and subsequent evaluation of complex premises is
the more general of the two methodologies.
Let us consider the four rules examined previously. Rules 1, 3,
and 4 satisfy the restriction placed on the premises of production
rules in the present treatment. However, Rule 2 has an OR connector
in its premise, and must be decomposed into two simple rules having
the same action. The new rule base is shown below.
CF
(1)
]
CF
(2a)
]
e 1: IF x
(l)
THEN Y (D
e 2a: IF x
(2a)
THEN Y
(2)
and
Rule 2b:
Rule 3:
Rule 4:
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IF x
(2b)
THEN Y (2) [cF (2b)
,
IF x
(3)
THEN Y
(3)
[ CF
(3)
]
IF x (4) THEN y(« [ CF (4) ]
For this modified rule base, let us examine the evaluation of
the certainty of the goal Y ( ^
.
The premises of Rules 1, 2a, 2b, and
3 offer the following evaluations;
E (X (1) ) = Min (h(x.)) (4.37)
x.eX (1)
and
E
m
(X C2a) ) = Min (h(x,)) (4.38)
x.,X<
2a>
J
E (X (2b) ) = Min (h(x.)) (4.39)
x. £X<
2b >
J
(3)
E
m (
X > = Min (h(x.)). (4.40)
(3) J
There are now two distinct ways in which we can proceed. Either, we
can essentially combine the evaluations of Rules 2a and 2b, as MYCIN
does, or we can go on to estimate the certainties of the sub-goals,
Y
,
Y
, and Y . Following the latter procedure, we obtain
h(Y (1) ) = CF (1) • V* (1) ) (4.41)
h(Y< 2\ -2a CE (2a) •Vx (2a) ), from Rule 2a (4.42)
(2)
CF
(2b) v* (2b) >. from Rule 2b (4.43)
and
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. ,„(3). (3) (3),h(Y ) - CF E^X ). (4.44)
We now have two estimates of the certainty or truth value of the
(2)
sub-goal Y [Equations (4.42) and (4.43)]. Since Rules 2a and
2b are two distinct pieces of knowledge that point toward the
same conclusion, it is feasible to select the certainty of Y
using the maximum operator. Thus,
h(Y U) ) = Max ( ha (2> ) 2a , h(Y
(2)
) 2b )
- Max(CF< 2a) .E
m
(X
(2a) ),CF (2b) , «W) ).
(4.45)
Note that this result is equivalent to the certainty estimated in
the previous case [see Equation (4.33)], only if
„„(2) (2a) (2b)
CF = CF
V
CF . (4.46)
This is because, if Equation (4.46) holds, we obtain
h(Y (2) ) - Max ( CF (2a) • Em (X
(2a)
), CF
(2b)
• E
m
(X(2b) ) )
CF
(2)
• Max ( Em (X
(2a)
), E
m
(X
(2b)
) ). (4.47)
Through the use of Equation (4.30), we can write
h(Y (2) ) . CF (2) .E
m
(X
(2)
), (4.33)
which is the estimate obtained prior to the modification of the
rule base.
In general, the two certainty factors do not have to be equal,
and, therefore, the results provided by the two approaches do indeed
differ. We adopt the modified-rule-base approach which is more general,
and is also justified from the point of view of convenience. Having
obtained the certainties of the sub-goals, Y , Y , and Y ; the
(4)
estimation of h(Y ) proceeds as before. Thus,
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(4)
E
m
(X v '•) - Min OlGc,))
(4)
3
and
x eX
J
Min ( h( Y
(1)
), h(Y
(2)
), h(Y
(3)
) ) (4.48)
h(Y
(4)
) = CF
(4)
• E (X (4) ). (4.49)
[Note that Equations (4.48) and (4.49) are the same as Equations
(4.35) and (4.36) respectively.]
It is now a simple matter to incorporate the Sugeno Integral in
multilevel reasoning. As already stated, the present formulation deals
with production rules whose premises consist of AND-connected soft
propositions. Furthermore, the truth values or degrees of certainty,
h, that are assigned to propositions are restricted to the [0,1]
interval, i.e.
,
h £ [0,1] (4. 6)
where "0" corresponds to falsehood, and "1" entails truth or
complete satisfaction. In the conventional scheme, the premise
evaluation is given by
Em (X) = Min (h(x )). . (4.7)
x.eX J
J
We have seen that this evaluation is equivalent to the Sugeno Integral
defined on a vacuous belief function measure space, (X, P(X)
, g )
[This fact follows from Lemma 4.2.1.], i.e.,
E (X) = Min (h(x,))
x.eX J
I h(x)og (.). (4.20)
X
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Monotonic measures are employed to convey meta-ievel Information
about the relative weights that groups of propositions carry in the
evaluation of a premise. The vacuous belief function is a special
monotonic measure that corresponds to an absence of this deeper
information. In general, for any monotonic measure, g, the value
of the Sugeno Integral is never less than the value obtained by
using the minimum operator (or, the Sugeno Integral defined under
the conditions of vacuous belief). This fact is stated mathematically
where
and
E
S
(X) >, EfX) = E„(X)
E
s
(X) - Sf h(x).g(.)
E (X) = Min (h(x.))
x.eX J
E (X) - ^h(x).g(.).
X
(4.50)
(4.22)
(4.7)
(4.51)
The higher value for E
g
(X) in Equation (4.50) is expected, and arises
from the use of additional or meta-level knowledge in the evaluation.
Since the evaluation can cope with additional information, it is more
general than the conventional minimum operator; and is employed in
the present methodology to evaluate the premises of production rules.
Before we can specify a generic production rule, one more point
remains to be considered. After a premise has been evaluated, it is
necessary to establish the certainty (or truth value) of the
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corresponding action. Recall that MYCIN'S model of approximate
reasoning employs a certainty factor, CF, for each action in a
production rule, where
CF £ [0,1]. (452)
A certainty factor that is close to one represents a strong link
between the conditions and action of the production rule. In
other words, this implies that the action has a high degree of
certainty when the premise is satisfied. For a rule i, whose
premise evaluation does not lie within the interval, (-0.2, 0.2),
MYCIN'S conclusion is made with a certainty, h(Y
1
). that is the
product of the premise evaluation, E
m
(X (l) ), and the corresponding
rule certainty factor, CF^ 1 ). Thus,
h e [-1.0, 1.0]
( 4.28)
and
h(Y (l) ) = 0, if E
m
(X
(i)
) £ [-0.2, 0.2] (4.53a)
h(Y
1
) = CF • E
ffl
(X
L
), otherwise. (4.53b)
In general, however, a certainty function, f , defined by
-f
U)
: E
m
(X (1) ) [or, ES (X
(1)
)] * [0,1], (4.54)
is suitable for expressing the strength of the link between the
conditions and action of the i-th production rule. Human experts
usually find it quite convenient to specify their conceptions in
linguistic terms. The notion of linguistic variables (see, e.g.,
Zadeh, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c) provides a rationale for the
representation of linguistic concepts in terms of the certainty
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functions, V
. These certainty functions are similar to the
certainty factors in MYCIN; however, the certainty or truth
value of the action, Y , is given by
h(Y (l) ) = y (1) (E
s
(X (1) )). (4.55)
We may now express a generic production rule in the form
Rule i: IF X
(l)
[ g
(l)
(.) ]
THEN Y
(1)
j f
(i)
,
(4.56)
4* [ f<«
Y
(i>
r
y(i)
m. m.
where X**J ± s the premise of Rule i, which consists of n. AND-
propositions , and is written as
X
(1)
- (x^.x^, x^ } . (4 . 57)
The truth value or extent of satisfaction of a proposition x. e X ,
is given by
h(xj ) £ [0,1]. (4.58)
Additionally, the importances of groups of propositions in the
(i)
premise, X
,
must be provided. They follow the constraints
imposed on monotonic measures (see, Definition 4.2.1):
8
(1)
£ [0,11 (4.59a)
g
(l)
(0> = (4.59b)
(D,v (iK
8 (x ) * 1 (4.59c)
and
148
forQ<«, Q<« £ P(x (i) ), IfQ^gQ^,
g
(1) (Q^).<g (1) (Q^). (*.»«
There are 2 different arguments for g 11 "', and there are 2 1
corresponding values.
The premise evaluation, E (X ) , is given by
E
S
(X ) = j h(x Jog (.)
(i)
X
= Max ( Min (h( X
(l)
) ) A g
(l)
(X
(l)
(\ F) )
(i) (i) J
F e P(X ) x. eF
= Max (Min (h( x (l) ) ) A g
(l)
(F) ) . (4.60)
(i) (i) J
FeP(X ) x. eF
J
For situations in which it is not possible to provide truth values to
all the propositions in a premise, X , the integration is performed
over a subset Q of X
X
[The set Q
(l)
contains all x^ X) for which
truth values are available.]. Thus,
h(x< 1) ) =0, if *<« t QW . (4.61)
and the evaluation of the incomplete premise, Q , is given by
E
S (Q
(1)
) = f h(x
(i) ).g (i) (.)
(i)
Q
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Max ( Min Wsf'))A g (i) (Q (i) n F) ),
(i) (i) J
FeP(X ) x. eF
(4.62)
where, in general,
E (Q
(i)
) « E(X (i) ).
The certainties or truth values for the actions, Y
, Y ,
(4.63)
Y
U)
are given by
HY (
k
±}
) - T
(1)
(E
s (Q
(1)
)), k .l, 2,
„w
where ty. is the certainty function for the k-th action in the
i-th rule, and ES (Q ), Q
x £ x ( , is the premise evaluation.
(4.64)
The rule base of the proposed production system would contain
several production rules of the generic form presented above. During
the operation of this production system, the interpreter schedules
the execution of the rules. The sequence of rule selection, validation,
and firing essentially nests the rules, and this elicits a chain of
reasoning. The execution of each rule represents a single deductive
step. But when rules are nested, the single deductive steps are
chained, and the reasoning process spans several deductive steps.
The present formulation employs the Sugeno Integral to evaluate
the premises of production rules. This functional permits the use
of meta-level information in the evaluation, and is a generalization
of the minimum operator. It can be used in conjunction with
conventional data-driven and goal-driven strategies. The following
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example demonstrates the application of the Sugeno Integral in
multilevel reasoning.
Example 4.3.1
In the preceding section, we have seen that knowledge about
a running back is specified by the production;
Rule 1: IF a man is well-built, but not too bulky (x )
AND he is very quick (x!j )
AND he has excellent ball-handling ability (x )
THEN he would make a good running back (Y )
Rule 1: IF X (1) [ g
(1)
(.) ]
where
THEN l'1' [ f^
1 1
„(«
,
(1) CD (1),X » {x. , X, , X, }.
The measures of importance, g (.), are as follows;
g
U)
(0) =
g
(1) ({x (1) }) = 0.10
g
(l) ({x (l) }) , . 2 5
g
C1) <{*<«}) - 0.20
and
(1) ((x^, f>» - o .50
1
x
(1 >}) = 0.
3
.40
2
*<»})
- 0.
3
.60
(1) ((x^,
*f,*f)) = 1.
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Th*> nfir-i-aint-Ar fim^f-!'^ W ^ 'e ce ta ty function, ¥ , is uniformly-true , or u- true (see, e.g.,
Zadeh, 1975c) , and is given by
Y
CW „<»,
. ,
(i)
1 * *! ( E (Q
v
') )
MQ (1) ),
where
Q
(1) SX (1\
and
E
S (Q
(1)
) - ^h(x (1) ).g (1) (.).
Q
(1)
Let us assume that there exists another rule that defines the
attribute of build. This is given by
Rule 2: IF a man has the requisite height (x. )
1
AND he has the requisite weight (x, )
THEN he is well-built, but not too bulky fl5 )
Rule 2: IF X (2 >
: s
(2)
(.) i
THEN Y| 2)
|: *{
2)
i
where
x
(2)
= <x<
2\xf>h
( 2)The measures of importance, g^ (.), are as follows;
g
(2)
(0) =
g
(2) ({x (2) }) = 0.30
g
(2) ((xf }) - 0.40
*
(2)
«42\*f
»
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(2)The certainty function, f, , is u-true, and is given by
i 2) - ^ 2) ( Es cq (2) >)
ES (Q
( 2
>),
where
Q
(2)£X (2)
,
and
e
s
(q< 2 >) = fh(x( 2 )). g ra ( .).
Q
(2)
Additionally, assume that the following rule defines the speed
criterion;
Rule 3: IF a man has a good timing for the 40 yd. dash (x\ )
AND he has a good timing for the shuttle run (xi )
(3)AND he has a good timing for the obstacle race (x )
THEN he is very quick (y| 3) )
Rule 3: IF X
(3)
[ g
(3)
(.) ]
where
THEN y' 3 ' [ <F <'
3 '
,(3) . (3) (3) (3).
C = CJEj
,
x
2 ,
x
3
}.
(3)The measures of importance, g (.), are as follows;
g
(3) (0) -
g
(3) ({x{ 3) }) - 0.20
g
(3) ({xp ) }) = 0.20
g
(3) ({x^ 3) }) = 0.15
3
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an d
,
0,«^.^H - 0.60
.(3)
«x<
3
>, *«>}) . 0. 50
5
(3W 3 > .(3)
,
*l ))
= 0.50
5
(3) ({x< 3 >, .(3) }) 1.x
(3)
2 ' "3
The certainty function, «, , is u-true, and is given by
»C3) ,„<3>,
_ ,
(3)f *, ( E (0/ ') )
E(Q (3) ),
where
and
Q
(3)£X (3)
,
EJQ (3) )
(3)
Note that the actions of Rules 2 and 3 are propositions in the
premise of Rule 1. The three rules are linked, and the tree that is
generated is presented in Figure 4.1.
h(x3
(2).
Let us suppose that a walk-on candidate has been evaluated as
satisfying the propositions to the following levels;
) = 0.35 (ball-handling ability)
') = 0.45 (height)
) = 0.55 (weight)
) = 0.60 (40 yard dash timing)
) = 0.55 (shuttle course timing)
h(x
h(x< 2 >>
h(x< 3^
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HEIGHT
Rule 2 BUILD
Rule 1
WEIGHT
Rule 3 SPEED
40 YARD DASH
SHUTTLE RUN RUNNING BACK
OBSTACLE RUN
BALL-HANDLING ABILITY
Figure 4.1. Selection of a running back.
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(3)
h(x^ ) = 0.75 (obstacle course timing).
The process begins by evaluating Rule 2. Since truth values have
been provided for all the propositions in the premise, integration is
performed over the premise set, X (2) [i.e., Q
(2)
= X
(2)
] . The premise
evaluation is given by
E
S
(X (2) ) . fn(K (2>).g< 2 >(.)
x
(2)
= 0.45.
The truth value or certainty of the corresponding action, Y.(2 '> , is
given by
h(Y{ 2) ) . ^
2
>( E (X <
2
>) )
Vx< 2 >)
0.45.
( 2)The certainty of the action, Y^
, is also the degree to which the
candidate satisfies the build criterion in Rule 1, i.e.,
hCx^) . h(Y< 2) )
0.45.
Next, Rule 3 is evaluated. Since truth values have been provided
for all the propositions in its premise, integration is performed over
the premise set, X [i.e., Q
3
= X
(3)
]. The evaluation is given by
E
S
(X
(3)
) . ^h(x (3) ).g (3\.)
x
(3)
= 0.55.
The truth value or certainty of the corresponding action, tP , is
156
given by
h(Y< 3) ) - ^
3) (E
S
(X»>) )
= E
s
(X (3) )
0.55.
This certainty is also the degree to which the candidate satisfies
the speed criterion in Rule 1, i.e.,
hix^h = h(YJj 3) )
0.55.
Finally, Rule 1 is evaluated. Since truth values for its
propositions are available, integration is performed over the
premise set, X [i.e., Q = X ]. The evaluation is given
. , Y U), r ,. (l), (l), ,E (X ) = f h(x )og (.)
by
x
(1)
= 0.45.
The truth value for the action, Y-, , is given by
h(Y{ 1) ) = t^i E
g
(X (1) ) )
- E (X (1) )
s
0.45,
or, the walk-on candidate has been found to satisfy our conception
of a good running back to a level of 0.45.
Note that the levels to which the candidate has satisfied the
(1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) upropositions; x^
,
x-^
, y>2 , x^ * *h i ana x3 • have been
provided. There are no missing data, and all evaluations are complete.
In a real-world problem, there is always a possibility that some data
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may be missing. In such instances, we suggest that default truth values
of zero be assigned to propositions for which data are not available.
Since integrations are performed over subsets of premise sets, one or
more premise evaluations are essentially incomplete; and the final
evaluation (the extent to which a candidate satisfies our conception
of a good running back) is even less certain.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The production rule formalism is natural to human strategies of
problem solving and decision making in several areas of human activity.
This has contributed to its increased use in conventional expert
systems
.
Human beings are able to engage in approximate reasoning. In fact,
it is this ability to reason in imprecise, subjective terms that
distinguishes human intelligence from machine intelligence. The
specification of premises of production rules in terms of soft
propositions that can take shades of truth, represents an attempt
to induce human-like reasoning that is able to cope with the imprecision
rampant in the real-world.
The goal of research in AI is to emulate intelligent human activity.
Yet, it is important to realize that this does not mean that a computer
program is considered successful only if it duplicates human intelligence
in its entirety. Instead, the intention must be to simulate human
strategies as reasonably as possible. Given the subjectivity that enters
into human decision making, it is evident that the specification of
soft production rules, on its own, is not sufficient. Human beings tend
to weigh and balance the individual pieces of evidence in arriving at
an evaluation. Clearly, a functional is needed to model this subjective
combination of evidence. The evaluation of premises of production rules
using the Sugeno Integral is, therefore, an attempt to introduce the
human quality of subjective combination of evidence into the production
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rule formalism.
In our methodology, premises are written in the form of sets of
AND-connected propositions. This is done without any loss of generality.
Monotonic measures of sets represent the magnitudes of importance that
groups of propositions (or subsets of premises) carry. These measures
are meta-level descriptions of the a priori notions that are inherent in
human expertise. Thus, in our attempt to introduce human subjectivity
into mechanistic decision making, the premise evaluation has been
decomposed into two distinct parts. One is the intrinsic importance
that propositions carry in an evaluation, and the other, is the extent
to which the propositions are satisfied. The Sugeno Integral combines
these two aspects non-linearly. The result is a mean evaluation that
has excellent intuitive justification. Additionally, the Sugeno Integral,
which includes the conventional minimum operator as a special case, also
provides a convenient framework for modeling the conservatism that is
seen in human reasoning in the presence of ignorance.
The knowledge-based strategy in AI is a pragmatic approach towards
the emulation of intelligent human activity. The pragmatism exhorts us
to look for better ways to express, recognize, and use diverse and
particular forms of knowledge in solving realistic problems that have
been suitably constrained so that useful solutions are obtained. We
believe that the present methodology is in line with this pragmatism.
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CHAPTER V
AN APPLICATION IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF RICE GRAIN
163
Processing operations performed on rice crops give rise to
appreciable amounts of broken grain. Unlike other cereals, rice
demands a premium price only as whole grain. Broken fragments sell
for approximately half the price of corresponding whole kernels, and
in the rice industry, it is a matter of considerable importance to
divide rice grain into several classes, depending on the degree to
which the kernels are damaged. The emphasis on uniformity and accuracy
in specifying standards on rice quality has seen the acceptance of
mechanical procedures of classification that involve the use of sieves
and plates. Although these procedures do work rather well, there is no
doubt that they tend to move away from a common-sense view of rice
classification.
The task of separating rice grains into different classes depending
on the extent of breakage, we believe, is purely a matter of visual
discrimination that is easily and effectively performed by trained
personnel. Observation of experienced grain inspectors indicates that
they have clear notions of what prototypes from different classes look
like. More specifically, they know what to look for, and exactly how to
assess what they see. In performing their analyses, they draw and act
on relevant pieces of domain-specific knowledge.
In this chapter, the ideas developed in preceding chapters are
brought to bear on the problem of classification of rice grain. We
attempt to follow the visual approach that an expert grain inspector
would adopt. Information specific to the task of classification is
coded in the form of production rules (see, e.g., Barr and Feigenbaum,
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1981). Essentially, a prototype from each class Is defined by a unique
production rule, similar in form to a discriminant function (see, e.g.,
Andrews, 1972) employed in classical pattern recognition theory.
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ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF RICE GRAIN
The quality of rice is usually evaluated on the basis of its
suitability for a specific end-use by a particular group of consumers.
In the United States, where standards on quality are rigidly observed,
rice quality depends on a variety of parameters, such as grain size,
shape, uniformity and general appearance. Other pertinent factors
concern milling yields, cooking and processing characteristics,
cleanliness, soundness and purity (Webb and Sterner, 1972). Throughout
much of the rice-growing world, however, the standards on quality are
less stringent, and there is still no generally accepted basis for
evaluation. Yet, since most rice is processed and consumed in whole
kernel form, we may anticipate that the physical properties of the
intact kernel, such as shape, size, and general appearance, are of
particular significance in determining the quality of rice. Indeed, it
must be emphasized that the majority of international trade in the
commodity is generally conducted on the basis of quality as determined
by visual examination by experts (Webb and Stermer, 1972).
Rice is unique among cereals in that it is almost always used for
human consumption, and demands a premium price only as whole grain. A
certain amount of breakage, however, is unavoidable. Rice kernels have
been observed to be cracked while still in the husk, and are also
broken during harvesting, handling, drying, and milling. Milling, which
is almost always performed on rough rice (unhulled rice, also known as
paddy), involves the removal of the hull, bran layers and germ, while
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preserving the kernels to approximately their original shape. It is
of interest to note that about 15 percent of all rice milled in the
United States is broken (U.S.D.A. , 1969). This translates to an annual
figure of approximately 1 billion lbs. [0.45 million metric tons].
Since the larger pieces of broken rice sell for a little more than
one-half the price of whole rice, while smaller fragments sell for
less than one-half the price of comparable whole grains; the annual
loss due to breakage may be conservatively estimated to be around
30 million dollars. A great deal of effort has already been focussed
toward the reduction of grain breakage, and many experts opine that
the percentage of grain breakage will not reduce drastically. It is,
therefore, quite obvious that economic considerations necessitate the
adoption of reliable and efficient procedures for separating whole
kernels from broken fragments of rice.
In the United States, rice is marketed under three types, designated
as long-grain, medium-grain, and short-grain (Adair, 1972). The present
work is confined in its scope to the treatment of long-grain milled
rioe (see APPENDIX I, for U.S. Standards for Hilled Rice.).
Milling operations result in the production of rice grains with
varying degrees of breakage. Depending on the extent of breakage, it is
customary to divide milled rice into four classes; wholes or head rice,
second heads, screenings, and brewers (see APPENDIX I). The class, wholes,
consists largely of unbroken kernels, although, it is common to consider
grains upto three-quarters of unbroken kernels as belonging to this
category. Second heads are the larger broken grains, one-half to three-
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quarters of the whole kernel. Screenings consists of medium-sized broken
kernels, one-quarter to one-half of the whole grain. The smaller broken
fragments that do not meet the kernel size requirements of the other
classes are termed as brewers. It is conventional to designate fragments
approximately one-quarter (or slightly lower) of the whole kernel as
belonging to this category. Second heads and screenings are usually
blended back into the head rice and used for human consumption (Witte,
1972). The extent of blending depends considerably on the orders placed
by specific consumers, and the standards governing the quality of rice
sold in the United States. Brewers, the least expensive of the four
classes, is usually sold to breweries where it is used as an adjunct
in the manufacture of beer (In the United States, it is permitted to
use rice as a starch source for making beer.). Representative samples
belonging to the four classes are presented in Figure 5.1.
Cursory examination of the grain samples seems to indicate that
properties such as shape, size, and general appearance are sufficient
for the task of distinguishing between grains belonging to different
classes. More importantly, the task appears to be purely a problem of
visual discrimination that could be performed by trained humans. However,
the U.S. Standards for Milled Rice suggest the use of procedures that
involve the operation of sieves and plates for classification. This is
largely due to a need for uniformly accurate procedures for judging
rice quality. In rice trading circles, there is a common feeling that
unless the grading procedures are objective, the criteria of quality
cannot be accurately and uniformly measured, interpreted, and specified.
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wholes second heads
screenings b rewe rs
Figure 5.1. Representative samples from the four classes of rice grain.
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It appears that the emphasis on objective procedures arises out of a
lack of faith in the reproducibility of human judgment. We do not feel
that this lack of faith is sufficient to justify the transmutation of
the classification problem, from one viewed in common-sense visual
terms, to another defined on the basis of objective and procedural
aspects
.
We must retain our a priori conceptions of grain classification.
Prototypes from the four classes should be defined in terms of what
we see, and not how we could mechanically separate them. In order to
do so, we must attempt to understand and emulate the reasoning an
expert grain inspector would adopt when he places a rice kernel on
his palm, prior to making a quantitative assessment of quality.
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PRODUCTION RULES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF RICE GRAIN
An experienced grain inspector, on examination of a rice kernel
that rests on his palm, is almost effortlessly able to place it in one
of the four prescribed classes. The assessment of the general appearance
of a grain sample plays a major role in the process of discrimination.
Production rules offer a convenient representation of knowledge relevant
to the discrimination process. In this section, we attempt to construct
the production rules that define prototypes from the four classes.
The extent of damage to the rice kernel is a basic attribute that
determines the belonging of a grain sample to a given class. This
enables us to specify the following simple rules.
Rule 1. IF the kernel is approximately intact
THEN the sample is a whole.
Rule 2. IF the kernel is approximately three-quarters intact
THEN the sample is a second head.
Rule 3. IF the kernel is approximately one-half intact
THEN the sample is a screening.
Rule 4. IF the kernel is approximately one-quarter intact
THEN the sample is a brewer.
Considerable clarifications are needed before the general rules
presented above can be applied. Specifically, it is important to
understand precisely what the concepts approximately intact, approximately
three-quarters intact, etc., entail. We contend that an expert grain
inspector has the ability to solve the classification problem because he
has clear notions of these concepts. Our task, therefore, is to elicit
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chis information from him and other experts.
There appear to be two separate strategies that a grain inspector
uses when he attempts to evaluate the degree of intaatness . In one
scheme, he superimposes a mental image of a prototype kernel over the
sample under consideration. Alternatively, he might extrapolate the
sample to achieve the prototype grain, and then assess the extent of
breakage. Consultations with several grain inspectors and grain
processing experts have indicated that both schemes are employed,
simultaneously, and to varying levels. The simulation of hybrid
matching-extrapolation schemes requires sophisticated hardware and
software capabilities. In our attempt to simplify the problem, while
retaining these aspects of the discrimination process, we examine a
set of more basic attributes, the consideration of which is implicit
in both methodologies.
Each of the parameters, length, width, area, and slenderness, has
an important bearing in an expert's assessment of the general appearance
of a rice grain. Length is the distance between the most distant tips
of a kernel. For milled rice, width is defined as the distance across
the kernel at its widest point. The area that a kernel projects along a
view, perpendicular to the length and width axes, is the area parameter.
Slenderness is defined as the ratio of kernel length to its width. The
four parameters, illustrated schematically in Figure 5.2, form the
basis for definitions of the ambiguous concepts, approximately intact,
etc., which occur in the simple discrimination rules specified above.
The incorporation of the four parameters, described in the preceding
slenderness =
length
width
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~*~
thickness
A.
width
length
Figure 5.2, Shape parameters for milled rice kernels.
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paragraph, in a model of visual discrimination is justifiable. Whether
an expert superimposes a mental image of a prototype kernel over the
grain sample, or, whether he extrapolates from the sample kernel, he
proceeds from a priori concepts. In the first case, the mental image
itself is the prior notion, and this could be specified as a function
of the four parameters. On the other hand, we could consider the four
parameters as governing the extent of extrapolation in the alternate
scheme, in much the same way as strings control the movements of a
marionette. Our simplified four parameter model, like a crude puppet,
is unable to simulate human ability completely, and it may be necessary
to introduce additional parameters at a later stage.
Notions about degrees of intactness, that appear in the simple
rules of discrimination, may now be expressed in terms of the four
parameters. The definitions, constructed in collaboration with experts,
incorporate linguistic concepts to qualify the parameters of length,
width, area, and slenderness (The grain experts who were consulted,
found it convenient to express their knowledge in qualitative, linguistic
terms.). These definitions are quite obvious, and are natural to human
understanding of the discrimination problem.
approximately intact (wholes) implies
i) a high length parameter
and ii) a medium to high width parameter
and iii) a high area parameter
and iv) a high slenderness parameter.
approximately three-quarters intact (second heads) implies
i) a medium to high length parameter
and ii) a medium to high width parameter
and iii) a medium to high area parameter
and iv) a medium to high slenderness parameter.
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approximately one-half intact (screenings) implies
i) a low to medium length parameter
and ii) a medium to high width parameter
and iii) a medium area parameter
and iv) a low to medium slenderness parameter.
approximately one-quarter intact (brewers) implies
i) a low length parameter
and ii) a medium to high width parameter
and iii) a low area parameter
and iv) a low slenderness parameter.
Corresponding to the four definitions, a set of four discrimination
rules may be specified. They are given below.
Rule 1. IF the kernel has a high length parameter
AND the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
AND the kernel has a high area parameter
AND the kernel has a high slenderness parameter
THEN the kernel is a whole.
Rule 2. IF the kernel has a medium to high length parameter
AND the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
AND the kernel has a medium to high area parameter
AND the kernel has a medium to high slenderness parameter
THEN the kernel is a second head.
Rule 3. IF the kernel has a low to medium length parameter
AND the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
AND the kernel has a medium area parameter
AND the kernel has a low to medium slenderness parameter
THEN the kernel is a screening
.
Rule 4. IF the kernel has a low length parameter
AND the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
AND the kernel has a low area parameter
AND the kernel has a low slenderness parameter
THEN the kernel is a brewer.
Symbolically, a rule may be written in the form:
IF X
(l)
THEN Y
(l)
,
i - 1, 2, 3, 4 (5.1a)
where
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Y (i) _ , (i) (i) (i) (i).X = Ix-l , x 2 , x 3 , x4 } (5.1b)
is the premise set consisting of four AND- connected propositions
(pertaining to the length, width, area, and slenderness parameters
of the kernel)
, and Y is the action corresponding to the i-th
discrimination rule.
Each rule defines a prototype kernel from one of the prescribed
classes. Although, the rules do provide reasonable conceptions of the
prototypes, they are still fairly ambiguous. The propositions that
comprise the premises of the discrimination rules are subject to
interpretation of the linguistic terms they contain. Before the rules
can be applied, it is important that we specify exactly what the
propositions entail.
A clear understanding of the propositions, therefore, is an
essential part of the expertise involved in grain classification.
This understanding enables a grain inspector to evaluate correctly
the extent to which a sample kernel satisfies each proposition, or
more precisely, assign a satisfactory truth value to each proposition.
In the present work, trapezoidal representations are employed to
specify truth values, h(x^ ), corresponding to a proposition x^ in
the i-th rule. The representations, illustrated in Figures 5.3 through
5.6, prescribe truth values (ranging from "0", or false, to "1", or
true) over feasible ranges of the measured parameters. The truth value
representations have been obtained in consultation with experts. The
task involved the measurement of length, width, area, and slenderness
for a large number of pre-evaluated kernels from each class (known as
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*P)
/I \< > \
1 , 1 1 ill 1 1 \ 1 J
5.12 5.40
Length: z^ (mm)
6.887.12 00
Proposition: the kernel has a high length parameter
(1).
) 1.5 1.7 2.5 2.7
Width: zo (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
h(f)
7.5 9.5 14.5 16.5 00
Area: z-^ (mm )
Proposition: the kernel has a high area parameter
h(x|«)
2.48 2.62 3.64 3.75
Slenderness : Za (dimensionless)
Proposition: the kernel has a high slenderness -parameter
CO
Figure 5.3. Truth values for the propositions defining a prototype
whole.
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1
x<
2)
)
i i / i \II 1 ll \ 1 1 «*
3.5 3.75 4.9 5.375
Length: z-, (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high length parameter'
CO
h(x< 2) ) n,
> 1—>
1.5 1.7 2.5 2.7
Width: Zn (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
h(x< 2 >)
4.0 5.0 8.0 9.0 00
Area: Zo (mm )
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high area parameter
h(x4 )
1.3 1.6 2.5 2.9
Slenderness: z, (dimensionless)
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high slenderness parameter
Figure 5.4. Truth values for the propositions defining a prototype
second head.
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h<«P>>
2.7 2.9 3.6 4.3
Length: z^ (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a low to medium length parameter
h(x< 3 >)
1.5 1.7 2.5 2.7
Width: z„ (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
CO
h(x< 3 >)
> 3.8 4.1 6.2 6.8
Area: 23 (mm )
Proposition: the kernel has a medium area parameter
h(4 3) )
0.88 1.04 1.68 2.0
Slendemess: z, (dimensionless)
CO
Proposition: the kernel has a low to medium slendemess parameter
Figure 5.5. Truth values for the propositions defining a prototype
screening.
h(x< 4 >)
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1.41.6 2.62.9
Length: z, (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a low length parameter
00
h(*»)
i LA , L
1.5 1.7 2.5 2.7
Width: z, (mm)
Proposition: the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
h(x<*>)
1,82.1 4.5 5.3
Area: z^ (mm )
Proposition: the kernel has a low area parameter
CO
l_
r t
—
\
h(x^) n
/: > !\
0.68 0.72 1.24 1.26
Proposition: the kernel has a low slenderness parameter
Slenderness: z, (dimensionless)
Figure 5.6. Truth values for the propositions defining a prototype
brewer.
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a training set, in the jargon of pattern recognition). Using this
information, a range of variation for the measured parameter corres-
ponding to each proposition was determined. The guidance of experts
was solicited for the purpose of specifying truth values over each
range.
It is now possible to assess the degrees to which the parameters
of an unclassified kernel satisfy individual propositions. The premise
of each rule, however, consists of four separate propositions, and the
assessment of these propositions produces four distinct pieces of
evidence which must be combined in evaluating the level to which the
unclassified kernel satisfies the entire premise. Since the premises
are comprised of AND-connected propositions, it is conventional to
employ the minimum operator to perform the combination (see, e.g.,
Shortliffe, 1976; and McDermott, 1982). Using this scheme, the
premise evaluation for the i-th rule, E^CX ) , is given by
E^Cx'
1
') = Min (h(x?
L)
)), (5.2)
CD »<«
x. eX
where h(x> 1J ) is the degree to which the sample kernel satisfies the
j-th proposition in the i-th rule. The major drawback of this scheme
is that it provides a very pessimistic evaluation. The sample kernel
is judged to be only as satisfactory as its worst quality indicates,
and it is debatable whether grain experts are so conservative in
their evaluations.
Our conversations with grain experts have indicated that they
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are Inclined to weigh and balance the different pieces of evidence
before arriving at an evaluation. A sample kernel may not satisfy
one proposition very well; yet, if the other propositions are
satisfied sufficiently, a trade-off is performed, and the resultant
evaluation could be quite high. Information about the relative
weights that propositions carry in an evaluation is significant
in the trade-off procedure. Some propositions are more important
than others, and a look at the discrimination rules will illustrate
this point. Note that the proposition pertaining to the width
parameter
the kernel has a medium to high width parameter
is common to all four rules. This is because only seldom in normal
grain processing, does a rice kernel break along a plane parallel
to the length axis (a break, so to speak, against the grain). Hence,
although the width proposition may be pertinent for the task of
differentiating rice kernels from other cereal grains, it does not
provide any information for the specific task of classifying rice.
On the other hand, the propositions dealing with length, area, and
slenderness are of special significance in both tasks, and would
surely carry greater weights in the evaluation of a premise.
The concept of monotonic measures, also known as fuzzy measures
(Sugeno, 1974; also see the preceding chapters), is employed to
capture the a priori notions that experts have concerning the relative
weights of propositions. In the present methodology, the premise of
the i-th rule, X , is written as a set, i.e.,
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v
(i)
,
(i) (i) (i) (i),
X = [*
1 ,
x
2 ,
x
3
,
x
4 }, (5.3)
and the monotonic measure
g
(i)
(Q
(i)
) E [0,l], «
(i)
=X (i)
, (5.4)
represents the combined importance that the set of propositions,
Q , carries in an evaluation. The entire premise, X , corresponds
to the totality of evidence, and
S
(i)
(X
(i) )=l. (5. 5)
On the other hand, the null set, 0, contains no propositions, and,
therefore, contributes no information to the evaluation. Thus,
g
(l)
(0) = 0. (5.6)
For other sets,
Q
(1)
S X
(1)
, ,
(i)
^(i)
, Q
(1)
*0, (5.7)
depending on the propositions contained; a value in the closed
interval [0, 1] is assigned to the measure, g (Q ) - The assignment
of values must follow the axiom of raonotonicity, that is,
qf>, QfW», qfSQ<«,
S^fqfXg'1'^'). (5.8)
The set, Q , is a subset of the premise, X , and for each
rule, there are sixteen different subsets, or mathematically,
Q
(l)
e P(X Cl) )* (5.9a)
P(X ) is known as the power set, or set of all subsets, of X
The cardinality (number of elements) of P(X ), written as card(P(X ),
is 16.
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where
and
P(X (1) ) - {Q«*>. «4«,
Ai)
,
(i)
Q
3
- {x
2
n
(i)
,
(i)
Q 4 - {x3
tf»- Cxf)
*
w
- i^. x, )
*f- ,
(i)
{x
l '
CD,
X, }
413 - t,f\ ?>)
c- u<«. f>,
tf- <4°. xf>#- (x^, 4^
<#- c4°. (i)x2 (i)x3
o
(1)
-Q 13 - c*i», x
(i)
2 ,
x
(1)
4
«<«
.
f,<« .<« .<«
3
(1)
3
(1)
.(« .(« _(Di
Ci)j
(i) (i) (i) (i>,
_ Y (i)
(5.9b)
(5.9c)
(5.9d)
(5.9e)
(5.9f)
(5.9g)
(5.9h)
(5.91)
(5.9j)
(5.9k)
(5.91)
(5.9m)
(5.9n)
(5.9o)
(5.9p)
(5.9q)
(5.9r)
„ . . (i) (i) . .Ine monotonic measure, g (Q ) , is used to represent the a pi^cpra
notion of the weight carried by the body of evidence, Q , in an
evaluation of the premise. Our task, therefore, is to assign values
between zero and one, for the sixteen different bodies of evidence
provided by each of the four rules (or, 16 x 4 = 64 values from the
[0, 1] interval).
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The experts we have consulted are of the opinion that since each
rule deals with the same four parameters, it would be reasonable to
assume that the measures are identical for equivalent sets from all
rules . Thus
,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3), (3) (*),„(*>,
g (Qj ) = g (Qj ) = g (Q. ) = g (Qj ),
j = 1, 2, . . . , 16. (5.10)
Once this assumption is made, it is necessary to assign values to
just sixteen measures; in reality, only fourteen values need be
specified, since, by definition,
g
(l)
(0) - 0, (5.6)
and
g
(i) (x (i) } m x _ (55)
The experts have found it quite convenient to specify magnitudes of
relative importance for individual propositions; however, the assign-
ment of values to subsets containing more than one proposition is a
difficult task. To alleviate this difficulty, the sixteen subsets are
arranged in order of increasing importance. The values are then
carefully assigned, one at a time , always checking that the axiom of
mono tonicity is satisfied. The following measures have been found to
be suitable for the discrimination rules:
,(i) (0) = (5.11a)
g
(i) ((x^ i) }) = 0.01 (5.11b)
g
(i) ({x^ i) }) = 0.02 (5.11c)
g
(i) ({x£ i} }) = 0.03 (5. lid)
g
(l) ({x| i) }) = 0.05 (5. lie)
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(^({.p, 4^)) 0.30
l
(1)«lW X(D }) . Q.30
0.35<*>«««> ««:
^Uk'", ««}) =0.40
5
(1) {{^i) , x* 15 )) = 0.55
^({x^xi^.x^
(i),. (i) (i) (i)
? (tx2 , x3 , x4
(i),, (i) (i) (i)
1 (tx, , x, , xA
}) » 0.40
) - 0.60
}) = 0.65
}) = 0.75
(5.11f)
(5.11s)
(5.11h)
(5.111)
(5.11J)
(5.11k)
(5.11£)
(5 . 11m)
(5.11a)
(5.11o)
and
(1) (1) (1) (i) (1)
; (tx , x
2
,
x , x^ )) = 1. (5. lip)
The Sugeno Integral (Sugeno, 1974; also see the preceding chapters
for additional details) combines the bodies of evidence provided by
individual propositions. The resultant expression for the premise
evaluation, ES (X ), is given by
»(D,
E S (X
W
) - fh(xW )
v (i)
UK U)
(.)
.
Max ( Min (h(x '(jAg' '(X (l) nF) )
U) U) J
FrP(X ) x. eF
Max ( Min (n(xW))/\ g
(l)
(F) ).
U) U) J
FeP(X ) x. eF
(5.12)
The Sugeno Integral in Equation (5.12) is evaluated over the reference
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set, X
,
and corresponds to an evaluation of the entire premise.
In certain situations, it may not be possible to evaluate a premise
completely. Specifically, information pertaining to certain parameters
may be missing, and truth values cannot be assigned to all propositions
within a premise. The present methodology permits the partial evaluation
of a premise. This may be represented by the evaluation of the sub-rule;
(i)
HEN Y (5.13a)
(5.13b)
IF Q
(i)
whe re
Q
(1W3.)
for which
ES (Q ) = J- h(x ).g (.)
Max ( Min (h(x
(l)
)) A g
(l)
(Q
(l)
F) ). (5.14)
(i) (i)
FeP(X ) x. eF
The set, Q , contains the propositions for which data are available.
We suggest that truth values of zero be assigned to propositions for
which no information is available. This corresponds to -the conservatism
that is often seen in human analyses performed in the presence of
ignorance. The conservatism also manifests itself in the resultant
evaluation, E
s
(Q^ 10. Since the Sugeno Integral is also monotonic, i.e.,
E
S (Q
(1)
) $ E
s
(X
(i)
), forQ (i)£X (1) . (5.15)
In other words, a partial evaluation, or one performed in a state
of ignorance, is never better than the complete evaluation of the
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premise.
To this point, we have confined ourselves to the evaluation of
premises of the discrimination rules. A production rule, however, has
two specific parts , a condition, and an action. Therefore , having
obtained the premise evaluation, ES (Q ), it is necessary to translate
this information into a certainty of the corresponding action. The
certainty or truth value of an action,
h(Y (l) ) £ [0,1], (5.16)
depends on the premise evaluation, and the strength of the link
between the condition and action.
A certainty function , ¥ , is used to relate the action certainty
to the evaluation of its premise (see Chapter IV) . This function, which
is similar to a certainty factor in MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976), is
adjusted to express the strength of the condition-action link. For the
purposes of grain classification, we assume that the action of each
rule is as certain as its premise evaluation. Thus , the certainty
functions take a u-true, or uniformly-true form (see, e.g., Zadeh, 1975c);
this gives rise to
h(Y (1) ) - * (1) (E
s (Q
(i)
))
= EfQ (i) ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, (5.17a)
q
(i)sx (i)_ (5.17b)
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A RULE-BASED CLASSIFIER FOR RICE GRAIN
In the preceding section, we have developed simple rules that
define prototype kernels from the four prescribed classes of rice
grain. The simple rules of discrimination are quite natural to an
expert's understanding of the classification problem. Naturally, at
this stage, it is of interest to implement these ideas in a simple
rule-based classifier that relies on these rules to identify unknown
kernels
.
The following rules define the four classes;
Rule 1. IF X (1) THEN Y (1) {wholes)
Rule 2. IF X (2:) THEN Y (2) {second heads)
Rule 3. IF X ( THEN Y^ 3) {screenings)
Rule 4. IF X (4 ' THEN Y (4) {brewers)
(see the preceding section for details)
.
Input data pertaining to
the shape and size of an unclassified kernel, I, is represented by
a pattern vector, z . This is given by
h = <•*!• zn< z i3> *w} - (5 - 18a)
where
*jl length of kernel l (mm) (5.18b)
Z£2 = width of kernel I (mm) (5.18c)
2Z£3 = area of kernel I (mm ) (5.18d)
Zjj^ " slenderness parameter of kernel I (dimensionless) (5.18e)
Values of zero are substituted in place of missing data in the
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pattern vector.
The classifier proceeds by scheduling Rules 1 through 4 in sequence.
For each rule i, depending on the elements in the pattern vector, t.,
truth values,
h<*j > £ E [0,1], J • 1, 2, 3, 4, (5.19)
are assigned to the propositions, x' 1 ^, in the premise. The Sugeno
Integral is used to obtain the premise evaluation,
E
s (Q
(i)
) , Q
(i) cx (i)
; (5.20)
after which, the corresponding action certainty, h(Y ) , is estimated.
The certainty functions are all assumed to be uniformly-true, i.e.,
h(Y (1\ . * (i) (Es (Q (1\)
= E
s
((5
(i))
i> (5.21a)
where
Q £X . (5.21b)
Rules 1 through 4 provide independent estimates of certainty
for their actions, i.e.,
h(Y )
l
= certainty that kernel I is a whole (Rule 1)
(2)h(Y ) = certainty that kernel I is a second head (Rule 2)
x,
(3)
h(Y )j = certainty that kernel 1 is a screening (Rule 3)
(4)
h(Y )^ = certainty that kernel I is a brewer (Rule 4).
(i)
The action certainty, h(Y )
.
, may be interpreted as representing
the degree of belonging of the unclassified kernel, <!. , to the class
defined by the i-th rule. Therefore, we place the kernel, I, in the
class which has the highest certainty. A rule that prescribes the
allocation of an unclassified kernel to a class must be scheduled
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after the application of Rules 1 through 4 . This rule is given by
Rule 5. IF h(Y^) = Max (h(Y (l) )„), k e {1, 2, 3, 4}
i i=l I
(k)
THEN adopt the action Y
(or, kernel I belongs to the class defined by Rule k) .
In some instances, two or more action certainties could satisfy Rule 5.
An additional rule is required to resolve deadlocks , i.e
.
,
Rule 6. IF h(Y ( *) = h(Y ( ') = Max (h(Y C±) ) ),
I I i=l X
AND fci < kl, fel, 82 e U, 2, 3, 4}
Oil)
THEN adopt the action Y
(or, kernel I belongs to the coarsep alass
defined by Rule kl) .
Hence, the proposed rule-based classifier must schedule Rules 1 through
6 in sequence.
A computer program, CERES (named after the Roman Goddess of grain
and harvests) , has been designed to classify rice kernels based on the
preceding six rules. The program is written in WATFIV, and is currently
in the process of validation by grain experts. Several hundred milled
rice kernels have been classified to this point , and the results have
been most satisfactory.
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EXPERIMENTAL WORK
The methodology for the combination of evidence in the production
rule formalism was applied to the problem of classifying long-grain
milled rice into the four classes, wholes, second heads, screenings
,
and brewers
,
described in the preceding sections. The present approach
towards grain classification relies on simple rules of discrimination
that define prototype kernels from the four classes. These rules are
expressed in terms of parameters that pertain to the shape and size
of kernels. The experimental work involved the measurement of the
parameters of length, width, area, and slenderness for sample rice
kernels. Samples of Arkansas-grown, long-grain milled rice were used
in the study.
Equipment
A Quantimet 720B image analyzing computer, manufactured by Image
Analyzing Computers (IMANCO) , Hertfordshire, England, was employed
for measuring the parameters pertaining to the shape and size of rice
kernels. To increase the accuracy of measurements, this system deli-
berately abandons conventional television standards in incorporating
digitally controlled 720 line scanners, purpose-built to minimize
electronic noise. Additionally, an automatic 686 point matrix shading
corrector, coupled with the low noise of special slow-speed scanners,
enable the detection of 64 gray levels. The instrument is equipped
with the following basic modules for operation in the manual mode:
i) Vidicon Scanner (50 mm lens)
ii) Display
iii) System Control
iv) Frame Generator
v) ID Auto-Detector
vi) MS3 Standard Computer
vii) Light Pen.
All experimental work was performed with the analyzer located at the
United States Grain Marketing Research Laboratory, Manhattan, Kansas.
Measurement Procedure
The Quantimet 720B image analyzer is permanently calibrated in
picture points, and all measurements are made in these units. For
calibration in absolute units, it was necessary only to find the
linear equivalent at the specimen of a picture point for the optical
system being used. This was accomplished by employing a scale cali-
brated in millimeters, and computing the picture-point-equivalent.
After the calibration procedure, grain samples were placed on
a black background, and were imaged on the Display Screen. Next, the
imaged kernels were detected using the ID Auto-Detector. Subsequently,
the MS3 Standard Computer was employed to measure the length, width,
and area (projected) of the detected kernels. All measurements were
performed in the manual setting, and, therefore, the slenderness
parameter, defined as the ratio of kernel length to its width, was
computed off-line.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In applications of classical pattern recognition theory, discriminant
functions (see, e.g., Andrews, 1972) are often used as the basis for
constructing classification algorithms . Discriminant functions have the
property that they partition the pattern or feature space into mutually
exclusive regions , each region contributing to the domain of a class.
Suppose that S is the pattern space, and it is required to partition
this space into n regions, s-, , s , . . . , s„. A discriminant function,
$.(2), is defined such that for all points (pattern vectors), 2, within
the class defined by s .
,
we have
$.(2) > *.(z), V2 e s., i i j. (5.22)1 J 1
Thus, within the region s^, the i-th discriminant function will have the
largest value.
The construction and adjustment of suitable functions are important
tasks in the design of a discriminant- function-based classifier. Methods
involving parametric or non-parametric statistical techniques are often
used for developing proper discriminant functions. Sometimes, distribution-
free techniques are employed; here, the functional forms of the discrim-
inant functions (i.e. , linear, quadratic, etc.) are assumed before-hand.
The rule-based classifier developed in this chapter operates in much
the same way as one relying on discriminant functions. Instead of an
assumed polynomial functional form, each production rule itself is a
linguistic discriminant function. The premise is first evaluated, and
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the subsequent estimation of the action certainty, h(Y ), corresponds
to the computation of the value of the discriminant function. Thus,
h(Y ( ') E $
1
(z) defines class 8^ (wholes) (5.23a)
(2)
h(Y ) - $2(8) defines class s 9 (second heads) (5.23b)
(3)h(Y ) 5 $0(2) defines class s, (screenings) (5.23c)
(4)h(Y ) = $,(z) defines class s, (brewers) (5.23d)
where
% = (z l% z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) (5.23e)
is the pattern vector containing the shape parameters of a milled rice
kernel, and h(Y ) is the action certainty for the i-th rule of dis-
crimination.
The present methodology offers advantages that are not available
when conventional discriminant function formulations are employed.
Perhaps, the most significant advantage is in the flexibility offered
by the production rule formalism. Human experts find it comfortable to
express their knowledge in the form of linguistic rules. Instead of
abstract mathematical functions, the propositions in a production rule
are easy to understand, and focus directly on the problem of discrimination.
Additionally, the evaluation of premises of the production rules employing
the Sugeno Integral permits discrimination and classification in an instance
in which the pattern vector, 2, is incomplete. In this situation, the
computation of a polynomial discriminant function in classical pattern
recognition theory, and the evaluation employing the minimum operator
in rule-based formulations, are both meaningless. All things considered,
195
the present methodology provides a powerful framework for a novel scheme
of discriminant-function-based classification.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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The present approach employs elements of monotonic measure
theory in modeling the subjective combination of evidence in the
production rule formalism. The approach has been motivated by
the current emphasis on knowledge-based expert systems and the
corresponding field of Knowledge Engineering.
Knowledge is power, and Knowledge Engineering is the technology
that promises to make knowledge a valuable commodity. In this
chapter, we examine the advantages offered by the present method-
ology in the light of Knowledge Engineering; and proceed to list
our recommendations for future work.
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CONCLUSIONS
The knowledge base of an expert system is a repository of human
knowledge, and the inference engine - the mechanism that manipulates
this knowledge - represents an attempt to mirror the processes involved
in human reasoning. Human beings are characterized by their ability to
reason in subj ective terms . This subjectivity is not only an intrinsic
feature of human knowledge, but also enters into the reasoning process.
Any attempt at modeling human subjectivity, therefore, involves looking
toward ways of representing subjective knowledge, as well as procedures
for using this knowledge effectively in reasoning mechanisms.
The principle of monotonicity underlies most human evaluative
strategies; and the monotonic measures, employed in this work, offer
a convenient means of representing subjective information about the
relative weights of propositions in premises of production rules. The
measures correspond to the deeper or meta-level knowledge pertaining
to the interactions of propositions. They are a priori epistemic notions
that come into play when the evidence provided by individual, or groups
of propositions is weighed and balanced. In many areas of human activity,
this kind of information forms a large chunk of human expertise. The
proper representation of these concepts , therefore , is of considerable
importance from the point of view of Knowledge Engineering.
Having represented the subjective knowledge , the next step in
developing a methodology that mirrors human subjective reasoning is
to get the inference engine to process this knowledge. The mechanism
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that processes the deeper knowledge may operate non-linearly , but must
also possess reasonable intuitive justification. The Sugeno Integral
,
a functional defined on monotonic measure space, has been shown to have
these properties. Employed to evaluate premises comprised of AND-connected
propositions, it unites the lower-level knowledge pertaining to the truth
values of propositions with the meta-level information concerning the
relative weights of propositions. The result is a subjectively weighted
premise evaluation that is also monotonic
.
The monotonicity of the measures and the Sugeno Integral have been
shown to provide a viable framework for the representation and treatment
of ignorance, and the conservatism that is seen in human evaluations
made in its presence. Human beings demonstrate an ability to reason in
the presence of incomplete information, and the present methodology
introduces this ability into systems relying on a pattern of rule-directed
inference.
It might be argued that the Sugeno Integral is just one more
functional that has been proposed for evaluating premises of production
rules. However, it has one significant property; the Sugeno Integral is
an extension of the minimum operator that is conventionally used to
evaluate premises consisting of AND-connected propositions. It is often
felt that the minimum operator is too conservative, since the evaluation
it offers is only as good as the worst attribute indicates. The fact that
the evaluation employing the minimum operator is the lower bound for the
Sugeno Integral and is equal to the Sugeno evaluation in the absence of
meta-level knowledge about the relative weights of propositions (vacuous
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belief conditions) , is in accordance with the conservatism that is the
hallmark of human evaluations made in the presence of ignorance.
The methodology is easily extended to admit multilevel reasoning,
and good results have been obtained in its application in a rule-based
classifier for long-grain milled rice.
In their pioneering paper on the knowledge-based approach in AI,
Minsky and Papert (1974) envision "... progress as coming from better
ways to express , recognize, and use diverse and particular forms of
knowledge...". The subjectivity that enters in the human combination
of evidence may be considered to be a specific local feature of
knowledge-organizing-knowledge . The present approach appears to
provide an excellent framework for expressing, recognizing, and
using this knowledge.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we outline our recommendations for future work;
they are listed under two categories. The first concerns potential
areas of application of the methodology developed in this thesis
,
while the second includes extensions and refinements of the method-
ology.
Production rules are natural to human understanding of problem
solving and decision making, and offer a modular scheme for repre-
senting and using domain-specific knowledge. Monotonic measures and
the Sugeno Integral give production systems the power to express
and manipulate human subjective knowledge. Hence, in addition to
areas that are attractive for production rule representations, the
methodology is especially useful for application in areas in which
subjective decision making is an important feature of human expertise.
The Sugeno Integral has been employed in the present work to
weigh and balance the evidence provided by individual propositions.
In doing so, it essentially performs a rational and systematic trade-
off, and the resulting evaluation is balanced and well-rounded. This
property could be used in developing novel lexicographic optimization
techniques. The use of production rule formulations for this purpose
also has its own benefits.
The design and synthesis of chemical processes is more an art
than a science. A considerable portion of expertise in this area
consists of heuristics , rules-of- thumb , and empirical associations
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that are acquired through extensive experience; this is valuable
knowledge that can be captured and preserved effectively by production
rules. Good engineering judgment has an important role in design and
synthesis. This judgment is characterized by its subjectivity, and is
central in making trade-off decisions.
Automatic control of chemical processes is another area in which
the present methodology can be implemented successfully. Many chemical
systems are too complex to model mathematically. Yet, expert human
operators are capable of performing control actions very satisfactorily.
Heuristic knowledge guides the operator, and often, control actions are
performed although all the feedback information may not be provided.
It appears to be a good idea to incorporate operator-specified, linguistic
rules as a means for effective control. The ability of the present method-
ology to provide evaluations in the absence of complete information is
significant in such applications
.
There are several extensions and refinements that could increase
the power and applicability of the methodology for the combination of
evidence. In this work, we have been concerned mainly with the tasks
of expressing and using subjective knowledge. The acquisition of
knowledge is an important aspect of Knowledge Engineering; and future
work must focus in this direction.
A learning system seems to be the best way in which the machine
could obtain accurate values for measures of groups of propositions.
Tazaki (1983), and Yasuhara (1983) have investigated the inverse
problem, in which knowledge of the value of the Sugeno Integral is
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employed in estimating the values of the monotonic measures. This
requires an understanding of the functional behaviour of the Sugeno
Integral. Another method involves the use of the conditional fuzzy
measure (Sugeno, 1974). This monotonic measure is similar to Bayes'
conditional probability (additive monotonic measure) that is often
used in constructing conventional learning systems (see, e.g. , Fu,
1970).
The use of the present methodology in an expert system requires
an explanation facility designed specifically for the evaluation
employing the Sugeno Integral. The construction of such a facility
needs knowledge of the functional behaviour, and the operations
involved in integration.
It seems plausible to employ a measure-theoretic approach to
express subjective meta-level knowledge. However, as stated previously,
the Sugeno Integral is just one functional defined on monotonic measure
space that is employed for our purposes because it appears to mirror
certain human evaluative strategies. It is, perhaps, possible to define
other functionals having better properties. Detailed psychological
investigations of human evaluative behaviour are required so that
appropriate functionals can be developed.
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APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES STANDARDS FOR MILLED RICE
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U.S. STANDARDS FOR MILLED RICE 1/
TERMS DEFINED
§ 68.301 Definition of milled rice .
Whole or broken kernels of rice (Ovyzg sative L. ) from which the hulls
and at least the outer bran layers have been removed and which contain
not more than 10.0 percent of seeds, paddy kernels, or foreign material,
either singly or combined.
§ 68.302 Definition of other terms .
For the purposes of these standards, the following terms shall have the
meanings stated below:
(a) Broken kernels . Kernels of rice which are less than three-
fourths of whole kernels.
(b) Brown rice . Whole or broken kernels of rice from which the
hulls have been removed.
(c) Chalky kernels . Whole or broken kernels of rice which are one-
half or more chalky.
(d) Classes . There are seven classes of milled rice. The following
four classes shall be based on the percentage of whole kernels, (broken
kernels), and types of rice:
Long-Grain Milled Rice
Medium-Grain Milled Rice
XI Compliance with the provisions of these standards does not excuse
failure to comply with the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, or other Federal laws.
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Short-Grain Milled Rice
Mixed Milled Rice
The following three classes shall be based on the percentage of whole
kernels and of broken kernels of different size:
Second-Head Milled Rice
Screenings Milled Rice
Brewers Milled Rice
(1) "Long-grain milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which
contains more than 25.0 percent of whole kernels of milled rice and in
U.S. Nos. 1 through 4 not more than 10.0 percent of whole or broken
kernels of medium- or short-grain rice. U.S. No. 5 and U.S. No. 6 long-
grain milled rice shall contain not more than 10.0 percent of whole ker-
nels of medium- or short-grain milled rice (broken kernels do not apply).
(2) "Medium-grain milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which
contains more than 25.0 percent of whole kernels of milled rice and in
U.S. Nos. 1 through 4 not more than 10.0 percent of whole or broken
kernels of long-grain rice or whole kernels of short-grain rice. U.S. No.
5 and U.S. No. 6 medium-grain milled rice shall contain not more than
10.0 percent of whole kernels of long- or short-grain milled rice (broken
kernels do not apply).
(3) "Short-grain milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which
contains more than 25.0 percent of whole kernels of milled rice and in
U.S. Nos. 1 through 4 not more than 10. Q percent of whole or broken
kernels of long-grain rice or whole kernels of medium-grain rice. U.S.
No. 5 and U.S. No. 6 short-grain milled rice shall contain not more
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than 10.0 percent of whole kernels of long- or medium-grain milled rice
(broken kernels do not apply)'
(4) "Mixed milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which contains
more than 25.0 percent of wnole kernels of milled rice and more than
10.0 percent of "other types" as defined in paragrapn (i) of this
section. U.S. No. 5 and U.S. Ho. 6 mixed milled rice shall contain more
than 10.0 percent of whole kernels of "other types" (broken kernels do
no t app ly
)
.
(5) "Second-head milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which.
when determined in accordance with §§ 68.303 and 68.304 contains:
(i) Not more than (a) 25.0 percent of whole kernels, (b) 7.0
percent of broken kernels removed by a 6 plate, (c) 0.4 percent of
broken kernels removed by a 5 plate, and (d) 0.05 percent of broken
kernels passing through a 4 sieve (southern productvon) ; or
(ii) Not more than (a) 25.0 percent of whole kernels, (b) 50.0
percent of broken kernels passing through a 6h sieve, and (c) 10.0
percent of broken kernels passing through a 6 sieve (western production).
(6) "Screenings milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which.
when determined in accordance with §3 68.303 and 68.304. contains:
(i) Not more than (a) 25.0 percent of whole kernels, (b) 10.0
percent of broken kernels removed by a 5 plate, and (c) 0.2 percent of
broken kernels passing through a 4 sieve (southern production); or
(ii) Not more than (a) 25.0 percent of whole kernels (b) 15.0
percent of broken kernels passing through a 5^ sieve; and more than
(c) 50.0 percent of broken kernels passing through a 5% sieve and
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(d) 10.0 percent of broken kernels passing through a 6 sieve (western
production) .
(7) "Brewers milled rice" shall consist of milled rice which, when
determined in accordance with 51 68.303 and 68.304, contains not more
than 25.0 percent of whole kernels and which does not meet the kernel-
size requirements tor the class Second Head Milled Rice or Screenings
Milled Rice.
(e) Damaged kernels . Whole or broken kernels of rice which are
distinctly discolored or damaged by water, insects, heat or any other
means, and parboiled kernels in nonparboiled rice. "Heat-damaged
kernels" [see paragraph (g) of this section] shall not function as
damaged kernels.
(f) Foreign material . All matter other than rice and seeds. Hulls
germs, and bran which have separated from the kernels of rice shall be
considered foreign material.
(g) Heat-damaged kernels . Whole or broken kernels of rice which
are materially discolored and damaged as a result of heating and par-
boiled kernels in nonparboiled rice which are as dark as. or darker in
color than, the interpretive line for heat-damaged kernels.
(h) Objectionable seeds . Seeds other than rice, except seeds of
Eahinoch log cztisgalli (commonly known as barnyard grass^ watergrass
_,
and Japanese Millet).
(i) Other types . (1) Whole kernels of : (i) Long-grain rice in
medium- or short-grain rice, (ii) Medium-grain rice in long- or short-
grain rice, (iii) Short-grain in long- or medium-grain rice, and (2)
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broken kernels of long-grain rice in medium- or short-grain rice and
broken kernels of medium- or short-grain rice in long-grain rice,,
except in U.S. No. 5 and U.S. No. 6 milled rice. In U.S. No. 5 and
U.S. No. 6 milled rice, only whole kernels will apply.
NOTE: Broken kernels of medium-grain rice in short-grain rice and
broken kernels of short-grain rice in medium-grain rice shaii not be
considered other types.
(j) Paddy kernels . Whole or broken unhulled kernels of rice; whole
or broken kernels of brown rice, and whole or broken kernels of milled
rice having a portion or portions of the hull remaining which cover one-
eighth (1/8) or more of the whole or broken kernel.
(K } Red rice . Whole or broken kernels of rice on which there is an
appreicable amount of red bran.
(1) Seeds . Whole or broken seeds of any plant other than rice.
(m) Types of rice . There are three types of milled rice as follows:
Long grain
Medium grain
Short grain
Types shall be based on the length-width ratio of kernels of rice that
are unbroken and the width, thickness, and shape of kernels that are
broken as set forth in the Rice inspection Handbook 2/.
(n) Ungelatinized kernels . Whole or broken kernels of parboiled
2/ Publications referenced in these standards will be made available upon
request to the Federal Grain Inspection Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 1400 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20250.
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rice with distinct white or chalky areas due to incomplete gelatinization
of the starch.
(o) Well-milled kernels . Whole or broken kernels of rice from which
the hulls and practically all of the germs and bran layers have been
removed.
NOTE: This factor is determined on an individual kernel basis and applies
to the special grade Undermilled milled rice only.
(p) Whole kernels . Unbroken kernels of rice and broken kernels of
rice which are at least three-fourths of an unbroken kernel.
($) 5 plate . A laminated metal plate 0.142-inch thick, with a top
lamina, 0.051-inch thick, perforated with rows of round holes 0.0781
(5/64) inch in diameter, 5/32 inch from center to center, with each row
staggered in relation to the adjacent rows, and a bottom lamina 0.091-
inch thick, without perforations.
( r ) §. PAft-t-Jr ' A laminated metal plate 0.142-inch thick, with a top
lamina, 0.051-inch thick, perforated with rows of round holes 0.0938
(6/64) inch in diameter, 5/32 inch from center to center, with each row
staggered in relation to the adjacent rows, and a bottom lamina 0.091-
inch thick, without perforations.
(s) 2\ sieve . A metal sieve 0.032-inch thick, perforated with rows
of round holes 0.0391 (2^/64) inch in diameter, 0.075-inch from center
to center, with each row staggered in relation to the adjacent rows.
£t) 4 sieve . A metal sieve 0.032-inch thick, perforated with rows
of round holes 0.0625 (4/64) inch in diameter, 1/8 inch from center to
center, with each row staggered in relation to the adjacent rows.
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(u) 5 sieve . A metal sieve 0.032-inch thick, perforated with rows
of round holes 0.0781 {5/64) inch in diameter, 5/32 inch from center to
center, with each row staggered in relation to the adjacent rows.
(v) 5h sieve . A metal sieve 0.032-inch thick, perforated with rows
of round holes 0. 0859 (5%/64) inch in diameter, 9/64 inch from center to
center, with each row staggered in relation to the adjacent rows.
(w) 6 sieve . A metal sieve 0.032-inch thick, perforated with rows
of round holes 0.0938 (6/64) inch in diameter, 5/32 inch from center to
center, with each row staggered in relation to the adj acent rows
.
( x ) §h s ieve • A metal sieve 0.032-inch thick, perforated with rows
of round holes 0.1016 (6%/64) inch in diameter, 5/32 inch from center to
center with each row staggered in relation to the adjacent rows.
(y) 30 sieve . A woven wire cloth sieve having 0.0234-inch openings,
with a wire diameter of 0.0153-inch, and meeting the specifications of
American Society for Testing and Materials Designation E-ll-61, as set
forth in the Equipment Handbook 2/
.
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPLICATION OF STANDARDS
§ 68.303 Basis of Determination .
All determinations shall be on the basis of the original sample. Mechan-
ical sizing of kernels shall be adjusted by handpicking, as set forth in
the Rice Inspection Handbook 2/, or by any other method which gives
equivalent results
.
§ 68.304 Temporary modifications in equipment and procedures .
The equipment and procedures referenced to in the milled rice standards
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are applicable to rice produced and harvested under normal environmental
conditions. Abnormal environmental conditions during the production and
harvest of rice may require minor temporary modifications in the equip-
ment or procedures to obtain results expected under normal conditions.
When these adjustments are necessary, Federal Grain Inspection Service
Field Offices, official inspection agencies, and interested parties in
the rice industry will be notified promptly in writing of the modification.
These modifications shall not include changes in interpretations of iden-
tity, class, quality, or condition.
§ 68.305 Broken kernels determination .
Broken kernels shall be determined by the use of equipment and procedures
set forth in the Rice Inspectation Handbook 2/ t or by any method which
gives equivalent results
.
§ 68.306 Interpretive line samples .
Interpretive line samples showing the official scoring line for factors
that are determined by visual observation shall be maintained by the
Federal Grain Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and
shall be available for reference in all inspections offices that
inspect and grade rice.
§ 68.307 Milling requirements .
The degree of milling for milled rice; i.e., "well milled," "reasonably
well milled," and "lightly milled" shall be equal to, or better than
that of the interpretive line samples for such rice.
§ 68.308 Moisture .
Water content in milled rice as determined by an approved device in
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accordance with procedures prescribed in the Rice Inspection Handbook
2/. For the purpose of this paragraph, "approved device" shall include
the Motomco Moisture Meter and any other equipment that is approved by
the administrator as giving equivalent results 3/
•
§ 68.309 Percentages .
Percentages shall be determined on the basis of weight and shall be
rounded off as follows:
(a) When the figure to be rounded is followed by a figure greater
than 5, round to the next higher figure; e.g., 0.46, report as 0.5.
(b) When the figure to be rounded is followed by a figure less
than 5, round to the next lowest figure; e.g., 0.54, report as 0.5.
(c) When the figure to be rounded is followed by the figure 5,
round to the nearest even figure; e.g., 0.45, report as 0.4; 0.55,
report as 0.6.
All percentages, except for milling yield, shall be stated in whole
and tenth percent to the nearest tenth percent. Milling yield shall
be stated to the nearest whole percent.
GRADES, GRADE REQUIREMENTS, AND GRADE DESIGNATIONS
For §§§§ 68.310, 68.311, 68.312, and 68.313 see United States Standards
for Rice, revised July 1983, pp 23-26, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
3/ Requests for information concerning approved devices and procedures
,
criteria for approved devices, and requests for approval of devices
should be directed to the Federal Grain Inspection Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 1400 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20250.
217
Federal Grain Inspection Service, Washington, D.C..
§ 68.314 Grade Designations .
(a) The grade designation for all classes of milled rice, except
Mixed Milled Rice, shall include in the following order: (1) The letters
"U.S."; (2) the number of the grade or the words "Sample grade", as
warranted; (3) the words "or better", when applicable and requested by
the applicant prior to inspection; (4) the class ; and (5) each applicable
special grade (see § 68.316).
(b) The grade designation for the class Mixed Milled Rice shall
include, in the following order: (1) The letters "U.S."; (2) the number
of the grade or the words "Sample grade," as warranted; (3) the words
"or better," when applicable and requested by the applicant prior to
inspection; (4) the class ; (5) each applicable special grade (see
§ 68.316); (6) the percentage of whole kernels of each type in the
order of predominance and when applicable; (7) the percentage of broken
kernels of each type in the order of predominance; and (8) the percentage
of seeds and foreign material.
NOTE: Broken kernels other than long grain, in Mixed Milled Rice, shall
be certificated as "medium or short grain".
SPECIAL GRADES, SPECIAL GRADE REQUIREMENTS, SPECIAL GRADE DESIGNATIONS
§ 68.315 Special grade and special grade requirements .
A special grade when applicable, is supplemental to the grade assigned
under § 68.314. Such special grades for milled rice are established and
determined as follows:
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(a) Coated milled rice . Coated milled rice shall be rice which is
coated, in whole or in part, with substances that are safe and suitable
4/ according to commercially accepted practice.
(b) Granulated brewers milled rice . Granulated brewers milled rice
shall be milled rice which has been crushed or granulated so that 95.0
percent or more will pass through a 5 sieve, 70.0 percent or more will
pass through a 4 sieve, and not more than 15.0 percent will pass through
a 2\ sieve.
(c) Parboiled milled rice . Parboiled milled rice shall be milled
rice in which the starch has been gelatinized by soaking, steaming,
and drying. Grades U.S. No. 1 to U.S. No. 6, inclusive, shall contain
not more than 10.0 percent of ungelatinized kernels. Grades U.S. No. 1
and U.S. No. 2 shall contain not more than 0.1 percent, grades U.S. No. 3
and U.S. No. 4 not more than 0.2 percent, and grades U.S. No. 5 and U.S.
No. 6 not more than 0.5 percent of nonparboiled rice. If the rice is:
(1) Not distinctly colored by the parboiling process, it shall be con-
sidered "Parboiled Light"; (2) distinctly but not materially colored by
the parboiled process, it shall be considered "Parboiled"; (3) materially
colored by the parboiled process, it shall be considered "Parboiled Dark".
The color levels for "Parboiled Light", "Parboiled", and "Parboiled Dark"
shall be in accordance with the interpretive line samples for parboiled
4/ Compliance with the provisions of these standards does not excuse
failure to comply with provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, or other Federal Laws. Safe and suitable is defined in
the regulation issued pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act at 21 CFR 130.3(d)
.
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NOTE: The maximum limits for "Chalky kernels", "Heat-damaged kernels",
"Kernels damaged by heat", and the "Color requirements" in § § § § 68.310,
68.311, 68.312, and 68.313 are not applicable to the special grade
"Parboiled milled rice".
(d) Undermilled milled rice . Undermilled milled rice shall be milled
rice which is not equal to the milling requirements for "well milled",
"reasonably well milled", and "lightly milled" rice (see § 68.307).
Grades U.S. No. 1 and U.S. No. 2 shall contain not more than 2.0 percent,
grades U.S. No. 3 and U.S. No. 4 not more than 5.0 percent, grade U.S.
No. 5 not more than 10.0 percent, and grade U.S. No. 6 not more than
15.0 percent of well-milled kernels. Grade U.S. No. 5 shall contain
not more than 10.0 percent of red rice and damaged kernels (singly ot
combined) and in no case more than 6.0 percent of damaged kernels.
NOTE: The "Color and milling requirements" in §§§§ 68.310, 68.311,
68. 312, and 68. 313 are not applicable to the special grade "Undermilled
milled rice"
.
§ 68.316 Special Grade designation .
The grade designation for coated, granulated brewers, parboiled, or
undermilled milled rice shall include, following the class, the word(s)
"Coated", "Granulated", "Parboiled Light", "Parboiled", "Parboiled
Dark", or "Undermilled", as warranted, and all other information as
prescribed in § 68.314.
[These standards are taken from "United States Standards for Rice",
revised July 1983, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Federal Grain
Inspection Service, Washington, D.C.]
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ABSTRACT
The goal of research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) is to get
machines to emulate intelligent human behaviour. Knowledge Engineering,
a sub-field of AI , focuses on the technical issues of acquiring,
representing, and using knowledge in constructing computer programs
that can "reason". This has led to the development of expert systems.
Modeled on human experts, these programs embody knowledge, and use it
to solve real-world problems in specific areas of human activity.
Production rules (or IF-THEN rules) are a popular approach for repre-
senting and manipulating domain knowledge in expert systems. Implemented
in rule-based or production systems, they are natural to human problem
solving strategies.
Human beings are able to reason subjectively, and this ability
must be incorporated in any synthetic model of human reasoning. In
making evaluations, humans tend to weigh and balance the evidence
they receive, and this feature may be assumed to introduce subjectivity.
The present work focuses on the combination of evidence in the
production rule formalism. The premise of a rule, comprised of AND-
connected propositions, is written as a set, and each proposition is
a distinct piece of evidence pointing to the action. Some propositions
are more important than others, and monotonic measures are employed to
hold meta-level information pertaining to the subjective weights of
propositions. The evaluation of the premise, therefore, requires the
combination of truth values of individual propositions with their
relative weights. The Sugeno Integral, a functional defined on a monotonia
measure space, unites these two quantities. The result is a subjectively
weighted premise evaluation that is also monotonic, and has excellent
intuitive justification.
The introduction of monotonic measure theory into the production
rule formalism provides a logical foundation for expressing and coping
with the subjectivity that is the hallmark of human evaluative strategies.
It offers a viable framework, for the representation and treatment of
ignorance. Additionally, the Sugeno Integral is simply an extension of
the conventional minimum operator, and the methodology can be extended
to admit multilevel reasoning. The development of the present methodology
is in keeping with the guidelines of Knowledge Engineering, and the
advantages gain significance when viewed in this light.
The methodology is implemented in a rule-based system for the
classification of long-grain milled rice. Several hundred unclassified
kernels have been evaluated, and satisfactory results have been obtained.
